OPINION: The medical documentation and the patient ’ s condition can be linked to the harmful act in question and the injuries sustained by the plaintiff on that occasion.

Pain of significant intensity lasted two days, of medium intensity three days and of minor intensity one week.

The remaining minor, occasional pains are caused by increased physical effort.

The initial fear was intense and short in duration. Secondary fear (in respect of the injuries and their consequences) of significant intensity lasted a day, of medium intensity three days and of minor intensity a week.

The medical documentation and examination of the victim did not reveal any lasting consequences from the harmful act.

The plaintiff did not require assistance from other persons.”

The civil proceedings before the Zaprešić Municipal Court are still pending.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

Criminal Code

46 . The relevant parts of the Criminal Code ( Kazneni zakon , Official Gazette no. 110/1997) provide :

Article 8

“(1) Criminal proceedings in respect of criminal offences shall be instituted by the State Attorney ’ s Office in the interest of the Republic of Croatia and its citizens.

(2) In exceptional circumstances the law may provide for criminal proceedings in respect of certain criminal offences to be instituted on the basis of a private prosecution or for the State Attorney ’ s Office to institute criminal proceedings following [a private] application.”

BODILY INJURY

Article 98

“ Anyone who inflicts bodily injury on another or impairs another ’ s health shall be fined or sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.”

Article 102

“Criminal proceedings for the offence of inflicting bodily injury (Article 98) shall be instituted by means of a private prosecution.”

TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT

Article 176

“A public official, or another person acting at the instigation or with the explicit or tacit acquiescence of a public official, who inflicts on another person pain or grave suffering, whether physical or mental, for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one to eight years.”

Code of Criminal Procedure

47 . The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( Zakon o kaznenom postupku , Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002 and 62/2003) provide:

Article 2

“(1) Criminal proceedings shall be instituted and conducted at the request of a qualified prosecutor only. ...

(2) In respect of criminal offences subject to public prosecution the qualified prosecutor shall be the State Attorney and in respect of criminal offences to be prosecuted privately the qualified prosecutor shall be a private prosecutor.

(3) Unless otherwise provided by law, the State Attorney shall undertake a criminal prosecution where there is a reasonable suspicion that an identified person has committed a criminal offence subject to public prosecution and where there are no legal impediments to the prosecution of that person.

(4) Where the State Attorney finds that there are no grounds to institute or conduct criminal proceedings, the injured party as a subsidiary prosecutor may take his place under the conditions prescribed by this Act.”

Articles 47 to 61 regulate the rights and duties of private prosecutor s and of injured part ies acting as subsidiary prosecutor s . The Criminal Code distinguishes between these two roles. A private prosecutor ( privatni tužitelj ) is an injured party who brings a private prosecution in respect of criminal offences for which such prosecution is expressly prescribed by the Criminal Code (these are offences of a lesser degree). The injured party as a subsidiary prosecutor ( oštećeni kao tužitelj ) takes over criminal proceedings in respect of criminal offences subject to public prosecution where the relevant prosecuting authorities, for whatever reason, have decided not to prosecute. Pursuant to Article 47, where the prosecution is brought privately, the charge must be lodged with the relevant authority within three months after the qualified prosecutor has learnt of the offence and the identity of the perpetrator.

Article 48

“(1) A request to prosecute shall be lodged with the competent State Attorney ’ s Office and a private prosecution with the competent court.

(2) Where the injured party has lodged a criminal complaint ... he or she shall be considered to have thereby lodged a request to prosecute.

(3) Where the injured party has lodged a criminal complaint or a request to prosecute but the [competent authorities] establish that the criminal offence in question should be prosecuted on the basis of a private prosecution, the criminal complaint or the request to prosecute shall be treated as a timely private prosecution if it has been submitted within the time-limit prescribed for [bringing] a private prosecution ... ”

Pursuant to Article 55(1), the State Attorney is under a duty to inform the injured party within eight days of a decision not to prosecute and of that party ’ s right to take over the proceedings, as well as to instruct that party on the steps to be taken.

Juvenile Courts Act

48 . The relevant provisions of the Juvenile Courts Act ( Zakon o sudovima za mladež , Official Gazette nos. 111/1997, 27/1998 and 12/2002) read as follows:

Section 2

“A minor is a person who, at the time of the offence, was at least fourteen but not older than eighteen. A young adult is a person who, at the time of the offence, was at least eighteen but not older than twenty-one.”

