PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MARUSTE

To my regret I do not share the majority view that there has been no violation of Article 8 in respect of the applicant ’ s complaint concerning the travel ban, and that the Court ’ s assessment and finding in that respect should be confined to Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. I am of the opinion that Article 8 has also been infringed in this case, for the following reasons.

According to my understanding, the scope of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 is narrow and relates, stricto sensu , to liberty of movement and freedom to choose a residence. It clearly does not cover all the problems and complaints raised by the applicant. It is obvious that the restrictions placed on the applicant ’ s right of movement had a direct impact on her private and family life. It is scarcely credible that the fact that the applicant was prevented for nine and a half years from leaving Bulgaria, and thus could not visit her husband, her adult daughter and her grandchildren who lived in Austria did not adversely affect her family life. This, by the way, was not disputed by the Government.

It is true that there were no legal obstacles to the applicant ’ s family visiting her or even settling with her in Bulgaria . But it is taking matters too far if we accept that a financial (tax) dispute between an individual and the State entitles the State to place an additional burden on other people who are not parties to the dispute or otherwise linked to it and who, moreover, are nationals of another State. In this case the State opted for the most stringent, not to say punitive, restrictions while other legal options for securing resolution of the tax dispute were not considered. The restrictions were therefore disproportionate. Unfortunately, the domestic courts and administrative authorities were rather formalistic and legalistic in their approach, and did not explore other means of collecting the debt. Nor did they have regard to the fact that other rights of the applicant, including her right to respect for her private and family life, were infringed as a result. Accordingly, a fair balance was not struck between the public interest and the applicant ’ s rights.

Although I voted for a non-violation of Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention in respect of the refusal of the applicant ’ s request to renounce her Bulgarian citizenship, as a separate issue, my second argument in favour of a violation of Article 8 in general is that I see nationality (citizenship) as part of someone ’ s identity. If Article 8 covers the right to self-determination in respect of, for example, sexual orientation and so forth, it undoubtedly also covers the right to self determination in respect of nationality and citizenship. It is true that the Convention does not guarantee the right to citizenship. But it follows from the general idea of freedom, freedom of choice and self-determination that there should be a right to apply for citizenship and also a negative right to renounce it. This is part of the social, cultural and political self-determination of the individual which, to my

mind, also falls within the general scope of Article 8. Furthermore, under Bulgarian law, renunciation of citizenship cannot result in exemption of the individual from the obligation to pay his or her tax debts. Consequently, the refusal was unnecessary and arbitrary and infringed the applicant ’ s rights under Article 8.