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CASE OF BLADET TROMSO AND STENSAAS v. NORWAYDISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE GREVE

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Document date: May 20, 1999

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CASE OF BLADET TROMSO AND STENSAAS v. NORWAYDISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE GREVE

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Document date: May 20, 1999

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DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE GREVE

Together with my colleagues in the minority – Judges Palm, Fuhrmann and Baka – I find no violation of Article 10 of the Convention in the present case and I basically share their reasoning. Moreover, I attach particular significance to the following considerations.

In my view, the case under review is essentially an ordinary defamation case concerning restrictions placed on accusations of criminal conduct made in the press against private individuals. It is vital that the assessment of the necessity of the interference in a democratic society not be obscured by the sensitive nature of the seal hunting issue.

I agree with the majority that the manner of reporting by Bladet Tromsø should not be considered solely by reference to the disputed articles on 15 and 20 July 1988 but in the wider context of the newspaper’s coverage of the seal hunting issue. Bladet Tromsø carried altogether twenty ‑ six articles about the controversy between 11 April 1988 – when the newspaper broke the story – and 19 and 20 July 1988 when it published Mr Lindberg’s report.

In my opinion the majority do not give sufficient weight to the fact that, under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, the seal hunters had a right to be presumed innocent of any criminal offence until proved guilty. I fully accept the majority’s view that Bladet Tromsø had a “public-watchdog” function in disseminating information derived from the Lindberg report about alleged irregularities and crimes committed during seal hunting – a highly controversial activity. However, the restrictions imposed on the newspaper’s freedom of expression in the wake of the impugned statements related solely to allegations of crimes committed by identifiable individuals, allegations which were not proved true. Normally, a newspaper would in such a situation issue a disclaimer, which also would benefit the general readership who have a right to receive correct and complete information where possible. Since Bladet Tromsø did not issue a disclaimer, it ought to be recognised that the seal hunters had a legitimate need for recourse to defamation proceedings in order to protect their reputation and rights.

While it can hardly be argued that the identification of the persons concerned corresponded to any public interest, it would have been possible for Bladet Tromsø to protect the seal hunters’ reputation simply by leaving out any reference to the Harmoni . Had information enabling readers to identify the alleged perpetrators been omitted from the relevant articles, this would, in my opinion, not really have affected the newspaper’s exercise of its freedom of expression. To oblige a paper to take such measures in the circumstances could, to my mind, not be viewed as a measure capable of discouraging the participation of the press in debates over matters of legitimate public concern. In this respect it is indicative that no argument has been presented suggesting that there was a need to identify the alleged perpetrators.

On the other hand the majority seem to lay much emphasis on the official nature of Mr Lindberg’s report, in finding that the newspaper could rely on this source without taking any steps to verify the veracity of the impugned accusations. In so doing, the majority do not, in my view, take necessary account of the particular relationship which existed between Mr Lindberg and Bladet Tromsø .

As a freelance journalist, Mr Lindberg had covered the Harmoni ’s seal hunting expedition for Bladet Tromsø in 1987. Bladet Tromsø must have been aware of his background when it contacted him in April 1988 as the vessel returned to port in Tromsø. It cannot, in my opinion, be considered acceptable that an officially appointed inspector let himself be approached by the media at his duty station and be photographed and then proceed to give the media a first-hand report about his inspection findings – allegations of crimes against private individuals included – without even having made a prior report to his principal, the Ministry of Fisheries. Such lack of professionalism would be comparable to, for instance, a police officer reporting criminal charges directly to the media in order first to have a trial by the press. In this connection it is significant that Mr Lindberg made himself immediately available to Bladet Tromsø after his return from the expedition, whereas almost three months elapsed before he made his first report to the Ministry that had appointed him.

In the light of the above, Bladet Tromsø must have been aware at the relevant time not only of Mr Lindberg’s apparent lack of professionalism, but also of a conflict of interests between his official role and his relationship with the newspaper. Bladet Tromsø exploited both these aspects.

To Bladet Tromsø the printing of Mr Lindberg’s report was only one and a late phase in the newspaper’s co-operation with Mr Lindberg. The publication of the report was not intended to break the story. This had already been done in the first of the series of twenty-six articles which Bladet Tromsø had published on the issue. The report seems rather to have been utilised as a kind of final and official imprimatur on Bladet Tromsø ’s wider coverage of the seal hunting issue, in which context Mr Lindberg had been their main informant all along. In these circumstances, I do not find that the newspaper could, as a matter of good faith, pray in aid their argument that Mr Lindberg’s report was an official document on which it was entitled to rely without further inquiry.

Notes by the Registry

[1] -2. Protocol No. 11 and the Rules of Court came into force on 1 November 1998.

3 . Since the entry into force of Protocol No. 11, which amended Article 19, the Court has functioned on a permanent basis.

[3] . Note by the Registry . Rules of Court B, which came into force on 2 October 1994, applied until 31 October 1998 to all cases concerning States bound by Protocol No. 9.

1. Note by the Registry . For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the final printed version of the judgment (in the official reports of selected judgments and decisions of the Court), but a copy of the Commission’s report is obtainable from the Registry.

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