DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE CASADEVALL

( Translation )

1. The majority of the Grand Chamber found no violation in the present case. I regret that I am unable to agree.

2. Certainly the case is not a very serious one. However, the context in which the incident took place and the judgment at first instance of 29 April 1993 in which the Zduńska Wola District Court sentenced the applicant, for an act of hooliganism, to eight months’ imprisonment, suspended, and a fine (which judgment was quashed on 29 September 1993 by the Regional Court) reveal a rather disturbing state of mind.

3. In my opinion, the Court should have adopted a rather more balanced approach to its assessment of the facts, taking into account the applicant’s spontaneous reaction to the municipal guards’ arbitrary and unjustified intervention, the fact that he was right from the legal point of view [7] and the nature of the words spoken to the public officials on the spur of the moment. I do not approve of terms such as “oafs” or “dumb”, but I consider, like the majority of the Commission, that the applicant, in the very special circumstances of the case, did not overstep the limits of acceptable criticism of the municipal guards. They, being responsible for maintaining public order, had a duty to act in accordance with the law.

4. The Government’s argument concerning the objective nature of the offence as defined in Article 236 of the Polish Criminal Code (which made it a kind of strict-liability offence) is not acceptable. They asserted that in order to establish whether the offence of insult has been committed “ it is irrelevant ... whether a civil servant was substantively right or wrong in undertaking a specific action within his official duties ” [8] . In the Oberschlick case, with regard to use of the word “idiot” ( Trottel ) in an article published by a journalist in the magazine Forum to describe a politician, the Austrian court held that, as the word itself was insulting, its mere use was enough to justify the conviction. The Court disagreed, observing:

“[The Court] wishes to point out in this connection that the judicial decisions challenged before it must be considered in the light of the case as a whole, including the applicant’s article and the circumstances in which it was written.” [9]

The same analysis is required in the present case, namely an assessment of the words spoken by Mr Janowski in the conditions and circumstances of the incident with the municipal guards.

5. No one has denied that the applicant’s conviction constituted interference with the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. Thus, as Mr Janowski was eventually convicted of insulting civil servants, an offence under the Criminal Code [10] , the interference was “prescribed by law” and was aimed at preventing disorder or protecting the rights of others, but it remains to be seen whether it was really necessary in a democratic society.

As stated in paragraph 33 of the judgment, civil servants must enjoy public confidence in conditions free of undue perturbation if they are to be successful in performing their tasks and it may prove necessary to protect them from offensive verbal attacks when on duty. That is quite right. But it is still necessary, and is the least one might expect, for those civil servants to act in accordance with the law. Arbitrary conduct cannot be protected.

6. The Court’s judgments relating to Article 10, from Handyside to Lingens and on to Vogt, lay down the fundamental principles regarding the criterion of necessity, which are reproduced in paragraph 30 of the present judgment: the adjective “necessary” implying “pressing social need”, the margin of appreciation for determining whether such a need exists, the proportionality of the interference and the existence of “relevant and sufficient” reasons.

7. In the present case, can it be maintained that the applicant’s conviction on account of a banal discussion with the municipal guards, when – in spite of the fact that a few of the remarks he made were unfortunately chosen – he was right about the substantive legal point at issue, met a “pressing social need” within the meaning of the Court’s case-law? In my opinion it cannot.

I accordingly conclude that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.

Notes by the Registry

[1] -2. Protocol No. 11 and the Rules of Court came into force on 1 November 1998.

[3] . Since the entry into force of Protocol No. 11, which amended Article 19, the Court has functioned on a permanent basis.

Notes by the Registry

1. Protocol No. 9 came into force on 1 October 1994 and was repealed by Protocol No. 11.

[3] . Rules of Court B, which came into force on 2 October 1994, applied until 31 October 1998 to all cases concerning States bound by Protocol No. 9.

[4] . Note by the Registry . For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the final printed version of the judgment (in the official reports of selected judgments and decisions of the Court), but a copy of the Commission’s report is obtainable from the Registry.

[5] . See the judgment of the 29 September 1993 of the Sieradz Regional Court and paragraph 23 of the report of the Commission.

[6] . See the memorial of the Government of 7 August 1998, §§ 22-29.

[7] . The Sieradz Regional Court, in its judgment, noted that there was no legal provision prohibiting trading on the public highway at the place where the incident took place, nor had any notice to that effect been put up there (Commission’s report, paragraph 42).

[8] . Paragraphs 25-26 of the Government’s memorial.

[9] . Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 2) judgment of 1 July 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV, p. 1275, §§ 30 and 31.

[10] . Article 236 of the Polish Criminal Code.