CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE BRATZA

The Grand Chamber has reached the same conclusion as the Chamber but by a somewhat different route. As appears from the judgment ( see paragraph 47), the Chamber left open the question whether the applicants, as siblings, could claim to be in an analogous position to a married couple or to those in a civil partnership, holding that any difference of treatment was in any event reasonably and objectively justified, regard being had to the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by States in the area of taxation. The Grand Chamber has preferred to found its decision on the lack of analogy between those who have entered into a legally binding marriage or civil partnership agreement, on the one hand , and those, such as the applicants, who are in a long - term relationship of cohabitation, on the other.

While I fully share the view of the majority of the Grand Chamber that there has been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, I continue to have a preference for the reasoning of the Chamber in arriving at this conclusion.

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE DAV Í D THÓR BJÖRGVINSSON

I agree with the majority in finding that there has been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. However, I prefer different reasoning.

When Article 14 is applied, in essence two questions must be answered : first ly , whether there is a difference in treatment of persons in relevantly similar or analogous situations; secondly, if this is the case, whether the difference in treatment is justified.

The majority has in paragraphs 62-65 of the judgment found that cohabiting sisters cannot be compared for the purposes of Article 14 of the Convention to married or civil partnership couples. Therefore , they are not in a relevantly similar or analogous situation and no breach of Article 14 has occurred.

The reasoning of the majority, as presented in paragraphs 62-65 of the judgment, is in my view flawed by the fact that it is based on the comparison of factors of a different nature and which are not comparable from a logical point of view. It is to a large extent based on reference to the specific legal framework which is applicable to married couples and civil partnership couples but which does not, under the present legislation, apply to the applicants as cohabiting sisters. However, although in the strict sense the complaint only relates to a difference in treatment as concerns inheritance tax, in the wider context it relates, in essence, to the fact s that different rules apply and that consanguinity between the applicants prevents them from entering into a legally binding agreement similar to marriage or civil partnership, which would make the legal framework applicable to them, including the relevant provisions of the law on inheritance tax.

I believe that in these circumstances any comparison of the relationship between the applicants , on the one hand , and the relationship between married couples and civil partnership couples , on the other, should be made without specific reference to the different legal framework applicable, and should focus only on the substantive or material differences in the nature of the relationship as such. Despite important differences, mainly as concerns the sexual nature of the relationship between married couples and civil partner ship couples, when it comes to the decision to live together, the closeness of the personal attachment and most practical aspects of daily life and financial matters, the relationship between the applicants in this case has , in general and for the alleged purposes of the relevant inheritance - tax exemptions in particular, more in common with the relationship between married or civil partnership couples, than there are differences between them. Despite this fact, the law prohibits them from entering into an agreement similar to marriage or civil partnership and thus take advantage of the applicable rules, including the inheritance - tax rules. That being so, I am not convinced that the relationship between the applicants as cohabiting sisters cannot be compared with married or civil partner ship couples for the purposes of Article 14 of the Convention. On the contrary , there is in this case a difference in treatment of persons in situations which are, as a matter of fact, to a large extent similar and analogous.

The question then arises whether the difference in treatment is objectively and reasonably justified. In substance I agree with the reasoning offered in paragraphs 59 - 61 of the Chamber judgment on this point, which are cited in paragraph 47 of this judgment, namely that the difference in treatment for the purposes of granting of inheritance - tax exemptions was reasonably and objectively justified.

In this regard it should also be borne in mind that the institution of marriage is closely linked to the idea of the family, consisting of a man and a woman and their children, as one of the cornerstones of the social structure in the United Kingdom , as well as in the other m ember States of the Council of Europe. On the basis of this assumption, a whole framework of legal rules, of both a private and a public nature, has come into existence over a long period of time. These rules relate to the establishment of marriage and mutual rights and obligations between spouses in both personal and financial matters (including inheritance) and in relation to their children, if any, as well as with regard to taxes (including inheritance taxes), social security, and other matters. The applicability of such rules, or similar rules, in many of the m ember States have gradually, step by step, and mostly upon the initiative of the legislature in the respective countries, been extended to cover relationships other than those traditionally falling under marriage in the formal legal sense, namely civil partnership couples (including individuals of the same sex), and thereby the legislator has responded to new social realities and changing moral and social values. However, it is important to have in mind that each and every step taken in this direction, positive as it may seem to be from the point of view of equal rights, potentially has important and far - reaching consequences for the social structure of society, as well as legal consequences, namely for the social security and tax system in the respective countries. It is precisely for this reason that it is not the role of this Court to take the initiative in this matter and impose upon the m ember States a duty to further extend the applicability of these rules with no clear view of the consequences that it may have in the different m ember States. In my view it m ust fall within the margin of appreciation of the respondent State to decide when and to what extent this will be done.