DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI

I regret very much that it is impossible for me to share the majority ’ s finding that th ere has been a violation of Article 6 in the case before us.

I fully agree with Judge Bratza ’ s position, expressed in his Dissenting Opinion, and readily join him.

At the same time I find it necessary to add a few words of my own concerning the fourth-instance nature of the present application.

It is generally accepted that the standard of proof applicable in criminal proceedings when finding a person guilty is “beyond a reasonable doubt”. This is the standard trial judges must apply after properly conducted judicial examination of the case.

It is not open to international judges to re-assess the facts and the law in the place of national courts, because international judges do not have the possibility to fully examine charges brought against an accused, because they do not have suff icient knowledge of the member-S tate ’ s language, or of its national legislation or the practical application thereof. But to examine this issue in abstracto , in my view, would run counter to the basic principles of justice.

In so far as the applicant ’ s complaint may be understood to concern assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before the domestic courts, it is necessary to reiterate that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, the Court ’ s duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28 , ECHR 1999 ‑ I ).

That is why it is not by chance that the European Court of Human Rights has constantly refused to act as a “fourth-instance” court.

The same issue arises before us once more in the case of Gradinar v. Moldova .

In substance, the applicant complained mainly about the assessment of evidence and the result of the proceedings before the domestic courts. This Court has already stated on numerous occasions that it is not its task to act as an appeal court of “fourth instance” by calling into question the outcome of domestic proceedings. The domestic courts are best placed to assess the credibility of witnesses and the relevance of evidence to the issues in the case and to interpret and apply the rules of substantive and procedural law

(see, amongst many authorities, Vidal v. Belgium , judgment of 22 April 1992, Series A no. 235 ‑ B, pp. 32-33, § 3 3 ).

During the domestic proceedings the applicant had the benefit of adversarial proceedings. She was legally represented throughout the proceedings and was able to present her position and call witnesses in support of her case. She failed to submit any single piece of evidence that the national judicial authorities had in any way restrained her rights or acted in any other arbitrary manner.

The national courts held hearings on the merits of the case , heard statements from all necessary witnesses and the accused, and examined and assessed all the evidence at their disposal. Moreover, the factual and legal reasons for the national courts ’ findings were set out at length both in the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 31 January 2000 and in that of the Supreme Court of Justice of 30 May 2000. In their judgments the national judicial authorities gave a very persuasive and detailed analysis of all the relevant circumstances of the case. In no way may their findings be considered “arbitrary” or “unreasonable” .

Moreover, even the majority in their finding of a violation in the present case do not allege that Mr. G ’ s conviction was “arbitrary or unreasonable”.

Insofar as the relevant domestic decisions do not reveal any manifestly arbitrary reasoning, I consider that the applicant ’ s complaint under Article 6 § 1 is manifestly ill-founded and should have been rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention or, alternatively, that no violation should have been found in the instant case.