CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE SERGHIDES

1. I voted with the majority and am thus in agreement with all points of the operative provisions (nos. 1-6) of the judgment, which finds that only Turkey – and not Cyprus – has been in violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention; a finding also reached by Judge Pere Pastor Vilanova and myself in our partly dissenting opinions in the Chamber procedure.

2. Though I am in agreement with the reasons and arguments on which the judgment is based, in finding no breach by Cyprus and a breach by Turkey of Article 2 under its procedural limb, I cannot, with all due respect, allow my attention to be diverted from the central issues, reasons and principles that I discussed in my partly dissenting opinion in the Chamber procedure, especially as they could provide additional but very strong reasons to support the conclusion of the Grand Chamber.

3. I therefore refer to all those issues, reasons, arguments and principles, which formed the basis of my partly dissenting opinion, in support of my present concurring opinion, without elaborating on them again apart from some issues that I wish to highlight further.

4. Having included a summary of the facts in my partly dissenting opinion in the Chamber procedure, I will not have to go into them all over again.

5. As will be explained in more detail below, the following two main reasons would suffice, in my view, to find only Turkey and not Cyprus to be in violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention: (a) Turkey, for reasons not based on good faith, was not willing to cooperate with Cyprus regarding the unlawful killing which had taken place in the part of the territory of Cyprus not under Turkey’s occupation and effective control, contrary to its obligation under Article 2 of the Convention, and (b) Cyprus did not have the obligation under the principle of non-recognition to transmit all its evidence to the “TRNC” authorities so that the “TRNC” courts could try the murder suspects.

Principles of good faith and effectiveness

6. Having said the above, an important issue which needs further elaboration is the role of the principles of good faith and effectiveness in interpreting and applying Article 2 of the Convention and, in particular, in relation to the positive procedural obligation of a State under Article 2 (read also in conjunction with Article 1 of the Convention) to secure the right to life and also the specific obligations which may spring therefrom: (a) the procedural obligation to investigate, and (b) the procedural obligation to cooperate. As will be seen, this issue is not at all theoretical in the present case, but is of great practical importance.

7. The procedural obligation to cooperate between two or more States regarding an unlawful killing is a specific aspect of the procedural obligation to investigate, which is, in turn, a specific aspect of the positive procedural obligation of the States concerned, under Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention, to secure the right to life. These obligations are derived from case-law developments based mainly on the principle of effectiveness, or in other words the principle of effective protection of rights [3] , which requires that the protection of the right to life be practical and effective. The relationship between these positive obligations and the principle of effectiveness can be said to resemble the affinity between offspring and their forebears.

8. Good faith is an indispensable element of interpretation under Article 31 § 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which provides that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose” [4] . The principle of effectiveness is implicit in the requirement of good faith [5] , though in my view they are not identical in terms of substance, but merely overlapping.

9. These principles of good faith and effectiveness, together with any other principles on which the Convention is based, like the principles of the rule of law and democracy, are aspects – or parts or elements – of the object and purpose of a Convention provision and must be taken into account when interpreting and applying it. The principle of good faith stems not only from the very object and purpose of a treaty, but is expressly referred to in Article 31 § 1 of the VCLT, as a manner by which a treaty provision, in the present case Article 2 of the Convention, must be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning and in the light of its object and purpose.

10. All the principles referred to above are also rules or norms of international law and must be taken into account together with the context of a treaty provision, by virtue of Article 31 § 3 (c) of the VCLT [6] .

11. As noted in the Preamble to the VCLT, the principle of good faith is universally recognised. This principle demands honesty, fairness, and reasonableness; it prohibits the abuse of rights and the taking of any unfair advantage; and it means respecting, interpreting and applying the rule of law effectively [7] . It precludes “States parties from adopting views and positions that misrepresent the genuine content of what they have undertaken through the treaty” [8] . Also, as the International Law Commission (ILC) has stated: “[w]hen a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be adopted” [9] . As rightly observed by Richard K. Gardiner, “[t]he ILC subsumed both elements of the principle of effectiveness under two elements in article 31(1) jointly, that is ‘good faith’ and ‘object and purpose’” [10] .

