JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES KELLER AND DEDOV

1. Even though we voted with the majority in favour of a finding of no violation of A rticle 14 of the Convention, we must respect f u lly express our disagreement as regards the application of A rticle 8 in the present case . Indeed , since the applicants ’ complaint was primarily of a pecuniary nature , we consider that it does not fall within the scope of A rticle 8 .

2. The present case concerns the refusal by the Swiss invalidity insurance fund to maintain the extraordinary invalidity pension and disability allowance ( Hilflosenentschädigung ) in respect of the first applic ant following her change of address and place of ordinary residence. The reason for this is that under Swiss law , beneficiaries of an extraordinary invalidity pension and disability allo wance must have their private address and ordinary residence in Switzerland . Before the Court, the applicants alleged a violation of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 8, on the grounds that the decisive criterion for the first applicant ’ s entitlement to the impugned benefits, that is so say ordinary residence in Switzerland, was the discriminatory one of the type of disability suffered by the applicant – having been disabled since birth – because persons who had become disabled and been able to contribute were entitled to the benefits even if they lived abroad.

3. We consider that the applicants ’ complaint concerning social security benefits is pure ly pecuniary in nature . In line with the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Keller, Spano and Kjølbro in Di Trizio v . Switzerland (n o. 7186/09), we consider that A rticle 8 is not applicable in the instant case . Only A rticle 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention concerns pecuniary rights such as the right to a social welfare benefit . The Court has had recourse to A rticle 1 of Protocol No. 1 and no t to A rticle 8 of the Convention in most case concerning the granting of social security benefits ( see , fo r example , Moskal v. Poland , n o. 10373/05, §§ 93 et s eq. , 15 September 2009 ; Stec and Others v . the Uni ted Kingdom [GC], n os. 65731/01 and 65900/01, § 53, E CH R 2006 ‑ VI ; Koua Poirrez v . France , n o. 40892/98, §§ 43 et s eq. , E CH R 2003 ‑ X ; Kjartan Ásmundsson v . Iceland , n o. 60669/00, §§ 39 et s eq. , E CH R 2004 ‑ IX ; and Wieczorek v. Poland , n o. 18176/05, §§ 56 et s eq. , 8 December 2009). Switzerland has not ratified Protocol No. 1. Consequently , that case-law cannot be appli ed in the present case.

4. As in di Trizio ( cited above , § 62), in paragraph 66 of the present judgment the Court states that it “ considers that the refusal to pay the pension abroad was liable to affect the organisation of the applicants ’ family life ” . This i s not the first time the Court has assessed a social benefits under A rticle 8 of the Convention, as the majority mentioned in paragraphs 61 et s eq. o f the Di Trizio judgment ( with particular reference , as regards a parental leave allowance , to Petrovic v . Austria , 27 March 1998, § 27, Re port on Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ II, and Konstantin Markin v . Russia [GC], n o. 30078/06, § 130, E CH R 2012 ( extracts ) and , as regards a large- famil y allowance, to Dhahbi v . Italy , n o. 17120/09, § 41, 8 April 2014). However , as pointed out by the diss ent ing judges in di Trizio , the Court “ omit[s] to establish the relevant principles for determining the scope of application of Article 8 ” .

5. The Court ’ s reasoning in Di Trizio and in the present case impli es that A rticle 8 i s applicable in all cas es where a social security benefit impact s on the person ’ s family ( or private) life . The fact is that a social benefit is always lia ble to impact on the enjoyment or organisation of an individual ’ s family lif e. That reasoning also unjustifiably broadens the scope of A rticle 8 , potentially bring ing any social- security or labour-law issue within the ambit of that provision . That would be contrary to the Court ’ s established case-law to the effect that such issues must be assessed under A rticle 1 of Protocol No. 1 and not A rticle 8 of the Convention.

6. Furthermore , in the instant case, as in Di Trizio , the majority failed to check whether there was a close link between the social benefit in issue and the enjoyment of family lif e. In the cases which we cit e in paragraph 4 above , where the Court found that various benefits fell within the scope of A rticle 8 of the Convention, th e close link was based on the aim of the social benefits . In the present case , as stated by the Federal Court ( see paragraph 15 of the judgment ) and the Government ( see paragraph 49 of the judgment ), th e purpose of the extraordinary invalidity pension and the disability allo wance is not to facilit at e family lif e. As the Government and the Federal Court explained , “ they were designed to allow adult beneficiaries to lead an autonomous, independent life ” ( paragraph 49) and “ are paid regardless of the beneficiaries ’ lifestyle, that is, irrespective of whether they live alone, with family or in an institution ” ( paragraph 15). Consequently , we cannot subscribe to the Court ’ s position as set out in paragraph 66 to the effect that the refusal to pay the pension abroad was liable to affect the organisation of the applicants ’ family life .

7. The Court should not extend the scope of A rticle 8 of the Convention to the point of duplicating A rticle 1 of Protocol No. 1. If a country – such as Switzerland – has not ratified Protocol No. 1, i t should not be held responsible for violating that Protocol by dint of the – unjustified – application of other Convention articles . Th e principle that a S tate cannot be held responsible on the basi s of a Protocol which it has not ratified through the intermediary of another provision of the Convention is established in the case-law of the Court . As regards A rticle 2 of Protocol No. 4, fo r example , in the judgment in the case of Austin and Others v . the Uni ted Kingdom , the Grand Chamber pointed out that “ Article 5 should not, in principle, be interpreted in such a way as to incorporate the requirements of Protocol No. 4 in respect of States which have not ratified it, including the United Kingdom ” ( see Austin and Others v . the Uni ted Kingdom [GC], n o. 39692/09, 40713/09 and 41008/09, § 55, E CH R 2012). Previously , the Court had already used the sa me reasoning vis-à-vis Protocol No. 12, o r vis-à-vis A rticle 14 of the Convention , to reiterate that that provision does not set out any independent general ban on discrimination ( see Sahin v . Germany [GC], n o. 30943/96, § 85, E CH R 2003 ‑ VIII), or again vis-à-vis the guarantees of A rticle 1 of Protocol No. 7 , to find the inapplicability of A rticle 6 to expulsion procedures ( see Maaouia v . France [GC], n o. 39652/98, § 36, E CH R 2000-X).

8. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, we consider that the Court should have found that A rticle 8 was not applicable in the present case owing to the pecuniary nature of the complaint, or at least that it should have left the question of the applicability of A rticle 8 open . The Court should also have affirmed that pecuniary complaints should rather be considered under A rticle 1 of Protocol No. 1. Moreover, having regard to the fact that Switzerland has not ratified Protocol No. 1, the Court ought to have declared inadmissible the complaint under Article 8 for incompatibility ratione materiae with the Convention, pursuant to Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.