SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER

(Translation)

I. T he merits

1. The fundamental aim of the injunction in issue was to prohibit the applicant associations from helping pregnant women within the jurisdiction of the Irish State to travel outside Ireland to have abortions; the very terms of the injunction made this clear [1] .

The injunction clarified its scope by citing expressly three ways of providing the prohibited assistance. These were: referring the pregnant women to a clinic, making travel arrangements for them and informing them of the identity and location of and the method of communication with a specified clinic or clinics. Such methods were, however, only examples, since the prohibition also covered any assistance provided "otherwise".

2. As the Court points out, the applicants would seem to have confined their complaint to that part of the injunction which concern ed the provision of information [2] .

In this respect I take the view, like the majority of my colleagues but on different grounds, that there has been a violation of the freedom of expression. I reached this conclusion for the reasons set out in the separate opinion that I and several other judges submitted in the Observer and Guardian case with regard to the prior restraints which were in issue in that case [3] .

3. Clearly the present case is not one involving the press like the Observer and Guardian case. However, the freedom of expression also exists for those who exercise it otherwise than through the press.

4. It is true, equally, that the applicant associations were restrained from communicating information only in so far as such information was intended to help pregnant women obtain abortions outside Ireland, and thus evade the restrictions resulting from the prohibition and punishment of abortion in Ireland itself and, in particular, violate the right of unborn children to be born.

In this context, it is indeed essentially that right which is at stake, much more so than the protection of morals, and this therefore also raises serious problems from the point of view of Articles 2, 17 and 60 (art. 2, art. 17, art. 60) of the Convention.

There could thus be very good reasons justifying the adoption of criminal provisions punishing the communication of information of this type, but I do not think that they could warrant a derogation from the, in my view essential, principle that the imposition of prior restraints on the exercise of the freedom of expression, even where they take the form of judicial i njunctions, cannot be permitted [4] .

5. There was, of course, nothing to preclude the imposition of restrictions of this nature in respect of the activities by which the applicant associations helped, otherwise than by the communication of information or ideas, pregnant women to obtain abortions.

II. A pplication of article 50 (Art. 50)

As regards the damage which Dublin Well Woman claims to have sustained, I consider that, in the circumstances of the case and in particular in view of the fact that the communication of information represented only one of the aspects of this association ’ s activity, it is not entitled to compensation.

I subscribe to the conclusions set out in the judgment concerning the costs and expenses.