PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LEMMENS

1. To my regret, I am unable to follow the majority in their conclusion that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. My disagreement has to do with a different approach to the obligation for courts to give reasons for their decisions.

The majority limit themselves to examining whether reasons were given and, if so, whether the reasons were or were not based on a manifest factual or legal error (see paragraph 70 of the judgment). They conclude that the domestic courts ’ reasoning “did not reach the threshold of arbitrariness or manifest unreasonableness ... or amount to a den ial of justice” (see paragraph 71 of the judgment). I do not question that finding, but consider that it provides an insufficient basis in the present case for concluding that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1.

2. The obligation to give reasons does not consist only of an obligation to state the reasons which have led the court to decide as it does. It also comprises an obligation to give a reply to the arguments of the parties. Without requiring a detailed answer to every argument advanced by them, this obligation presupposes that they can expect to receive a specific and explicit reply to the arguments which, if accepted, would be decisive for the outcome of the proceedings (see, among other authorities, Ruiz Torija v. Spain , 9 December 1994, §§ 29-30, Series A no. 303 ‑ A; Hiro Balani v. Spain , 9 December 1994, §§ 27-28, Series A no. 303 ‑ B; MugoÅ¡a v. Montenegro , no. 76522/12 , § 60, 21 June 2016; and Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC] , no. 19867/12, § 84, 11 July 2017). By fulfilling that obligation, the court shows to the parties that they have been heard (see, among other authorities, Suominen v. Finland , no. 37801/97, § 37, 1 July 2003, and Tatishvili v. Russia , no. 1509/02, § 58, ECHR 2007 ‑ I).

3. Turning to the present case, in the proceedings brought by the first applicant against his dismissal the Diyarbakır Administrative Court rejected the appeal on the basis of very brief reasoning, consisting of one page. It found it established “that the applicant committed the disciplinary offence in so far as he gave the organisation his profile and attended its lessons and meetings” (see paragraph 24 of the judgment).

However, at no point in the disciplinary proceedings (including the judicial-review proceedings), or in the criminal proceedings for that matter, was there a definite finding that the applicant had actually given his profile to the organisation or that he had attended its lessons and meetings. In fact, the applicant had argued that the information as written in the profile contained spelling mistakes, discrepancies and inaccurate information which demonstrated that it had been prepared by someone else without his knowledge. The applicant had, moreover, submitted that the disciplinary investigation file contained no objective assessment of whether he had engaged in ideologically or politically motivated behaviour at the workplace

so as to disrupt the peace, tranquillity and working order of the school (see paragraph 17 of the judgment).

In these circumstances, and also taking into account what was at stake for the applicant, the Diyarbakır Administrative Court was not entitled to limit itself to referring in a very general way to the case file and the investigation report (see paragraph 24 of the judgment). Having regard to the applicant ’ s explicit denial of the facts with which he was charged, the obligation to give reasons required the court to refer to factual elements that supported its conclusion that the applicant had himself given his profile to the organisation and that he had attended its lessons and meetings, or that he had displayed blameworthy conduct at the workplace. By not doing so, the court did not make clear why it did not accept the applicant ’ s arguments.

The failure by the Diyarbakır Administrative Court to reply to the applicant ’ s arguments was not corrected by the Supreme Administrative Court, which did not give any further reasons (see paragraphs 26 and 28 of the judgment).

4. As no answer was given to the applicant ’ s arguments, there has in my opinion been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.