CASE OF POJATINA v. CROATIACONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KOSKELO
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Document date: October 4, 2018
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CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KOSKELO
1 . I agree with my colleagues that there has been no violation of Article 8 in the present case. In the judgment, the complaint is analysed from the point of view of the State ’ s negative obligations. Thus, the impugned domestic measures are characterised as an interference with the applicant ’ s rights under Article 8. Although this approach is in line with the position taken by the Grand Chamber in Dubská and Krejzová v. the Czech Republic ( [GC], nos. 28859/11 and 28473/12, §§ 164-65, 15 November 2016), I would nevertheless like to express my reservations about it, especially as the Grand Chamber judgment on this point appears quite thinly reasoned.
2 . The Court has accepted that Article 8 cannot be interpreted as conferring a right to give birth at home (see Dubská and Krejzová , cited above, § 163). At the same time, the choice of the place of birth is said to fall within the scope of the woman ’ s private life, and the impugned measures are characterised as an interference with the woman ’ s “right” to avail herself of the assistance of midwives when giving birth at home. Thus, the State is seen as “interfering” with the woman ’ s private life by limiting what is perceived as her inherent “right” of choice through a denial of professional assistance for home births. I find this line of thinking problematic, especially as there is more at stake than self-determination for the woman who will be giving birth, namely the health and safety of the baby about to be born, the latter being unable to attend to his or her own interests.
3 . It suffices here to refer to the World Health Organization, according to which a properly attended home birth does require a few essential preparations. Transport facilities to a referral centre must be available if needed. In practical terms this means that community participation and revolving funds are necessary to enable transport to be arranged for emergencies in areas where transportation is a problem. If birth does take place at home, contingency plans for access to a properly-staffed referral centre should form part of the antenatal preparations (see WHO/FRH/MSM/96.24).
4 . Thus, the issue of home births is not one where the State could, responsibly, adopt a policy of laissez-faire . Nor is it merely a matter of regulation, but one of putting in place an adequate infrastructure and, consequently, of providing the budgetary resources necessary for implementing the requirements referred to above.
5 . With the above in mind, I would find it appropriate to examine a complaint such as the present one from the point of view of the State ’ s positive obligations.
6 . Furthermore, given that the adoption of policies in this field will have to reconcile the interests at stake, in circumstances where the framework conditions and available possibilities vary and where decisions must depend on the setting of priorities among various competing needs in health and social policies, States must enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. In this regard, I have no difficulty in agreeing with the Court ’ s position in Dubská and Krejzová and in the present case.
7 . In the light of the submissions put forward in this case, I see no grounds for finding a violation of Article 8.