Section 4

“(1) Sanctions in respect of minors who have committed criminal offences are educative measures, imprisonment of a minor and security measures.

... ”

Section 6

“(1) Educative measures are:

...

(2) special obligations

... ”

Section 9

“(1) A court may order a minor to fulfil one or more special obligations where it finds that appropriate orders or injunctions are needed to influence the minor and his or her conduct.

(2) A court may impose the following obligations:

...

7. to participate in the activities of humanitarian organisations or activities of communal or ecological interest .

...

(7) In connection with the obligation under paragraph 2, point 7 of this section a court may impose a maximum of one hundred and twenty working hours within a period of six months, so as not to hinder the minor ’ s education or regular employment;

(8) A competent Social Welfare Centre shall supervise the enforcement of the obligation ... ”

Section 45

“(1) Criminal proceedings against minors shall be instituted at the request of the State Attorney in respect of all criminal offences.

(2) Prosecution [of minors] in respect of criminal offences generally subject to private prosecution may be instituted if a person authorised [to initiate a private prosecution] has lodged an application for proceedings to be instituted with the competent State Attorney ’ s Office within three months of learning of the offence and the identity of the perpetrator.”

Section 46

“In criminal proceedings against a minor [the] victim cannot take the role of prosecutor.”

Section 62

“(1) Where the State Attorney has decided under section 45 of this Act that there is no ground to request that criminal proceedings be instituted against a minor (Article 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), he or she shall notify the victim of this and state the reasons for his or her decision ...

(2) Within eight days after notification [under paragraph 1] has been served on the victim, he or she may request a competent j uvenile council of a higher court to decide whether proceedings should be instituted. The d ivision shall decide after it has obtained the opinion of the State Attorney. The d ivision may decide that the proceedings should not be instituted at all or that they should be instituted before a j uvenile j udge.

(3) Where the d ivision has decided that proceedings should be instituted, the competent State Attorney ’ s Office shall take over the proceedings against a minor.”

Section 63

“(1) In respect of criminal offences which carry a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine, the State Attorney may decide not to request that criminal proceedings be instituted, despite the existence of a reasonable suspicion that a minor has committed such an offence, where the State Attorney considers that the proceedings against the minor would not fulfil any purpose in view of the nature of the offence and the circumstances under which it was committed, as well as the previous life and personality of the minor in question. In order to establish these facts, the State Attorney may request information from the [minor ’ s] parents ... other persons and institutions ... or interview the minor in question ...

(2) The State Attorney shall inform the competent Social Welfare Centre and the victim about his or her decision under paragraph 1 of this section and shall inform the latter of his or her right to bring any compensatory claim he or she might have in civil proceedings ... ”

Section 65

“ (1) The State Attorney may make his or her decision not to institute proceedings (section 63) subject to the minor ’ s willingness to:

...

(b) participate in the activities of humanitarian organisations or activities of communal or ecological interest (within the limits of section 9(2).22).

... ”

Section 68

“(1) A request that preparatory proceedings be instituted shall be lodged with a competent j uvenile j udge by the State Attorney.

(2) Where the j uvenile j udge agrees with the request she or he shall issue a decision that preparatory proceedings are to be instituted. ... ”

Rules on the State Attorney ’ s Office s

49 . The relevant part of the Rules on the State Attorney ’ s Offices ( Pravilnik o unutarnjem poslovanju u državnim odvjetništvima , Official Gazette no. 106/02) reads:

Section 49

“A victim, a party represented by a State Attorney ’ s Office ... or an interested person, other than a suspect, an accused or an opposing party in the proceedings, may consult a criminal, civil or other case file held by the State Attorney. Such person s may also be allowed to copy the case file in whole or in part.

Permission to consult or copy the case file shall be given by the State Attorney or the official in charge of a particular case file.”

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE S 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION

50 . The applicant complained that the domestic authorities had not afforded him adequate protection against a serious act of violence and that he had had no effective remedy in respect thereof. The applicant relied on Article 3 of the Convention, taken alone and together with Article 13 of the Convention . The relevant A rticles provide:

Article 3

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

Article 13

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

51 . The Government contested that argument.

