SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE MOSLER

(Translation)

I agree with the judgment in its en tirety save only for one of the grounds that led the Chamber to retain Mr. Koç ’ s case on its list. Since this decision is justified by reasons other than the one which I would like to question, I nonetheless arrive at the same result.

In the second sub-paragraph of pa ragraph 36 of the judgment, the Chamber rightly states that the Government ’ s declaration to the effect that the compulsory collection of costs will not be carried out does not constitute a "fact of a kind to provide a solution of the matter". The Chamber concludes that it is not empowered by Rule 47 para. 2 of the Rules of Court to strike the case out of the list.

The Government made this declaration during the oral hearings before the Court (see paragraph 29 of the judgment). The direct and principal consequence of the Cologne Court of Appeal ’ s judgment of 5 June 1975 of which Mr. Koç complained in his application is thus eliminated. However, Mr. Koç ’ s legal interest to continue the proceedings before the Court subsists since there may be consequences which that declaration has not eliminated and which would give rise to an award of just satisfaction under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Con vention. This ground for retaining the case on the list is also stressed by the Chamber (at the end of the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 36) but its main reason is that the declaration would not remove the applicant ’ s legal interest to have established the incompatibility with the Convention of the Cologne Court of Appeal ’ s judgment ordering him to pay the interpretation costs. In fact, the Government maintain that the German law and its application by the German courts to Mr. Koç comply with the Convention. As the judgment notes, the declaration is not prompted by reasons deriving from Article 6 para. 3 (e) (art. 6-3-e) of the Convention.

This reasoning appears to me to imply that an individual applying to the Commission is entitled not only to the cancellation of the act which constitutes the violation with respect to him and, if necessary, to an award of just satisfaction but also to a decision by the Court as to whether the law and the judicial decisions giving rise to the violation are compatible with the Convention. Moreover, the wording of the judgment seems to me to indicate that the reason why a Government cancels the act challenged in an application is a legally significant fact.

Everyone admits that Article 25 (art. 25) of the Convention do es not give individuals a right to attack a Contracting Party ’ s legislation. Each applicant must claim that there has been a violation with repect to him. If the act constituting the violation is cancelled during the proceedings before one or other of the Convention institutions, the application becomes without object provided that the applicant has not suffered any prejudice other than the direct result of that act.

I do not consider that Article 25 (art. 25) can be interpreted as conferring on an applicant a legal interest to have established in his particular case the incompatibility with the Convention of either a State ’ s law or a judgment of a national court founded on that law, unless such a finding is necessary in order to decide whether there is a violation of the Convention in the applicant ’ s specific case. Since this last condition is satisfied on the present occasion, the Court must give a decision on Mr. Koç ’ s case.

I have not disregarded the fa ct that the judgment limits the applicant ’ s legal interest to his particular case. However, the reasoning is, to say the least, ambiguous. If it were taken to have the meaning which I have just given to it, I would not be in agreement with the consequences.

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE LAGERGREN

I associate myself with the judgm ent but would like to state the following.

In the course of the proceedings much discussion has been devoted to the interpretation of sub-paragraph (c) of Article 6 para. 3 (art. 6-3-c) of the Convention. Taken on its own, the term "free" must necessarily have the same unqualified meaning in sub-paragraphs (c) and (e) of Article 6 para. 3 (art. 6-3-c, art. 6-3-e). In my opinion, it then follows from the wording of sub-paragraph (c) (art. 6-3-c) that the accused, subsequent to his conviction, must be exempted from having to pay for the legal assistance granted to him, at least for such time as he has not sufficient means to pay for it. If a higher court or authority finds on appeal that legal assistance was not in fact required in the interests of justice, the individual concerned should not be obliged to pay for such assistance, even if he acquires sufficient means.