JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES KELLER AND Serghides

1 . We respectfully disagree with the majority ’ s conclusion that there is no need to review the applicant ’ s claim under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. While we agree with the Court ’ s finding that the applicant ’ s Article 8 right has been violated, we cannot accept that such finding makes it unnecessary to examine a potential violation of Article 6 § 1.

2 . The applicant ’ s claim that he had sustained a violation of his right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 is distinct from the interference with his right to respect for his honour and reputation under Article 8 of the Convention. Under Article 6 § 1, the applicant complained that he did not have an adequate opportunity to address the allegations of harassment in the workplace made exclusively against him during the proceedings in the High Court of Justice of Castilla-León. Following those proceedings, in which the applicant was not allowed to take part, the High Court of Justice issued a judgment which included the applicant ’ s identity and described his conduct as amounting to repeated psychological harassment. The applicant argued that this judgment was an unjustified interference with his right to respect for his honour and reputation as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. Thus, the two complaints, although related, are separate: one, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, relates to his right to participate in the proceedings, while, the other, under Article 8 of the Convention, concerns the harm caused by the inclusion of his name in the judgment (see paragraph 28 of the judgment).

3 . In other words, these two claims may be adjudicated with entirely different outcomes. For instance, the finding that the High Court of Justice did not adequately and sufficiently protect the applicant ’ s right to respect for his private life in drafting its judgment does not necessarily mean that the refusal to grant party status to the applicant failed to proportionately pursue a legitimate aim. Similarly, finding a violation of the right to access to court would not inevitably lead to the proposed finding that the disclosure of the applicant ’ s identity in the judgment violated his right to respect for his private life.

4 . Indeed, the Court ’ s own questions communicated to the parties on 10 February 2015 had made a clear distinction between the two claims:

1. Did the failure to summon the applicant, as a concerned party with interests at stake, to the adversarial administrative proceedings before the High Court of Justice of Castilla -Leon breach the applicant ’ s right to access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of Convention? (See Cañete de Goñi v. Spain , no. 55782/00, ECHR 2002 VIII).

2. Did the national courts, in particular the High Court of Justice of Castilla -Leon, take all the necessary and appropriate measures that could reasonably be expected of them to ensure that the decision taken would not affect the applicant ’ s honour and reputation under Article 8 in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention?

5 . Considering that the Court had thus acknowledged to the parties that there was a difference between the nature of the two claims, it would have been advisable to fully address both issues in the judgment.

6 . Moreover, the Government ’ s submission in the case highlights that the Spanish law on administrative proceedings narrowly restricts those who may become parties to such proceedings. Yet it is unclear whether such strict limitations to party status are compatible with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Given that the relevant law had been brought to the Court ’ s attention, this would have been an opportune time to provide guidance on the compatibility of such a regulation with the Government ’ s obligations under Article 6 § 1.