PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KARAKAÅž

(Translation)

I agree entirely with the majority’s finding of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

However, I do not share the majority’s opinion that the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant.

It is obvious that under Article 41 the Court decides to award a certain amount in respect of non-pecuniary damage if it considers it “necessary” to afford redress. As it has considerable latitude to determine in which cases such an award should be made to the applicants, the Court sometimes concludes that the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction and that no monetary award is required (see, among many other authorities, Nikolova v. Bulgaria , no. 31195/96, § 76, ECHR 1999-II; Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 66069/09 and 2 others, ECHR 2013 (extracts); and Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 10511/10, ECHR 2016). In order to arrive at that conclusion, the Court will have regard to all the facts of the case, including the nature of the violations found and any special circumstances pertaining to the context of the case (see, for example, Vinter and Others , cited above, and the joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Spielmann, Sajó, KarakaÅŸ and Pinto de Albuquerque in the case of Murray , cited above). Where this is warranted by the circumstances of the case, as in McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom (27 September 1995, § 219, Series A no. 324), in which the Court declined to make any award in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage in view of the fact that the three terrorist suspects who had been killed had been intending to plant a bomb in Gibraltar, or by the nature of the violation found, as in the case of Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 29217/12, ECHR 2014 (extracts)), the Court rules that the finding of a violation in itself affords sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage. In other words, it is only in very exceptional cases that the Court decides not to make any award in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

There may also be instances in which the Court decides to award a lower sum than that awarded in other cases relating to the Article concerned, again taking into consideration the particular features of the context. For example, in A. and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 3455/05, ECHR 2009), in the context of terrorism, the Court gave detailed reasons (§ 252; see also Del Río Prada v. Spain [GC], no. 42750/09, § 145, ECHR 2013) explaining why it had awarded a significantly lower sum than in other previous cases concerning unlawful detention.

In the present case, the domestic courts did not ensure adequate protection of the applicant’s right to respect for his private life and correspondence: the applicant was seriously affected by the disciplinary proceedings against him, since he was dismissed from his post.

This violation of Article 8 undoubtedly caused non-pecuniary damage to the applicant, who cannot be satisfied with the mere finding that such damage was sustained. For that reason, I was in favour of granting an award, even of a modest amount, by way of just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant.