PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KOVLER

I share the conclusions of the Chamber as to the admissibility of the remainder of the application, in view of the seriousness of the applicants ' allegations. I also concur with its conclusions concerning the violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention, as the reasoning of the Chamber follows the approach established in the case of Nasrulloyev v. Russia (no. 656/06, 11 October 2007), in which the Court found that the legal provisions on detention pending extradition did not meet the “quality of law” requirement, in breach of Article 5 § 1, and did not provide for judicial review of such detention, contrary to Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

My dissent concerns some of the other conclusions.

1. In my opinion, the finding of a potential violation of Article 3 of the Convention “in the event of the extradition orders against the applicants being enforced” constitutes a radical reading of the recent judgment in Saadi v. Italy (no. 37201/06, [GC], judgment of 28 February 2008), and especially of the following conclusion: “The weight to be given to assurances from the receiving State depends, in each case, on the circumstances obtaining at the material time” (see Saadi , cited above, § 148). It will be recalled that in the Grand Chamber ' s judgment in the case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey concerning extradition to the same country – Uzbekistan – the Court concluded as follows, taking into account an assurance obtained from the Uzbek Government before the extradition date: “In the light of the material before it, the Court is not able to conclude that substantial grounds existed at the aforementioned date for believing that the applicants faced a real risk of treatment proscribed by Article 3” (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, § 77, ECHR 2005-I).

The Chamber justified this departure from Mamatkulov by assessing the current position of the applicants in the light of the evolution of the situation in the receiving country, as stipulated by our case-law (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V, § 86). I could agree with this approach if I were persuaded that the extradition of the applicants was inevitable or was even carried out. But the Chamber ' s analysis of the facts of this extremely sensitive and constantly evolving case stops with the applicants ' release on 5 March 2007 (that is, more than one year before adoption of the judgment!) (§ 50) and with the ruling of the Ivanovo Regional Court of 27 March 2007 upholding the decisions releasing them (§ 51). According to the Russian media the applicants left Russian territory for “third countries”; however, this information was not confirmed or refuted by the parties and the Court did not take the trouble to obtain information concerning the applicants ' current situation (the application of Rules 39 and 41 of the Rules of Court provides such an opportunity). As my colleague Judge Zupančič stressed in his concurring opinion in Saadi , speaking about the “Chahal test”, “one cannot prove a future event to any degree of probability because the law of evidence is a logical rather than a prophetic exercise. It is therefore an understatement to say that the application of the Chahal test is ' to some degree speculative ' ” (see Saadi , cited above, concurring opinion of Judge Zupančič). Accordingly, I favoured a clear position of non-violation over a “prophetic exercise” or “some degree of speculation”, precisely because of the lack of specific information concerning the current situation of the applicants.

2. The second point of my disagreement concerns the alleged violation of Article 6 § 2 on the ground of a breach of the presumption of innocence owing to the wording of the prosecutor ' s decision on extradition. I agree with the Ivanovo Regional Court ' s position that the extradition decision simply described the charges against the applicants, as received from the Uzbek authorities, and did not contain any findings as to their guilt.

I would recall that in its decision in Zollmann v. the United Kingdom the Court stated: “Article 6 § 2, in its relevant aspect, is aimed at preventing the undermining of a fair criminal trial by prejudicial statements made in close connection with those proceedings. Where no such proceedings are, or have been in existence, statements attributing criminal or other reprehensible conduct are relevant rather to considerations of protection against defamation and adequate access to court to determine civil rights and raising potential issues under Articles 8 and 6 of the Convention” (see Zollmann v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 62902/00, 27 November 2003).

In the present case the applicants were not charged with any criminal offence in Russia , nor was there any pending or intended criminal investigation against them in Russia , the outcome of which might have been said to be prejudged by the statements of the First Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation . Moreover, I cannot consider that any close link, in legislation, practice or fact, was established between the statements by the Russian prosecutor and the criminal proceedings pending against the applicants in Uzbekistan . I saw no need to speculate as to how the prosecutor ' s statements (despite their strictly professional wording) might have unduly influenced the judicial authorities of another sovereign State competent to decide on the applicants ' guilt or innocence.

3. As I voted only on the violation of Article 5 § 1 and § 4 of the Convention, it is logical that the amounts in respect of non-pecuniary damage could be reduced. As to the costs of legal representation, I recall that in other comparable and no less complicated cases the Court awarded the lawyers much more modest amounts (EUR 1,400 in Nasrulloyev and EUR 790 in Garabayev ): a simple arithmetical multiplication by the number of applicants is not fair in my view.