CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE VILLIGER

I agree with the outcome of the judgment and its thorough and structured reasoning.

However, I would not wish the reasoning to distract from what is, in my view, the crucial issue of the case. It is dealt with in paragraph 100 of the judgment. In particular, I do not think that this case is one concerning implications of Article 2 for psychiatric patients.

In my view, the case concerns the quite straightforward issue of supervising a patient who is required to take medication. The present applicant ’ s brother was a vulnerable person with a psychiatric condition. The medical report described him as a “very disturbed prisoner” (paragraph 16 of the judgment). He had attempted to commit suicide, and the medicaments which he was prescribed purported to prevent further suicide attempts.

It is normal practice that any vulnerable person, for example in a hospital, a nursing home or a children ’ s home, should be supervised when taking prescribed medication. Such monitoring involves a minimal amount of time and effort. It consists in the assistant, nurse or doctor attending the patient until he or she has taken the medication and ensuring that it does not, for example, fall on the floor or is not concealed by the patient. While this description of the sequence of events may appear trite, the matter is of cardinal importance if a person will suffer, even suffer seriously, from the consequences of failing to take the prescribed medication.

It is therefore quite surprising to read in paragraph 34 of the judgment that Dr L., the SMPR doctor, explained that verification of whether or not a patient had taken the prescribed medicaments was “ contrary to the principle of trust which underlies the therapeutic alliance in a hospital environment ”. The whole case turns on this statement. While such trust might be an important element of a relationship between a medical doctor and a responsible and mature patient, I fail to see how such trust can at all be established with a vulnerable person such as the applicant ’ s brother, who in addition had already attempted to commit suicide.

I find it surprising that the prison authorities were not in a position to undertake such surveillance. Would it not have been completely disproportionate instead to send the applicant ’ s brother to a psychiatric hospital merely to monitor that he took the required medicaments?

Since the authorities failed adequately to supervise the applicant ’ s brother, and in view of the applicant ’ s brother ’ s death, they failed sufficiently to respect their obligations arising under Article 2 of the Convention.

[1] 1. These provisions are reproduced in Articles D. 372 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure.