CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE LEMMENS

1. I agree with the judgment in so far as it concludes that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. However, in my opinion, this issue could be disposed of in a more straightforward way [1] .

2. The applicants allege that the dismissal of their claims amounted to a denial of justice (see paragraph 3 of the judgment). More specifically, they complain about the application of the presumption that one can work only for fourteen hours in a twenty-four-hour shift (see paragraph 44 of the judgment). This presumption was established by the Court of Cassation in decisions of 2006 and 2007 (see paragraph 34 of the judgment). It was indeed applied in the applicants ’ case, with reference to the Court of Cassation ’ s “well-established case-law” (see paragraph 27 of the judgment).

As the majority correctly reiterate, it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law (see paragraph 50 of the judgment; see also, for recent confirmation of this principle, Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC] , no. 17224/11, § 71, 27 June 2017, and Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], no. 931/13, § 144, ECHR 2017 (extracts)). Unless the domestic court ’ s decision is arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable, the Court will not intervene (see paragraph 48 of the judgment). Having regard to the subsidiary nature of the Court ’ s supervisory function, the threshold for arbitrariness or manifest unreasonableness is high (see paragraph 49 of the judgment).

The above-mentioned presumption is part of Turkish domestic law. It is for the domestic courts to determine its scope, and to determine whether or not it applies where individual labour contracts or collective bargaining agreements provide for more than fourteen-hour working periods. I cannot see anything arbitrary or unreasonable in their finding that the presumption, with all its characteristics under the Court of Cassation ’ s case-law, is applicable to the facts of the applicants ’ case.

This should be sufficient, in my opinion, to reject the applicants ’ complaint under Article 6 § 1.

3. The judgment goes on to consider the complaint from the point of view of the obligation for a court to give reasons for its decision and to reply to the parties ’ arguments (see the pri nciples mentioned in paragraphs 47-48).

I wonder whether this is an answer to the complaint actually brought by the applicants. They do not seem to complain about any formal shortcoming in the reasoning of the Court of Cassation: rather, they complain about the substance of that court ’ s reasoning.

Be that as it may, like the majority, I do not to see any irregularity in the reasoning of the courts. First of all, what more should domestic courts say when they hold that a presumption is of a general nature and applies to all cases of working shifts of twenty-four hours? Moreover, the applicants criticise the decision of the Court of Cassation of 28 October 2008 (see paragraph 27 of the judgment), but they lose sight of the fact that their case was subsequently heard again by the Ä°zmir Labour Court, which in its judgment of 28 December 2009 gave its own reasons for the dismissal of their claims (see paragraph 28 of the judgment).

4. In sum, the complaint brought by t he applicants under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is of a “fourth-instance” nature, and it is not for the Court to deal with such a complaint (see, among other authorities, Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no. 76943/11, § 90, ECHR 2016 (extracts), and De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395/09, § 170, ECHR 2017 (extracts)). The complaint does not need long explanations to justify its dismissal.

Of course, it is open to the applicants to complain about the content of Turkish law, in particular about the presumption applied in their case. But this is then not a complaint about a violation of Article 6 § 1, a provision which guarantees a fair procedure.

Actually, the applicants do complain about violations of provisions of the Convention guaranteeing substantive rights, namely Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 4 of the Convention. However, these complaints are rejected (see paragraphs 55-69 of the judgment), for reasons with which I fully agree.

5. I would like to conclude by observing that the Court does not seem to be the most appropriate forum for addressing the applicants ’ complaints.

The substance of their complaints is that the presumption applied in their case leads to excessive working hours and prevents them from receiving a fair remuneration. These are issues that touch upon the right to just conditions of work and the right to a fair remuneration, guaranteed respectively by Articles 2 and 4 of the Revised European Social Charter (see paragraph 37 of the judgment). Turkey ratified the Revised European Social Charter and agreed to be bound by, among other provisions, Article 2 § 1, dealing with reasonable working hours, and Article 4 § 2, dealing with remuneration for overtime work (see paragraph 38 of the judgment).

It seems to me that this is therefore a matter that might better be raised with the European Committee of Social Rights.