CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE RANZONI

1. I voted with the majority in finding no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and of Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. However, concerning the latter point, my reasoning differs from that of the majority.

2. In assessing the Article 14 complaint, four main questions are to be answered: (1) Was there a difference in treatment between the applicant, an old-age pensioner working in the public sector, and old-age pensioners working in the private sector? (2) Were these two groups of pensioners in an analogous, or relevantly similar, situation? (3) Was the difference in treatment based on an identifiable characteristic, or “status”, within the meaning of Article 14 of the Convention? (4) Was there an objective and reasonable justification for the different treatment of both categories?

3. It is not in dispute that the applicant was treated differently from old ‑ age pensioners working in the private sector because his pension payment was suspended for the continued duration of his employment in the civil service (see paragraph 100 of the judgment). Therefore, the first question has to be answered in the affirmative.

4. The majority answer the second question in the negative, finding that the applicant, as a member of the civil service whose employment, remuneration and social benefits were dependent on the State budget, was not in a relevantly similar situation to pensioners employed in the private sector (see paragraphs 121-133 of the judgment). I disagree with this assessment. The decisive factor in this context is not the source of the salary, be it from a private budget or the State budget, but rather the source of the pension and its contributory system. In that regard, I agree with the arguments and conclusions in the joint dissenting opinion of my colleagues Judges Sajó , Vehabović , Turković , Lubarda , Grozev and Mourou-Vikström (see paragraphs 2-9 of their opinion), to which I subscribe and have nothing further to add.

5. Concerning the third question, I again agree with the dissenting judges that there is no dispute between the parties that the different treatment of the applicant was based on “other status” within the meaning of Article 14 (see paragraph 10, first sentence of the dissenting opinion).

6. Where I differ from the dissenters, and what eventually led me to join the majority in finding no violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, is regarding the answer to the fourth question, namely whether there was an objective and reasonable justification for the difference in treatment.

7. The relevant principles in this context are set out in the judgment (see, in particular, paragraphs 113-117). Applying these principles, my starting point would be the wide margin of appreciation afforded to the State in respect of general measures in the economic a nd social sphere (see paragraph 115). Such policy decisions are, in principle, reserved for the national authorities, which have direct democratic legitimation and direct knowledge of their society and are better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions. The Court will therefore generally respect the legislature ’ s policy choice unless it is “manifestly without reasonable foundation” (see, inter alia , Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, § 52, ECHR 2006-VI, and British Gurkha Welfare Society and Others v. the United Kingdom , no. 44818/11, § 62, 15 September 2016); that is not the case here.

8. In parts, I would adopt the arguments the majority invoked in examining the question whether the two groups of pensioners were in a relevantly similar situation, in particular regarding the State ’ s role when acting in its capacity as employer (see paragraphs 127 and 131-132). To my mind, these arguments in fact pertain to the justification analysis. Whereas the similarity of situations should be seen and assessed from the perspective of the persons affected, the justification for a different treatment, in contrast, is an element to be assessed based on the State ’ s situation.

9. The elimination of “double income” from the same State budget and the reduction of public debt, as argued by the Government, are valid reasons for treating differently pensioners in the public sector and those in the private sector; the latter receive their “double income” from different budgets. Furthermore, even if at the relevant time the EU deficit procedure was already closed and even if an exceptional financial crisis might no longer have existed in Hungary, the reduction of expenditures and a balanced budget, as well as balanced and well-funded pension schemes, remained important policy aims of the Hungarian Government, as for all responsible Governments.

10. The small number of persons affected by the impugned measure (see, in this respect, paragraphs 13-15 of the dissenting opinion) is not a weighty argument. National authorities often have to introduce a variety of different policy measures, as mentioned by the Government in their submissions; these measures, taken separately, may affect only a limited group. However, such measures have to be looked at as a whole and cannot be dissected in all their particulars. That is one of the reasons for affording the States a wide margin of appreciation when determining general measures of economic or social strategy.

11. The fact that a majority of the member States of the Council of Europe do not make a distinction between public and private-sector employees regarding whether pension payments may be reduced or suspended (see the comparative study, paragraphs 31-43 of the judgment) does not seem a valid argument to me. There exists a wide range of different social-security schemes throughout Europe, and several States actually make distinctions, in particular in situations of retirement before the legal age of retirement.

12. As the dissenting judges concede (see paragraph 14 of their opinion), the applicant was not left without any means of subsistence. He continued to receive his salary, which was presumably higher than the amount of his pension and corresponded approximately to the average salary in Hungary. He did not argue that he risked falling below the subsistence threshold (see, in this respect, paragraphs 79-82 of the judgment). Furthermore, the suspension of his pension entitlements was only of a temporary nature. No doubt the impugned measure affected the applicant ’ s life. However, that does not suffice for finding that he had to bear an excessive or disproportionate burden.

13. These are the main reasons for me to find that the difference in treatment between the applicant, an old-age pensioner working in the public sector, and old-age pensioners working in the private sector had an objective and reasonable justification and that the means employed were proportionate to the aim sought to be achieved. The respondent State did not overstep its wide margin of appreciation. If a State is afforded such a wide margin as in the economic and social sphere, the Court should respect it; otherwise it is just paying lip service to this principle. Besides, taking into account this wide margin of appreciation, it is not the Court ’ s task to look for alternative measures which the State could have adopted (see, mutatis mutandis , Markovics and Others v. Hungary ( dec. ), nos. 77575/11 and 2 others, § 39, 24 June 2014).

14. I n the light of the foregoing observations, and in contrast to the dissenting judges, I came to the conclusion that there had been no violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 Protocol No. 1.