SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER

(Translation)

Like the majority of my colleagues, I consider that there would be a violation of the applicants ’ fundamental rights "in the event of the decision to deport Mr Beldjoudi being implemented".

But which right or rights are these?

Our colleague Mr Martens was right to wonder whether the case did not concern their right to respect for their private life just as much as their right to respect for their family life. I agree to a great extent with his observations [*] .

It seems to me, however, that ultimately, bearing in mind the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 77 and 78 of the judgment, the deportation of Mr Beldjoudi, with respect to both applicants, would not merely constitute an unacceptable interference with their private and family life, but would actually b e inhuman treatment [*]  .

This would be so, not indirectly because of what might await them in Algeria - that i s not the point in issue here [*]   - but directly, in that Mr Beldjoudi would be ejected, after over forty years, from a country which has always in fact been "his" since birth, even though he does not possess its "nationality".

While it is true, as the documents in the case show, that Mr Beldjoudi has already been convicted of numerous offences, mostly comparatively serious ones, and is now once more under suspicio n of having committed others [*]    , he can be sufficiently punished for these by the criminal law.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE VALTICOS

(Translation)

I regret that I must express my dissent from the opinion of the majority of the Court, who have concluded that there was a violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention in the instant case, with reference in particular to Mr Beldjoudi ’ s family life.

My explanation need not be long, as it is based in essence on the dissenting opinion I gave in the similar, although not identical, case of the youth Moustaquim.

The differences between the two cases cut both ways: on the one hand, the present case concerns the ties between a husband and his wife, not those between a young man and his family. On the other hand, young Moustaquim ’ s criminal behaviour consisted of the offences of an adolescent, very numerous but for the most part comparatively unimportant, whereas here there were repeated crimes of violence committed by a person aged about forty, who had been sentenced to nearly eleven years ’ imprisonment in less than seventeen years. Moreover, the Court acknowledged that Mr Beldjoudi ’ s criminal record was "much worse".

The deportation of aliens - which one can understand being contemplated in a case as serious as this one - is a prerogative of States, and its use is restricted by the Convention (Article 5 para. 1 (f) of the Convention and Protocols Nos. 4 and 7) (art. 5-1-f, P4, P7) only in well-defined cases. This is not one of them.

Admittedly, the Court has in the present case interposed the concept of family life, which is protected by Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention. It considers that there was on the part of the Government an interference by a public authority with the exercise of the applicants ’ right to respect for their family life. One may well wonder, however, whether Article 8 (art. 8) is really applicable to a case such as this and whether it was designed to prohibit the deportation of aliens married to citizens of the host country. Such an interpr État ion might open the way to many abuses.

In any event, it does not seem to me to be possible to use Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention to restrict the right of States to take deportation measures, where they have valid reasons for deciding on them in defence of public safety, and where their effect on family life is only an indirect consequence.