12. The ratification of a treaty by a State indicates its consent to be bound by the terms of the treaty and hence its awareness as to the existence of those terms. This gives rise to legitimate expectations by all other parties to the treaty. Therefore, an interpretation of the provisions of the treaty by one State which lacks one or more of the aforementioned elements of good faith, e.g. reasonableness, and thus results in a contra legem interpretation or an interpretation against the object and purpose of the provision, could automatically be regarded as an interpretation that is not made in good faith. As is rightly observed by one author “[i]nternational law does not attach great weight to the state of mind of sovereign states and it only seldom requires inquiring into it” [11] .

13. Apart from Article 31 § 1 of the VCLT, employing the principle of good faith in treaty interpretation, Article 18 of the VCLT further provides that “[a] State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty” that has been signed and remains subject to ratification [12] . If a State is required to refrain from acts calculated to frustrate or obstruct the object of a treaty it has signed but not yet ratified, the same standard or an even higher one should apply when the State does ratify the treaty. Article 18 indicates that for a State to be a party to a treaty, it must genuinely be prepared and ready to abide by it [13] . This is another provision, apart from Article 31 § 1 of the VCLT, which indicates the importance of the object of a treaty in interpreting or performing it.

14. Though there is no such express mention of the principle of good faith in the Convention or any of its Protocols, the Preamble to the Convention speaks about “collective enforcement” of the rights, which, in my view, presupposes good faith [14] . Furthermore, the Convention, in Articles 17 and 18 respectively, prohibits the abuse of rights and the misuse of restrictions, those prohibitions also being elements of the principle of good faith. Moreover, Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe (London, 5.V.1949) provides that “[e]very member of the Council of Europe must … collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council” stated in Article 1 therein. Similarly, the Preamble to the Convention provides “that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater unity between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms”. The principle of “sincere” and “effective” cooperation is nothing less than cooperation based on good faith and effectiveness. In addition, Article 4 of the said Statute indicates that membership in the Council of Europe is premised on the ability of a candidate State to collaborate with all other members “sincerely” and “effectively”, as provided in Article 3. Finally, Article 8 of the Statute provides for serious penalties (e.g. suspension and expulsion) for member States that do not comply with the requirements of Article 3.

Principle of non-recognition

15. The next issue which calls for some elaboration is the role of the principle of non-recognition in interpreting and applying Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention, as this principle is a rule of international law which must also be taken into account by virtue of Article 31 § 3 (c) of the VCLT. As will be explained, this issue is once again not at all theoretical in the present case, but is of great practical importance.

16. The rule or principle of non-recognition, apart from being a customary international rule, is also reflected in the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the “Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”. Two of these Articles, namely Articles 40 and 41 are quoted in paragraph 157 of the judgment under the heading “C. The principle of non-recognition”. Article 41 § 2 of these Draft Articles provides that “[n]o State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation ” (emphasis added). In the Commentary to Draft Article 41 § 2, quoted in paragraph 158 of the judgment, the ILC observed that the principle of non-recognition had been applied by the European Court of Human Rights (see paragraph 10 of that Commentary). Under Draft Article 30 “[t]he State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: (a) to cease that act, if it is continuing; (b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require”.

17. Cyprus is a victim of State aggression by Turkey. In addition to the international response to the establishment of the “TRNC” included in paragraphs 159-61 of the judgment, it is pertinent to note that the United Nations Security Council adopted a number of resolutions in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus, demanding an end to the foreign military intervention and requesting the withdrawal of foreign military troops [15] . Furthermore, the United Nations General Assembly has also expressly deplored the continuing occupation of Cyprus by foreign forces [16] .

18. It is to be underlined that the illegal occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkey, which is an internationally wrongful act of a continuing character under Draft Article 14 § 2, must cease, and Turkey has an undiminished responsibility to bring an immediate end to this act in order to protect the interests of the international community as a whole in the preservation of, and reliance on, the rule of law. As a result, third States are required not to aid or assist Turkey in maintaining this unlawful situation and entrenching or normalising the occupation of Cypriot territory. That is exactly the evil that the rule of non-recognition aims at protecting against.

