CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KARAKAÅž

I agree that there has been a procedural violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. However, as the central reason for finding a violation relates to the length of proceedings before the IPC (pending for almost ten years), I think that an examination under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention would have been more appropriate.

I think that Article 6 § 1 is applicable to the proceedings before the IPC (moreover, the parties did not contest this).

There is no doubt that there was a dispute before the IPC concerning the applicant ’ s property claim. Such a dispute was for the IPC to decide at first instance followed, if necessary, by the High Administrative Court at second instance (see Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (dec.) [GC], nos. 46113/99 and 7 others, §§ 35-37, ECHR 2010, citing sections 4 and 9 of Law no. 67/2005). So the applicant was obliged to obtain a ruling from the IPC in order to bring a case before the “TRNC” High Administrative Court, which is a body integrated into the domestic system of courts (see Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, §§ 90-102 and 236, ECHR 2001 ‑ IV , and Demopoulos and Others , cited above, §§ 92-98).

These considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that − for the purpose of the applicant ’ s length-of- proceedings complaint – Article 6 § 1 is applicable to the proceedings before the IPC (see, for instance, Janssen v. Germany , no. 23959/94, § 40, 20 December 2001, and Božić v. Croatia , no. 22457/02, § 26, 29 June 2006). This is true irrespective of the fact that the case has not yet been examined by the “TRNC” High Administrative Court, as the IPC has failed to adopt its decision over a prolonged period of time (compare Bici v. Albania , no. 5250/07, §§ 28 and 41-45, 3 December 2015). Indeed, the Court cannot overlook the length of proceedings before the IPC, as to do so would make the applicability of the reasonable-time guarantee under Article 6 § 1 wholly dependent on the IPC ’ s conduct and allow it to drag the proceedings on for years without them reaching the stage of the “TRNC” High Administrative Court, before which Article 6 § 1 would undoubtedly apply.

In view of this, it is clear that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is applicable to the applicant ’ s complaint concerning the length of proceedings before the IPC.

On the merits, it is clear that the applicant failed to duly submit some of the relevant documents in support of her application before the IPC and that she provided some of the documents only two years later. However, in any case, the period of more than nine and a half years during which the proceedings have been pending before the IPC cannot be explained by the applicant ’ s conduct alone.

I agree that the protracted length of the proceedings in this case was due chiefly to the IPC ’ s manner of proceeding. Much of it could have been avoided if the IPC had, from the outset, tried to identify the controversial points and gather evidence in relation to them in a more efficient manner (see Rule 7(1) of the IPC Rules, cited in paragraph 43 of the judgment). However, it failed to do so and thereby allowed the proceedings to drag on over a significant number of years without a final resolution of the case being reached.

In sum, the length of the proceedings complained of is far from satisfying the reasonable-time requirement.

In the judgment the Court emphasises that the violation found does not call into question the effectiveness of the IPC remedy as such (see paragraphs 86-87 and 106 of the judgment).

As a result, having regard to the procedural nature of the violation found under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, relating to the IPC ’ s lack of coherence, diligence and appropriate expedition concerning the applicant ’ s compensation claim (see paragraph 104 of the judgment), the Court considers that it is not necessary to award any amount in respect of pecuniary damage. It takes the view that, as regards pecuniary damage, the proceedings before the IPC would still allow the applicant to obtain compensation for her property claim (see paragraph 116 of the judgment). For this reason the Court awards only non-pecuniary damage.

In view of the fact that the applicant ’ s property claim is still pending before the IPC, I find that her complaint concerning the length of proceedings should have been examined under Article 6 § 1 and that the remaining complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 should have been rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.