JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES LAGERGREN, PETTITI AND MACDONALD

The present judgment recognises the important requirement that judgments of courts and tribunals should adequately state the reasons on which they are based. In this respect the judgment follows a statement of the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion of 12 July 1973 [*] . In that opinion the International Court stated that (paragraph 92):

"[C] ertain elements of the right to a fair hearing are well recognized and provide criteria helpful in identifying fundamental errors in procedure which have occasioned a failure of justice: for instance, the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law; the right to have the case heard and determined within a reasonable time; the right to a reasonable opportunity to present the case to the tribunal and to comment upon the opponent ’ s case; the right to equality in the proceedings vis-à-vis the opponent; and the right to a reasoned decision."

In paragraph 95 of the same Advisory Opinion the International Court further stated that:

"While a statement of reasons is thus necessary to the validity of a judgement of the Tribunal, the question remains as to what form and degree of reasoning will satisfy this requirement. The applicant appears to assume that, for a judgment to be adequately reasoned, every particular plea has to be discussed and reasons given for upholding or rejecting each one. But neither practice nor principle warrants so rigorous an interpretation of the rule, which appears generally to be understood as simply requiring that a judgment shall be supported by a stated process of reasoning. This statement must indicate in a general way the reasoning upon which the judgment is based; but it need not enter meticulously into every claim and contention on either side. While a judicial organ is obliged to pass upon all the formal submissions made by a party, it is not obliged, in framing its judgment, to develop its reasoning in the form of a detailed examination of each of the various heads of claim submitted. Nor are there any obligatory forms or techniques for drawing up judgments: a tribunal may employ direct or indirect reasoning, and state specific or merely implied conclusions, provided that the reasons on which the judgment is based are apparent. The question whether a judgment is so deficient in reasoning as to amount to a denial of the right to a fair hearing and a failure of justice, is therefore one which necessarily has to be appreciated in the light both of the particular case and of the judgment as a whole."

JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES GÖLCÜKLÜ, MATSCHER SIR VINCENT EVANS, BERNHARDT AND GERSING

We share the starting-point of the present judgment that Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1) extends only to disputes over civil rights and obligations which can be said, on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law (see paragraph 40 of the judgment). But in our opinion this condition is not fulfilled in the present case.

The wording of Article 471 of the Belgian Judicial Code makes it quite clear that the power of the Council of the Ordre des avocats to readmit a person to the Bar is a discretionary one which however can only be exercised if certain conditions are satisfied. The relevant conditions are:

(a) ten years must have elapsed since the decision to strike the avocat from the roll; and

(b) exceptional circumstances must warrant readmission (when such circumstances exist, has never been clarified by law or practice).

If these conditions are fulfilled, restoration to the roll may be granted. In view of this legal situation, it does not appear that any right can be considered to exist under domestic law.

This view is supported by the history of the relevant provision of Belgian law (see paragraph 30 of the judgment and the memorial of the Government) as well as by the express exclusion of any appeal.

Even if one considers the Belgian law concerning readmission to the Bar to be highly unsatisfactory, it is not up to the international judge to interpret the internal law in contradiction to its wording and the relevant national practice.

Since, in our opinion, no right exists, the question does not arise whether such rights could be qualified as civil rights under Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.