19. The obligation of non-recognition is itself intended to protect human rights. However, the fact that the case-law of the Court accepts that the “TRNC” courts have some limited jurisdiction, in particular over acts occurring within the part of the territory of Cyprus that is under the occupation and effective control of Turkey, is not contrary to the obligation of non-recognition. The reason behind this approach is to avoid a vacuum and protect the human rights of the persons concerned. In paragraph 250 of its judgment the Court rightly distinguishes the present case from its previous jurisprudence, on the ground that the unlawful killing in question took place in the territory of Cyprus which was not under the effective control of Turkey; therefore, the key consideration for the Court in other cases, namely to avoid a vacuum, did not apply in the present case.

The use of the above principles in interpreting Article 2

20. Undoubtedly, an interpretation of Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention in disregard of the principles of good faith and effectiveness, and/or the principle of non-recognition, should not be accepted by the Court, since otherwise the Court would be considered as not paying due regard to fundamental Convention principles and rules of international law.

21. For this reason, it is highly regrettable that the judgment fails to deal with these issues, even though the principle of non-recognition was emphatically invoked by the Government of Cyprus. As is clear from paragraph 250 of the judgment, the Court decided not to deal with the principle of non-recognition by saying the following:

“The Court does not consider it desirable or necessary in the present case to elaborate a general theory concerning the lawfulness of cooperation in criminal matters with unrecognised or de facto entities under international law.”

22. However, with all due respect, what the Court states in the above paragraph is misplaced, because it precedes the Court’s argument and its finding that Cyprus was not under an obligation to supply all the evidence to the “TRNC” authorities or Turkey. This finding is only made at the end of paragraph 253, where the Court concludes that it was not unreasonable for Cyprus to refuse to waive its criminal jurisdiction – which is one of the main features of the sovereignty of a State – in favour of the “TRNC” courts, which in any event only have limited acknowledged jurisdiction. If the Court, at the end of paragraph 253 of the judgment, had stated that its above finding, by itself, made it unnecessary for it to examine any other arguments raised by Cyprus (including the argument based on the principle of non-recognition) to justify Cyprus’ refusal to transmit all the evidence to the “TRNC” authorities”, that would have been understandable for me. In any event, with all due respect, the said statement of the Court in paragraph 250, a priori and without examining the issue, renders meaningless the principle of non-recognition in interpreting and applying Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention, despite the fact that the Court includes one whole section under the “Relevant International Law and Practice” heading which deals with the “Principle of non-recognition” (see paragraphs 157-58 of the judgment).

23. Even though I would have been able to understand that it was not “necessary” for the Court to deal with the principle of non-recognition, had it been considered in the right order, I am unable to understand why the Court says that it does not find it “desirable” to deal with this principle. This is especially puzzling given that this principle is a mandatory and extremely important principle of international law, the legitimacy of which is recognised in the judgment by the fact of including a separate section on it, as stated above.

24. The Court should have emphasised, as I do now in my concurring opinion, that the Convention cannot require any State to do anything that would require it to breach a rule of customary international law, in the present case the rule of non-recognition. I also wish to stress that the procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention cannot mandate that Cyprus, or any other State, should take steps which contribute to the entrenchment of an unlawful occupation in Cyprus.

25. Neither did the Court deal in the present case with the principle of good faith in interpreting Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention, though what is said in paragraph 234, namely that the duty to cooperate “is in keeping with the effective protection of the right to life as guaranteed by Article 2” was absolutely relevant and correct.

26. Hugh Thirlway observes that “it is … difficult to conceive circumstances in which the Court would find it necessary to reject an interpretation advanced by a party on the sole ground that it was not made in good faith” [17] . He adds that “[s]uch interpretation would almost certainly offend at the same time against some specific canon of interpretation; and the Court will be slow to accuse a State in its judgment of bad faith” [18] . Similarly, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice remarks that “[i]t may be useful … to draw attention to – without attempting entirely to resolve – a difficulty that arises in the application of the principle of good faith” [19] . And he explains that “[t]here is always a natural reluctance to ascribe bad faith to States, in the sense of a deliberate intention knowingly to circumvent an international obligation” [20] .

