CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE LEMMENS

1. I fully agree with the conclusion that there has been a violation of Articles 6 § 1 and 10 of the Convention.

I have, however, some reservations concerning the reasoning adopted by the majority in order to arrive at its conclusion under Article 10. While the majority ’ s reasoning with respect to the justification of the interference with the applicants ’ right to freedom of expression is developed entirely under the heading “prescribed by law”, it seems to me that at least part of that reasoning does not relate to the “law” in question, but rather to the application of the law in the specific case of the applicants.

2. I agree with the majority that the provisions of the Suppression of Extremism Act enumerating activities deemed extremist (section 1) and determining the conditions for the issuance of a warning or a caution (sections 6 and 7) are not foreseeable in their application (see paragraphs 78-92).

On this point, like the majority, I fully concur with the conclusions of the Venice Commission (see its opinion no. 660/2011 of 15-16 June 2012, in particular § § 74-77, quoted in paragraph 46 of the judgment).

3. I also agree with the majority that the picture of domestic law would not be complete if no attention were paid to the existing system of judicial review of measures taken under the Suppression of Extremism Act. A system of robust review could indeed have the effect of containing the application of the Act within limits that are permissible under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.

I agree with the majority that for cases like those of the applicants the scope of judicial review is not sufficiently broad to allow for such a correction (see paragraphs 94-105 of the judgment).

4. The domestic legal system, including in particular the Suppression of Extremism Act and Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, thus does not offer demonstrators in a situation like that of the applicants sufficient protection against arbitrary interferences with their freedom of expression.

This is sufficient for me to conclude that the interferences in question were not “prescribed by law” and thus violated Article 10 of the Convention.

5. The majority do not stop there, as they additionally examine “the applicants ’ case” (see paragraphs 98-106 of the judgment). They do so in order to “further highlight the general deficiencies of the regulatory framework” (see paragraph 98 of the judgment).

It seems to me that the majority are in reality arguing that the measures taken by the prosecutor did not comply with the conditions set by the Suppression of Extremism Act. The majority explain that it was not clear that the applicants were “planning” any (extremist) activity (see paragraphs 100-01 of the judgment), that the risk of any violence with which such activity might be combined was not substantiated (see paragraph 102 of the judgment), and that it was unclear which public authorities ’ activities might be obstructed (ibid.).

Unless formulated as an alternative argument (which does not seem to be the case), such an argument presupposes that the legal basis is a valid one under the Convention. Indeed, it does not make much sense to examine the compatibility of certain enforcement measures with an Act that itself is not compatible with the Convention. I am afraid that the arguments of the majority do not strengthen their reasoning in relation to the legislative framework, but rather weaken it. It is as if everything would be fine if only the prosecutor had refrained from taking measures that did not fit within the Suppression of Extremism Act.

This detracts from the central message, namely that the Suppression of Extremism Acts needs to be amended in order to make it Convention ‑ compliant. I consider it useful to emphasise this message.