JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES DE GAETANO AND VEHABOVI Ć

1. We regret that we cannot share the view of the majority in this case that that there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.

2. In the instant case the applicant ’ s criticism was directed at M.I.-I., a candidate in parliamentary elections for a national political party. M.I.-I. was thus, to all intents and purposes, a politician in respect of whom the limits of acceptable criticism are wider than in the case of a private individual (see Lingens v. Austria , 8 July 1986, § 42, Series A no. 103, and Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], no. 931/13, § 180, 27 June 2017). By standing in the parliamentary elections, M.I.-I. entered the political arena and inevitably and knowingly laid himself open to close scrutiny – scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large. For these reasons, he was required to display a greater degree of tolerance (see, among the most recent authorities, Genner v. Austria , no. 55495/08, § 35, 12 January 2016).

3 . The applicant was punished for his statements, in particular his utterance of the idea that M.I.-I. was an “impostor”, a person who was ready to accept any compromise and betray his electors for financial advantage. According to the Cluj-Napoca Court of First Instance, those statements had harmed M.I.-I. ’ s reputation and dignity and should not have been made public via the media, especially because they referred to private matters (see paragraph 10 of the judgment). Furthermore, the court took into consideration the harmful effect that the distribution by third parties of electoral leaflets, reproducing the content of the applicant ’ s article, had had on M.I.-I. ’ s reputation (see paragraph 11). However – and this is crucial for our dissent – the domestic courts failed, in our view, to undertake a balancing exercise between M. I.-I. ’ s reputation and the applicant ’ s freedom of expression in conformity with the criteria laid down in the Court ’ s case-law. They also attached no particular relevance to the overall context of the text.

4. The general aim of the applicant ’ s article was to draw voters ’ attention to the question of M.I.-I. ’ s suitability to be a candidate for national public office. The statements in the article therefore concerned a matter of public interest for the local community, even if some of them might appear harsh or far-fetched. As a general rule, the Court considers that opinions and information pertinent to elections which are disseminated during an electoral campaign should be considered as forming part of a debate on questions of public interest, unless proof to the contrary is offered. According to the Court ’ s case-law, in respect of matters of public interest restrictions on freedom of expression should be interpreted narrowly (see, by way of example, Kość v. Poland , no. 34598/12, § 38, 1 June 2017).

5. Furthermore, we are of the view that the domestic courts did not clearly assess whether the contested statements were value judgments and, if they were, whether there was a sufficient “factual basis” for them (see, for example, Morice v. France [GC], no. 29369/10, §§ 155-157, ECHR 2015). While it is true that some of the applicant ’ s statements, such as those concerning M.I.-I. ’ s alleged imposture and propensity to make immoral compromises, could be considered statements which lacked a sufficient factual basis, the thrust of the applicant ’ s article was to cast doubt on the suitability of a local politician for public office. Admittedly, the applicant ’ s article and, in particular, the expressions used, could be considered as polemical, involving at least a certain degree of exaggeration. The Court, however, has stated that persons taking part in a public debate on a matter of general concern are allowed to have recourse to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation, or in other words to make somewhat immoderate statements (see, mutatis mutandis , Do Carmo de Portugal e Castro Câmara v. Portugal , no. 53139/11, § 43, 4 October 2016), and the instant case is about exactly that. We are of the view that the said expressions do not amount to a gratuitous personal attack because the author supported them with an objective explanation, namely the existence, at the time of the article, of an actual commercial dispute before the Arbitration Tribunal concerning M.I.-I. ’ s alleged refusal to repay a loan (see paragraph 10 of the judgment). Moreover, the Court has also held that in the field of political debate, political invective often spills over into the personal sphere; such are the hazards of politics and the free debate of ideas, which are the guarantees of a democratic society (see, among the most recent authorities, Lykin v. Ukraine , no. 19382/08, § 29, 12 January 2017).

6. In the light of all this, and in the absence of any pertinent reasoning provided by the domestic courts in line with the Court ’ s case-law, we cannot consider that the applicant acted in bad faith.

7. The applicant was, moreover, ordered to pay damages to the tune of EUR 5,000 (see paragraph 16 of the judgment). The Court has repeatedly noted the chilling effect that a fear of sanction has on the exercise of freedom of expression. Although the applicant has not shown what his financial situation was at the time and whether or not he struggled to pay that amount, we are of the view that, in the circumstances, the sanction imposed was capable of having a “chilling”, dissuasive effect on the applicant ’ s exercise of his right to freedom of expression (see, for instance, Lombardo and Others v. Malta , no. 7333/06, § 61, 24 April 2007, and Ghiulfer Predescu v. Romania , no. 29751/09, § 61, 27 June 2017).

8. To sum up, we are of the view that the domestic courts failed to strike a fair balance between the relevant interests and to establish a “pressing social need” for putting the protection of M.I. - I. ’ s reputation protected by Article 8 of the Convention above the applicant ’ s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention, and this in the context of political repartee. We therefore ineluctably conclude that the interference with the applicant ’ s right to freedom of expression was not “necessary in a democratic society”, and that there has accordin gly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.