27. Indeed, it appears that the Court has never rejected an interpretation advanced by a party on the ground that it was not made in good faith, whereas it has repeatedly rejected an interpretation as formalistic, or restrictive, or as being theoretical and illusory rather than practical and effective.

28. Despite the difficulty of conceiving circumstances in which the Court could find it necessary to reject an interpretation advanced by a party on the sole ground that it was not made in good faith, one cannot exclude such circumstances, and the present case represents one of the clearest situations where the Court should have rejected Turkey’s interpretative approach to Article 2 on such a ground.

29. The element of good faith which is referred to in Article 31 § 1 of the VCLT, as mentioned earlier, is an important element without which the interpretative approach under that provision collapses. This is so, because good faith as a manner of interpretation relates both to the ordinary meaning of a treaty provision and to its object and purpose, and is, in my view, the ingredient or element which assists in making the process of interpretation of a treaty, in terms of Article 31 § 1, “a unity, a single combined operation” [21] . Thus the Court should not refer only to the text and/or object of a provision, as it usually does, while bypassing or neglecting “good faith” as an element or principle of interpretation.

30. Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as allowing a member State, in the present case Turkey, to refuse to cooperate with another member State, in the present case Cyprus, in a manner which contravenes international law, in particular by not respecting the independence and integrity of the latter State and by acting in bad faith, with the effect of strengthening and normalising the illegal situation that has been imposed over part of the territory of Cyprus. In fact, Turkey did exactly the opposite to what was provided for in the United Nations Resolution [22] .

31. More specifically, it runs counter to international law and especially to the principle of good faith, for Turkey, an invading and occupying power in northern Cyprus which established there an illegal entity not recognised by the whole international community, to argue that it is entitled to refuse to cooperate with the Government of Cyprus in the present case, because it does not recognise it, ignoring the fact that the Government of Cyprus is regarded as the sole legitimate government in Cyprus by the international community. Based on the above, Turkey’s claim that the courts of its entity in the northern part of Cyprus – and not the courts of the Republic of Cyprus – are competent to deal with a trial of the murder suspects, despite the fact that the murder was committed in part of the territory of Cyprus that is not under the occupation and effective control of Turkey, violates the principle of good faith.

32. This stance of Turkey is clear from both its written and oral observations. Importantly, in response to a question from the Bench at the oral hearing as to what would be the proper diplomatic channel for a valid extradition request, the following was stated:

“The ordinary diplomatic channel in the present case was not available to the Greek Cypriot Authorities for the simple reason, not because of non-recognition, but because there are no diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Greek Cypriot Authorities. That is the reason why Turkey adds a proviso to any convention under the auspices of the Council of Europe, that treaty membership does not create or cannot create any legal obligations between Turkey and the Greek Cypriot Authorities in southern Cyprus.”

33. The reference to “Greek Cypriot Authorities” is in fact an indication in itself as to Turkey’s refusal to recognise the Republic of Cyprus. Neither in the request for referral, nor in their written or oral observations, have the Turkish Government addressed even once the Government of Cyprus as such. Instead they have referred to the “Greek Cypriot Authorities”.

34. Turkey’s statement reproduced above (see § 32) is, with all due respect, misleading in that the lack of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Cyprus came about because Turkey decided so and is a corollary of the fact that it does not recognise the Government of Cyprus. It would therefore be misconceived to paint a picture in which both States refuse to have diplomatic relations with each other. This is especially so, as Cyprus does not dispute the statehood of Turkey, but only that of the “TRNC”, Turkey’s subordinate local administration established in the northern part of Cyprus. In addition, Cyprus has objected to Turkey’s reservations in both the European Convention on Extradition and the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters within the 12-month limitation period under Article 20 § 5 of the VCLT. It is clear from the content of Turkey’s reservations to these two treaties that it does not recognise Cyprus and does not want to enter into any dealings with it. In particular, Turkey declared that its ratifications did not amount “to any form of recognition of the Greek Cypriot Administration’s pretention to represent the defunct ‘Republic of Cyprus’ as a party” to these instruments, “nor should it imply any obligations on the part of Turkey to enter into dealings with the so-called Republic of Cyprus…” (see paragraphs 144 and 149 of the judgment).

