JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES RYSSDAL, THÓR VILHJÁLMSSON, AND GÖLCÜKLÜ

As to the alleged violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention, we can subscribe only in part to the finding of the Court.

I.   Introduction

The separation of children from their parents through a care decision taken by a State authority is certainly a serious interference with family life. In this respect it is important to protect parents and children against arbitrary intervention. The State concerned must be able to demonstrate that the views and interests of the parents have been duly taken into account and that the whole decision-making process is such as to ensure that the measures adopted are necessary to safeguard the children ’ s interests.

An important feature of the relevant Swedish legislation is the possibility of judicial proceedings before the administrative courts and the competence of those courts to examine fully whether children should be taken into care and how a care decision should be implemented.

It is established that different social authorities had been involved with the Olsson family to a considerable extent prior to the events giving rise to the present case. There had been continuing and intensive contacts, including contacts with Mr. and Mrs. Olsson. Home-therapy had been tried without success. According to the examination of the facts and evidence conducted by the Social District Council and the competent domestic courts, the parents were not able to deal satisfactorily with the children, and in August-September 1980 the latter ’ s needs created some kind of an emergency situation with the result that the Council considered it necessary to take them into care.

II. The care decision

We agree with the Court that the decision to take the children into care and its maintenance in force until 1987 did not give rise to a violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention, for the reasons given in paragraphs 71-74 and 75-77, respectively, of the judgment. In this context we would emphasise two facts: firstly, the Council ’ s decision of 16 September 1980 was confirmed by adequately reasoned judgments of the County Administrative Court (30 December 1980) and of the Administrative Court of Appeal (8 July 1981); secondly, the Council ’ s subsequent refusal to terminate care was confirmed by adequately reasoned judgments of the County Administrative Court (17 November 1982) and of the Administrative Court of Appeal (28 December 1982).

III. The implementation of the care decision

Paragraph 78 of the Court ’ s judgment states that the applicants complained of ( i ) the placement of the children separately and at a long distance from each other and their parents; (ii) the restrictions on and the conditions of visits; and (iii) the conditions in the homes where the children were placed.

First of all we would like to stress - as the Court has also done - that there is nothing to suggest that the Swedish authorities did not act in good faith in implementing the care decision.

As to the last of the complaints listed above, we agree with the Court that it is not established that the quality of the care given to the children in the homes where they were placed was not satisfactory. This complaint must accordingly be rejected.

As to the complaint about the placement, which mainly concerns the placement of Helena and Thomas far away from Gothenburg, we would first say that when a care decision - as in the present case - is to be regarded as a temporary measure, it is generally desirable to place the children in foster homes that are not far away from their parents ’ home. However, in view of Mr. and Mrs. Olsson ’ s conduct in the autumn of 1980 - their removal and hiding of Stefan -, it was quite reasonable for the Council to consider that Helena and Thomas could not be placed in foster homes in the Gothenburg region. It seems unfortunate that they were placed at so great a distance from Gothenburg, but it may have been difficult to find foster parents able and willing to satisfy the special needs of these two children. In our opinion, the Council ’ s view that it was not appropriate to place both of them in the same foster home has to be accepted. Moreover, we are satisfied that the Council did really try to place them in the same village, but that this became impossible because one of the chosen families in the end declined to receive the child. In any event, the national authorities must enjoy a considerable discretion in this respect, since the decision on such a matter has to be based on an overall appraisal of a number of facts, including the availability of suitable foster homes and the needs of the children taken into care.

As to the restrictions on visits, it should be mentioned that the County Administrative Court confirmed them on two occasions and that, after its decision of 3 October 1985 , Mr. and Mrs. Olsson withdrew their appeal on this point in subsequent proceedings before the Administrative Court of Appeal (see paragraph 24 of the European Court ’ s judgment). Moreover, they did not make full use of their entitlement to visit in accordance with the decisions taken and, on the subject of contacts with the children, their whole attitude seems to have been rather negative as regards co-operation with the foster parents and the social authorities (see paragraphs 25 and 26 of the judgment).

In the particular circumstances of the case and taking into account the domestic authorities ’ margin of appreciation, we have come to the conclusion that the measures taken in implementation of the care decision could reasonably be considered necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and that they accordingly did not give rise to a violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention.