CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE WOJTYCZEK

( Translation )

1. I fully share my colleagues ’ opinion that freedom of assembly is of primary importance for a democratic society and must be protected with particular stringency. I am also of the opinion that the Convention has not been breached in the present case. I would nevertheless like to introduce certain nuances in relation to the reasoning of the judgment.

2. In its reasoning, the Court states in general terms that “[ i ]t is not, in principle, contrary to the spirit of Article 11 if, for reasons of public order and national security , a High Contracting Party requires that the holding of meetings be subject to authorisation ... ” (par agraph 147 of the present judgment ), without examining the proportionality of the measure in question. I am not convinced by that approach, which seems to acknowledge as a general rule that the system of prior authorisation of meetings is in conformity with the Convention. The position thus adopted does not take sufficiently into account the letter of A rticle 11. The requirement that a demonstration be authorised beforehand is an interference with the sph e re protected by A rticle 11 § 1 , which must be seen in the light of paragraph 2 of that A rticle. In particular, the measure in question must comply with the proportionality principle . In order to answer the question whether the me a sure examin ed is necessary in a democratic society , it is indispensable to take into consideration, inter alia , the nature of the gathering that the citizens wish to organise and the nature of the places to which the measure applies . In addition, the factual circumstances of each case must be examined , taking into account the specificities of the various States. While in certain cases the obligation to obtain an aut h orisation will be perfectly justified , this is not necessarily true in others . It is also necessary to draw a clear distinction between the prior - authorisation system and the notification system , the latter being much less restrictive . In many cases, the obligation to notify the holding of a demonstration will be sufficient to ensure the effective protection of public interests and the rights of third parties, while the obligation to obtain prior authorisation will be an excessive measure .

The Court ’ s approach, requiring a certain flexibilit y on the part of the authorities vis-à-vis unauthorised demonstrations , and in particular spontaneous demonstrations , does not make good all the negative consequences for freedom of assembly that flow from a general acceptance that the system of prior authorisation of demonstrations complies with the Convention .

3. A rticle 11 of the Convention protects freedom of peaceful assembly . It applies to different types of collective action organised for the purpose of expressing opinions. It is necessary to adopt a broad interpretation of the notion of peaceful ass embly and to bear in mind the principle in dubio pro libertate . However, the scope of the provision in question must be circumscribed by certain limits . While freedom of assembly presupposes that the national authorities have an obligation to take the measures necessary to protect the safety of demonstrators , it is also necessary to take into consideration, when circumscribing the scope of A rticle 11 , the authorities ’ obligation to protect effectively the rights of third parties who could be directly affected by collective actions whose effects go far beyond the usual cons e quences of demonstrations . I find it, moreover, regrettable that this latter obligation of the national authorities has not been more prominently highlighted in the reasoning of the judgment .

I have strong reservations as to whether the blockading of highways, as organised by the applicant s, falls within the scope of A rticle 11. The judgment ’ s reasoning rightly emphasises the fact that the roadblocks were organised with the intention of disrupting the movement of persons and goods nationwide (par agraph s 164-75 of the present judgment ). The effects of such roadblocks go far beyond the usual disruption caused by demonstrations in public places . They also go well beyond the idea of a sit-in protest organi sed around certain specific places for the purpose of blocking access to them . The applicant s took these actions to promote their opinions, not by strength of argument , but by direct ly undermining the legitimate individual economic interests of a significant number of third parties, and by disrupting the economic life of their country – and thus, more by argument of strength . The demonstrators ’ message was meant not only to be heard but also to directly affect their fellow citizens . In that context , the reasoning of the judgment rightly describes the applicant s ’ acts as reprehensible ( see par agraph 174 of the present judgment ). Do such acts really enjoy the prima facie protection of A rticle 11?

4. The reasoning of the judgment seems to attach great importance to the fact that – as the Lithuanian courts observed – the farmers could have used alternative lawful means to protect their interests, such as the possibility of bringing complaints before the administrative courts ( see par agraph 168 of the present judgment ). In that perspective , the protection of peaceful freedom of assembly could be modulated depending on the existence of other means of protecting the interests in question, thus nuancing the protection afforded by the Convention.

I would note in this connection that in a democratic State – member of the Council of Europe – citizens necessarily have various means by which they can express their opinions collectively and defend their interests without directly and intentionally undermining the freedom of movement and legitimate economic interests of others . At the same time, the fact that the applicant s had the possibility of defending their interests through complaints to administrative courts does not seem to me to be pertinent for the legal characterisation of their actions. Even if, for various reasons, the economic interests defended by demonstrators cannot be protected effectively by the courts and their claims are not justiciable, that does not justify causing prejudice to the legitimate interests and rights of others . Conversely, the justiciabilit y of claims expressed during a peaceful gathering cannot reduce the extent of the protection afforded to demonstrators under Article 11.

5. Whatever the answer to the question of the applicabilit y of A rticle 11 in the present case , the finding that the Lithuanian authorities had complied with the Convention seemed to be self-evident . Given the particular circumstances of the case , as presented in detail in the judgment ’ s reasoning , the application could even have been declared manifestly ill-founded .