35. It is to be noted, in this respect, that the reservations of Turkey were not specific and were incompatible with the object and purpose of the Conventions to which they were made, contrary to what is provided respectively in Article 19 §§ (b) and (c) of the VCLT. Regarding the prohibition of broad reservations, Roslyn Moloney, referring to a judgment of the International Court of Justice, observed that “[i]n this case, the Court was concerned to protect the integrity of human rights instruments from erosion due to broad reservations which diluted the most fundamental provisions” [23] .

36. Turkey, a member of the Council of Europe, by unreasonably refusing to recognise and thus cooperate with the Republic of Cyprus, another member of the Council of Europe, as required under Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention, has violated these Convention provisions by disregarding the principle of good faith and the primary aims of the Council of Europe referred to in the Preamble to the Convention, namely the effective recognition and observance and the collective enforcement of the rights guaranteed by the Convention, the maintenance of the rule of law and effective political democracy. Turkey also violated Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, which requires sincere and effective cooperation between the member States of the Council of Europe in the realisation of its aims, as mentioned in paragraph 14 above. In effect, Turkey’s stance undermines the role of the Court as one of the Council of Europe’s organs. An indispensable component of the collective guarantee and enforcement of human rights is that each member State has to respect the sovereignty and independence of all other member States. Without this component, any kind of sincere cooperation is impossible.

37. It is an indispensable element, for any cooperation, that the parties involved should be willing to cooperate in good faith. Though the principle of good faith is not mentioned expressly in the judgment, this is acknowledged in paragraph 233 where it is said that “[t]he Court accordingly takes the view that Article 2 may require from both States a two-way obligation to cooperate with each other, implying at the same time an obligation to seek assistance and an obligation to afford assistance”. It would therefore be ab initio futile for a State, in the present case Cyprus, to cooperate with another State, in the present case Turkey, which has refused from the very beginning to do so and where its refusal is based on grounds which run counter to good faith and to international law. This stance has hermetically sealed the door for Cyprus to cooperate with Turkey. Even under these circumstances, Cyprus did provide some evidence to the “TRNC” through UNFICYP, namely the DNA results, and was also ready to hand over all evidence to UNFICYP so that the latter could see whether there was a prima facie case against the murder suspects, subject to the undertaking by the “TRNC” authorities that they would surrender the murder suspects to Cyprus in that event (see paragraph 252 of the judgment).

38. Cyprus was entitled to invoke the principle of non-recognition regarding the legitimacy of the “TRNC” and therefore not to transmit all the evidence to the “TRNC” or Turkey, which is an invading and occupying force in northern Cyprus. On the other hand, Turkey was not entitled to allege that it had a right not to extradite the murder suspects to the Government of Cyprus because it did not have diplomatic relations with it and did not recognise it. Such misuse of the principle of non-recognition by Turkey, which is attributable to its conquering and expansionist policy in respect of Cyprus, is contrary to international law and especially the principle of good faith and the primary, long and continuing aim of the Council of Europe to ensure the effective protection of human rights.

39. An interpretation of Article 2 of the Convention advanced by Turkey whereby a State may refuse to cooperate with another member State of the Council of Europe in a criminal case on the basis that it does not recognise that other State, or does not want to have any diplomatic relations with it, is, in my view, in total disregard of the principle of good faith, the principle of effectiveness or any other rule of international law, including the obligation to respect the sovereignty and integrity of another State.

40. Turkey’s claim that it did not have to cooperate was also based on its demand that the courts of the “TRNC” should have jurisdiction over crimes committed everywhere in the territory of Cyprus [24] , thus entirely ignoring the legitimacy of the courts of the Republic of Cyprus.

