DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE GARLICKI

I dissented from the principal judgment since, in my opinion, no Convention rights had been violated in the present case. The logical consequence is that I am against granting any award under Article 41 of the Convention.

Normally, there is no need to write a separate dissent on Article 41. What prompted me to depart from this practice is that today ’ s judgment does not correspond with the position that the Grand Chamber had expressed in paragraph 118 of the principal judgment. It was stated therein that “much lower amounts [of compensation] could suffice to fulfil the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1” (see Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC], no. 71243/01, § 118 , 25 October 2012 ).

I am not convinced that the award granted in the present judgment does justice to that suggestion of the Grand Chamber. The calculation of the award is based on a 75% reduction (a percentage which, already in itself, should have been greater ), but the resulting amount has been almost doubled due to the inflation rate. While this is the usual method of calculation, its application in the present case has led to over-generous effects. It should not be forgotten that the applicants received the property for free and that, initially, in their own assessment (as reflected in tax returns) the value of this property was set at a very low level. This assessment skyrocketed only when it came to the expropriation and compensation controversies.

In my opinion, the calculation adopted in the present judgment circumvents the tenor of the discussion i n the principal judgment and contradicts the directive expressed in paragraph 118 of the same .

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LORENZEN , JOINED BY JUDGES BRATZA, TSOTSORIA AND PARDALOS

In the judgment on the merits of the present case I voted together with four other judges for finding no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and it is accordingly my opinion that no compensation should be granted to the applicants under Article 41 of the Convention. In these circumstances I do not want to express any opinion on what amounts the Court should grant them for pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage or for costs and expenses following the judgment of the majority. This is the reason why I could not agree with the present judgment.