CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE VAJI Ć

1. I regret that I am unable to share the reasoning of the majority in the present case. My finding of a violation is based on reasoning different from th at set out in paragraphs 114 and 115 of the judgment. I refer in this respect to my concurring opinion in the case of Staroszczyk v. Poland, judgment of 22 M arch 2007.

2. In the majority ' s view , the main reason for finding a violation in the present case was due to the fact that - in the absence of domestic regulations specifying the time-frame within which clients should be informed of a refusal to prepare a cassation appeal - the applicant met with her lawyer only three days before the time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal was due to expire. The Court was of the view that , in the circumstances of th is case , it would have been impossible for the applicant to find a new lawyer. Consequently, the brevity of the time remaining to the applicant to take any steps to have the cassation appeal in her case prepared and lodged by another lawyer did not give her a realistic opportunity of having her case brought to and argued before the cassation court.

3. I agree that there has been a violation of the applicant ' s right in this case. However, I should like to point out that it is not necessary that all the details of a legal aid mechanism be strictly regulated in domestic law ( for example, the time-frame for a refusal to prepare a cassation appeal). The accessibility, quality and diligence of advice provided by lawyers should be the same , whether or not provided under a legal aid scheme. Had the legal aid system functioned properly and efficiently , making legal aid accessible in all circumstances, there might have been enough time for the applicant to take additional steps to seek advi c e from another lawyer and to have an appeal prepared , even at a very late stage prior to the expiry of the time - limit for lodging such appeal s . Th us , within an efficient legal aid system , the lack of time, even if it placed the applicant in a difficult situation, might not in itself have been enough to result in a violation of the applicant ' s right of access to a court . In this respect , I consider t hat the situation cannot be compared to th at in the case of Tabor v. Poland ( no. 12825/02, judgment of 27 June 2006 ) , where the Court did find a violation , in a case where the national court dealt with the applicant ' s request for legal aid in a way which left him without any realistic opportunity of seeking legal assistance of his choice in lodging a cassation appeal. In the Court ' s view , the manner in which the relevant court handled the applicant ' s request for legal aid was not compatible with the requirement of diligence ( see Tabor v. Poland, cited above, § 46).

In the present case, it is instead the existing , albeit defective, framework of the legal aid mechanism as such, as set out in point 3 of my concurring opinion in Staroszczyk v. Poland (cited above ) , which placed the applicant in a position in which “her efforts to have access to a court secured in a ' concrete and effective manner ' by way of legal representation appointed under the legal aid system failed” ( see paragraph 116 of the judgment).