41. This argument, to the effect that only “TRNC” courts are competent in Cyprus wherever a murder is committed in the territory of Cyprus, is an additional claim of Turkey that goes against the principle of good faith, because no State in the world apart from Turkey recognises the “TRNC”. Thus it was not reasonable for Turkey to expect “TRNC” courts, which have a very limited jurisdiction according to the case-law of the Court, to have jurisdiction over crimes committed in part of the territory of Cyprus that is not under its effective control. Nor was it reasonable for it to expect from Cyprus that it would not refuse to waive its criminal jurisdiction, this being one of the main features of its sovereignty, in favour of the “TRNC” courts. As has been said above, the argument of the Court for not finding a violation on the part of Cyprus, in paragraph 253 of the judgment, is “that in such a specific situation it was not unreasonable [for Cyprus] to refuse to waive its criminal jurisdiction in favour of the ‘TRNC’ courts”. Here, however, the point I am making is not what was reasonable for Cyprus to argue but what was unreasonable for Turkey to argue. Bad faith is demonstrated by unreasonableness on the part of a State.

42. A third claim raised by Turkey regarding the interpretation of Article 2 of the Convention – and one which breaches, in my view, the principle of good faith – is that Turkey does not have a duty of cooperation in the absence of any treaty commitments, in which case it applies its own domestic law. This claim is, with all due respect, unreasonable because Article 2 itself, as interpreted by the Court, imposes a duty of sincere cooperation; an obligation which emanates from the Convention to which Turkey is a committed State Party. Besides, as is stipulated in Article 27 of the VCLT, “[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty”.

43. A fourth claim by Turkey in refusing to comply with its positive obligation to cooperate was that Cyprus’ extradition requests were not valid under the Extradition Convention. This argument was raised by Turkey only before the Grand Chamber (see paragraph 262 of the judgment). I am in complete agreement with what the Court says in paragraphs 261-66, in dealing with Turkey’s stance. In particular, the Court, in paragraph 263 of the judgment, finds that Turkey did not comply with Articles 18 (1) and (2) of the Extradition Convention to inform the requesting State, Cyprus, of its decision with regard to the extradition. In paragraph 264 of the judgment the Court rightly says that it “is of the opinion that the obligation to cooperate under Article 2 should be read in the light of these provisions [i.e. Articles 13 and 18(1) and (2) of the Extradition Convention] and should therefore entail for a State an obligation to examine and provide a reasoned reply to any extradition request from another Contracting State …” Finally, in paragraph 265 of the judgment, the Court rightly says that the above consideration “suffices” for it “to conclude that Turkey did not make the minimum effort required in the circumstances of the case and therefore did not comply with its obligation to cooperate with Cyprus for the purposes of an effective investigation into the murder of the applicants’ relatives”.

44. The silence of Turkey further to Cyprus’ extradition request – which “could be understood” by the Court “as a refusal to extradite” (see paragraph 263 of the judgment) – and the fact that it failed to provide the Court with any reasoned reply to justify such a refusal, are, in my view, additional indications that Turkey breached the principle of good faith in interpreting and applying Article 2 together with Article 1 of the Convention.

45. It would be contrary to the principle of good faith to interpret Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention in such a way as to deny the right to life [25] . Turkey and the “TRNC” authorities, by refusing to cooperate on grounds which all fall outside the scope of the Convention and are contrary to international law, have automatically frustrated and rendered nugatory the purpose of Article 2 and the principles of good faith and effectiveness. They offered no protection at all to the applicants, because, as a result of their unreasonable claims the “TRNC” authorities ultimately released all the murder suspects.

46. It is to be observed that, when a State, as can be said of Turkey in the present case, totally disrespects [26] and fails to apply the principle of effectiveness, which is the legal basis, or source or substratum, of any positive procedural obligation that may arise from Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention, then compliance with any such obligation is doomed to be a complete failure.

47. Finally, for the reasons underlying the judgment, and for all the reasons on which my present concurring opinion and my partly dissenting opinion in the Chamber procedure are based, I conclude that only Turkey – and not Cyprus – has been in breach of the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention. Consequently, I am in agreement with the majority regarding point two of the operative part of the judgment as well as with all the other points of that part.