DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE VEHABOVI Ć

I regret that I am unable to subscribe to the view of the majority that there has been a violation of Article 9 and of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9.

The applicants ’ requests to the Prime Minister and to the Court were as follows:

(a) for services connected with the practice of the Alevi faith to constitute a public service ;

(b) for Alevi places of worship ( cemevis ) to be granted the status of places of worship ;

(c) for Alevi religious leaders to be recruited as civil servants ; and

(d) for special provision to be made in the budget for the practice of the Alevi faith.

None of these requests had implications for the applicants ’ freedom to practise Islam in their own way.

Article 14 complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols. It has no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms” safeguarded by those provisions. The application of Article 14 does not necessarily presuppose the violation of one of the substantive rights guaranteed by the Convention. It is necessary but it is also sufficient for the facts of the case to fall “within the ambit” of one or more of the Convention Articles (see, among many other authorities, Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, § 58, ECHR 2008). Thus, a measure which in itself is in conformity with the requirements of the Article enshrining the right or freedom in question may nevertheless infringe the Article when taken in conjunction with Article 14, for the reason that it is of a discriminatory nature (see, for example, Case “relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” (merits), 23 July 1968, pp. 33-34, § 9, Series A no. 6). Article 14 comes into play whenever the “ subject-matter of the disadvantage ... constitutes one of the modalities of the exercise of a right guaranteed” (see National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium , 27 October 1975, § 45, Series A no. 19), or the measure complained of is “linked to the exercise of a right guaranteed” (see Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden , 6 February 1976, § 39, Series A no. 21).

The Court has established in its case-law that only differences in treatment based on an identifiable characteristic, or “status”, are capable of amounting to discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 (see Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 42184/05, § 61, ECHR 2010). “Religion” is specifically mentioned in the text of Article 14 as a prohibited ground of discrimination.

In order to constitute discrimination on grounds of religion, however, the alleged discrimination must fall “within the ambit” of a right protected by Article 9, in this case, the right to manifest one ’ s religion. In the present case, the possibility or otherwise for Alevis to have their religious services granted the status of a public service and to obtain all the other financial benefits connected to that particular status does not prevent them from manifesting their religion. But I would not regard this as conclusive. If the legislation imposed any additional obligations on Alevis alone, I would regard that as coming within the ambit of Article 9. But in the present case no burden is imposed on the Alevis on account of their religion. The applicants simply complain that the State does not provide them with services that have the status of public services and with the benefits arising from that status. That seems to me an altogether different matter.

Furthermore, I think that even if this can be regarded as a case of indirect discrimination, it may relate only to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

I disagree with the majority ’ s conclusion that the assessment made by the Turkish authorities concerning the religious nature of the Alevi practice of Islam amounts to a denial that Alevi religious practice constitutes a form of religious worship and to depriving Alevi meeting places and religious leaders of legal protection. The Court goes even further, concluding that recognition of the religious nature of the practices linked to that faith and of the status of its religious leaders and places of worship is regarded by the Alevi community as essential to its survival and its development as a religious faith. Finally, the Court considers that the refusal of the applicants ’ claims, which amounts to denying the religious nature of the Alevi faith, constitutes an interference with the applicants ’ right to freedom of religion as guaranteed by Article 9 § 1 of the Convention.

In today ’ s world there are many deviant forms of religious practice and belief which should never obtain legitimacy and, by means of such recognition, the possibility to spread these deviant ideas and ideologies. Of course this case is in no way connected with these ideas, but the issue is relevant in terms of the wide margin of appreciation afforded to the States in this area and the possibility of creating a precedent for the future. The legislature must have broad discretion in deciding what should be regarded as a sufficient public benefit to justify including other religious groups and religious movements in the system of public services.

In short, I do not see this case as falling within the ambit of Article 9. The persons who worship in the cemevis are not prevented from manifesting their religion or their belief by the fact that cemevis do not have the status of places of worship or the fact that Alevi religious leaders are not recruited as civil servants and consequently are not paid from the State budget. The legislation is not directed at Alevis alone on the grounds of their beliefs. It is easier to view the case as falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

It is clear from a variety of sources that there are thousands of places of worship ( cemevis ) in Turkey, serving numerous Alevi communities, and that the cemevis all operate without any State interference or any pressure or limitations with regard to Alevi belief, worship, teaching, practice and observance. Are there limitations on Alevis ’ right to manifest their form of religious practice? Are any restrictions or prohibitions applicable to the applicants and their way of practising Islam? I find no such arguments in the applicants ’ submissions. What I find is that the applicants ’ requests are all connected, not to any right protected by Article 9 of the Convention, but rather to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, as is clear from the request for the State to intervene by providing financial services to the Alevi community. In other words, the Alevis ’ requests are not aimed at obtaining legal recognition of their faith so that they can start practising their religion, but at obtaining funding for their religious leaders and places of worship and having their religious leaders recognised as civil servants. There is not a single word concerning any alleged limitation on their right to manifest their belief or on any other right protected by Article 9 of the Convention; rather, the applicants ’ complaints concern property rights.

Seeking to define religion and to distinguish a religion from a sect is a very dangerous undertaking. Is Alevism a religion in its own right or is it merely a sect within Islam? The Western concept of religion is completely different from the Eastern understanding. According to its settled case-law, the Court leaves to Contracting States a certain margin of appreciation in deciding whether and to what extent any interference is necessary. It is true that a wide margin is usually allowed to the State when it comes to general measures of economic or social strategy. This is because, given their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is “in the public interest” (see James and Others v. the United Kingdom , 21 February 1986, § 46, Series A no. 98; see also, for example, National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom , 23 October 1997, § 80, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VII, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. the United Kingdom , no. 7552/09, 4 March 2014).

STATEMENT OF JUDGE SPANO

I concur with the judgment, but as regards my reasons for finding a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 9 I subscribe to the more narrowly tailored reasoning provided for in the joint partly dissenting, partly concurring opinion of my colleagues Judges Villiger, Keller and Kjølbro.

LIST OF APPLICANTS

[1] . Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.

[2] . Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland (with the exception of two of the twenty-six cantons) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.