CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE LOUCAIDES

I have voted with the majority that there h as been no violation of Article 4 of Protocol N o. 7 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in this case. However, the reasons for my finding as regards the applicant ’ s complaint under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 are different from those of the majority. In my opinion, the applicant was not a victi m in respect of this complaint.

In order to examine the merits of the complaints in question, we should first be satisfied that the applicant was either tried or prosecuted (see Zigarella v. Italy (dec.), no. 48154/99, ECHR 2002-IX) through, or as a result of, the request by the Pro cura tor General to the Presidium of the Supreme Court that the case be reviewed in supervisory proceedings.

However, the Presidium of the Supreme Court dismissed the P ro cura tor General ’ s request, with the result that no supervisory proceedings against the applicant ever took place. In the circumstances, I do not see how the applicant can be considered a victim as regards his complaint that supervisory review proceedings took place after his final acquittal, and that such proceedings constituted a violation of his right not to be tried again in criminal proc e ed ings for an offence of which he had been finally acquitted.

In other words, the Pro cu r ato r General ’ s request for a review of the case having been dismissed, one cannot speak of any commencement or recommencement of prosecu tion or trial of the applicant.

It is true that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 refers to the right not to be “ liable to be tried or punished again ... for an offence ...” (emphasis added). However, in my opinion, no one can be considered “liable” to be tried or prosecuted, in any real sense, for an offence unless all the necessary legal prerequisites for that trial or prosecution, according to the relevant national legal system, are satisfied. In this case, one of the essential prerequisites for the further trial or prosecution of the applicant, at the material time, was approval of the Procurator General ’ s request for review of the case, a co ndition that was not satisfied.

Moreover, since his acquittal, the applicant has n ot faced a ny other charge in whatever form. In the absence of such measures, I do not see how he could be considered as having been “liable” to prosecution for the purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, unless we stretch the concept of “prosecution” beyond its normal or established meaning.