PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LEMMENS

1 . I agree with most of the judgment. I respectfully dissent, however, on two issues.

The first issue relates to the exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicants Kaziks , Tarasovski and Savva. On this point I have joined Judges Spano and Kj ø lbro in a joint partly dissenting opinion.

The second issue relates to the Article 13 complaint of the applicants Nikitin , Villems and Tarasovski (see paragraphs 212-18 of the judgment). To my regret, I cannot agree with the majority ’ s conclusion that there has been no violation of Article 13. The present separate opinion deals with that issue.

2 . Article 13 of the Convention requires the availability of a domestic remedy allowing the competent national authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant “appropriate relief ” (see, among many other authorities, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 268, 15 December 2016, and De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395/09, § 179, 23 February 2017). Where a violation is found, the victim has a right to reparation, and what is more, the relief must be “appropriate”.

I therefore wonder whether it is entirely correct to suggest that the remedy required under Article 13 is “simply” a remedy before an authority “competent to examine the merits of a complaint” (see paragraph 216 of the judgment). The majority refer to Šidlová v. Slovakia (no. 50224/99, § 77, 26 September 2006); there are other cases in which such a statement has been made by the Court, but the wording does not belong to the standard formula followed in, e.g., Grand Chamber cases. The formula used by the majority seems to overlook the “relief” aspect of Article 13.

It is of course true that the “effectiveness” of a “remedy” does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant (see Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, § 88, ECHR 2000 ‑ II, and KudÅ‚a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 157, ECHR 2000 ‑ XI, and as a more recent authority, Khlaifia , cited above, § 268). But this is not the point.

3 . When the remedy is of a compensatory nature, the amount of compensation that can be awarded, or that has been awarded where the applicant has actually made use of the remedy, is relevant in order to assess its effectiveness.

I agree with the majority that “the fact that the applicants ’ claims were granted only partially is not in itself sufficient to render the remedy ineffective” (see paragraphs 216-17 of the judgment, referring to Artur Ivanov v. Russia , no. 62798/09, § 40, 5 June 2018 and, mutatis mutandis , Zarb v. Malta , no. 16631/04, § 51, 4 July 2006). But it seems to me that an issue of effectiveness of the remedy arises where the amount is “derisory” (see Wainwright v. the United Kingdom , no. 12350/04, § 55, ECHR 2006 ‑ X ( a contrario )), (wholly) “inadequate” (see Slavcho Kostov v. Bulgaria , no. 28674/03, § 64, 27 November 2008), or “unreasonably low” (as claimed by the applicant in the present case - see paragraph 212 of the judgment; see Sabev v. Bulgaria , no. 27887/06, §§ 92 and 102, 28 May 2013 ).

In order to assess whether the amount awarded at the domestic level is simply low or whether it is unreasonably low, it may be useful to compare that amount to the amounts the Court normally awards in comparable cases.

Again, the mere fact that the compensation awarded to an applicant at the domestic level does not correspond to the amounts awarded by the Court in comparable cases does not render the remedy ineffective (see, among other authorities, RiÅ¡ková v. Slovakia , no. 58174/00, § 100, 22 August 2006; Jakupović v. Croatia , no. 12419/04, § 28, 31 July 2007; Wasserman v. Russia (no. 2) , no. 21071/05, § 48, 10 April 2008; Kaić and Others v. Croatia , no. 22014/04, § 39, 17 July 2008). But the situation is different when the compensation awarded is “unreasonably” or “disproportionately” lower than the amounts awarded by the Court (see, among other authorities, Wasserman v. Russia (no. 2) , no. 21071/05, § 56, 10 April 2008; Burdov v. Russia (no. 2) , no. 33509/04, §§ 99 and 115, ECHR 2009; Ananyev and Others v. Russia , nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, § 117, 10 January 2012; Liseytseva and Maslov v. Russia , nos. 39483/05 and 40527/10, § 158, 9 October 2014; Rutkowski and Others v. Poland , nos. 72287/10 and 2 others, §§ 175 and 182-83, 7 July 2015; Valada Matos das Neves v. Portugal , no. 73798/13, §§ 73 and 99, 29 October 2015 ( a contrario ); in the same sense, with respect to the assessment of whether the amount awarded at the domestic level is sufficient to deprive an applicant of his or her victim status, see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 206 and 214-15, ECHR 2006 ‑ V).

4 . In the present case, no comparison has been made between the amounts awarded by the domestic courts and those that the Court normally awards in comparable cases. While the amounts awarded are, in my opinion, definitely low, I cannot conclude from the reasons given by the majority whether they are unreasonably or disproportionately lower than those normally awarded by the Court. In these circumstances, I am unable to conclude that the remedies used by the applicants Nikitin , Villems and Tarasovski were actually effective.

[1] . Judge Lemmens also disagrees with the conclusion that there has been no violation of Article 13 with respect to Mr Nikitin’s , Mr Villems ’ and Mr Tarasovski’s complaints (see his separate opinion on this issue).