CASE OF BARABANOV v. RUSSIADISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DEDOV
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Document date: January 30, 2018
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DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DEDOV
I regret that I cannot join the majority in finding a violation of Article 11 of the Convention. I believe that violent behaviour should not be protected by the Convention. According to the general principles, “where demonstrators do not engage in acts of violence it is important for the public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings” (see Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC] , no. 37553/05, § 150, ECHR 2015). This principle is based on the very important condition that demonstrators should not engage in acts of violence. The very fact of violence, regardless of the consequences, contradicts the spirit of peaceful assembly.
In the present case the applicant was involved in violent actions such as throwing stones, flagpoles or pieces of asphalt towards the police officers. The majority, although recognising that the applicant ’ s behaviour was violent, based their conclusion on the disproportionate nature of the criminal sanction, taking into account the incidental involvement of the applicant in the clashes and the absence of serious consequences for the health and life of the police officers. I personally agree that the sanction was disproportionate; however, the severity of the sanction relates mainly to the criminal policy of the State, and not to the freedom of peaceful assembly. The applicant was convicted for the violence and participation in the mass disorder, and not for participation in the demonstration itself. Although the applicant was not regarded as one of the individuals responsible for the disruption of the gathering or prompting the use of force by the police, the applicant later joined in and contributed to the mass disorder.
The proportionality of the sanction does matter if ideas are expressed without violence or force, albeit involving some degree of disturbance of public order. Recently the issue was examined by the Grand Chamber in the case of Kudrevičius and Others , cited above. In the case of Taranenko v. Russia (no. 19554/05, §§ 82-91, 15 May 2014) the Court produced an analysis of its case-law and formulated the principle that participants in a demonstration which results in damage or other disorder, but who do not themselves commit any violent or otherwise reprehensible acts, cannot be prosecuted solely on the ground of their participation in the demonstration. In that case the applicant had joined a group who intruded into the reception area of the President ’ s Administration building in Moscow and occupied one of the offices in order to distribute political leaflets through the windows to passers-by. The occupation of the administration ’ s premises was therefore an integral part of the expression of ideas in the form of a direct action. The participants pushed aside the guard who attempted to stop them. Similarly, in one of the “Bolotnaya” cases (see Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia , nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, 4 October 2016) the applicant threw an unidentified yellow object during clashes with the police, but causing no lasting harm to the health of a police officer. The Court did not characterise either action as violent and evaluated the proportionality of the sanction accordingly. Indeed, in the absence of violence the sanction imposed should not dissuade the person concerned from imparting information or ideas. However, the present case is completely different.