A. Admissibility

52 . The Government requested the Court to declare this part of the application inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Relying on the Court ’ s decision in the case of Duchonova v. the Czech Republic ( (dec . ), no. 29858/03, 2 October 2006), they submitted that the applicant ’ s civil action for damages in respect of the injuries and fears he had suffered was still pending.

53 . The applicant argued that he had exhausted all remedies and that the only remedy capable of providing adequate redress for the ill-treatment sustained in violation of Article 3 of the Convention was of a criminal-law nature.

54 . The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention obliges applicants to use first the remedies that are normally available and sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies must be sufficiently certain, in practice as well as in theory, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. However, Article 35 § 1 does not require that recourse should be had to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (see Aksoy v. Turkey , 18 December 1996, §§ 51-52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, and Barta v. Hungary , no. 26137/04, § 45, 10 April 2007 ).

55 . As to the Government ’ s reference to the case of Duchonova , the Court notes that the criminal offences complained of by the applicant in that case were those of defamation and blackmail and that the application in that case concerned Article 8 of the Convention. Therefore, the case of Duchonova is not comparable to the present case, which concerns physical violence against the applicant.

56 . The Court notes further that the applicant did indeed bring a civil action for damages against his assailants which is still pending . However, the Court is inclined to believe that effective deterrence against grave acts such as attacks on the physical integrity of a person, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, requires efficient criminal-law provisions (see, mutatis mutandis , X and Y v. the Netherlands , 26 March 1985, § 27, Series A no. 91; August v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 36505/02, 21 January 2003; and M.C. v. Bulgaria , no. 39272/98, § 1 50, ECHR 2003 ‑ XII ). The civil remedies relied on by the Government cannot be regarded as sufficient for the fulfilment of a Contracting State ’ s obligations under Article 3 of the Convention in cases such as the present one, as they are aimed at awarding damages rather than identifying and punishing those responsible (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria , 28 October 1998, § 85, Reports 1998-VIII). In this connection the Court reiterates that an obligation for the State to apply adequate criminal-law mechanisms cannot be considered in principle to be limited solely to cases of ill-treatment by State agents (see M.C. , cited above , § 151, and Å ečić v. Croatia , no. 40116/02, § 53, 31 May 2007).

57 . The Court finds that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further finds that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties ’ submissions

(a) The applicant

58 . The applicant argued that in view of the severity of the attack against him and the injuries he had sustained, Article 3 was applicable to the present case. As to the compliance of the State with its positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant argued that real and effective protection from the act of ill-treatment required effective investigation and prosecution. In this connection he stressed that the State ’ s positive obligation could not be limited to merely conducting an investigation. An investigation did not serve any purpose on its own, nor, alone, did it provide any protection against and redress for ill-treatment where it was not accompanied by effective follow - up. He maintained that the State authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into his case and that they had also failed to apply the relevant criminal-law mechanisms in an adequate manner. The investigating authorities had failed to act effectively and numerous mistakes and delays had occurred, causing the prosecution to become time-barred. In the applicant ’ s view, the time-barring itself amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. Although the assailant s had admitted in their interviews with the police that they had hit the applicant, the State Attorney ’ s Office had brought a criminal prosecution against only one of them, B.B.

59 . He also contended that he had not been allowed to take an active part in the proceedings because he had never been informed of the steps taken in the pre-trial proceedings, including the decision of 26 May 2003. The authorities had also failed to inform him of the medical report drawn up during the investigation stage. Thus, he had had no opportunity to challenge the medical reports.

60 . In the applicant ’ s view the fact that the assailant s had been charged on an individual basis rather than with participation in a group attack was in itself a violation of the State ’ s positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention. He also referred to the erroneous instructions from the State Attorney ’ s Office in respect of the prosecution of B.B. He further argued that S.T. and D.E. had also been minors at the time of the offence and that therefore they too should have been prosecuted by the competent State Attorney ’ s Office, irrespective of the gravity of the applicant ’ s injuries.

61 . The applicant also alleged that, contrary to Article 13, he had had no effective remedy in practice for his complaint under Article 3. He stressed that only a criminal-law remedy, that is, an official investigation, would have been appropriate in the circumstances of the present case.

(b) The Government

62 . The Government argued that Article 3 was not applicable to the present case since the applicant had suffered only bodily injuries of a lesser nature. Should the Court nonetheless find Article 3 applicable, the Government maintained that the procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention did not require a judgment convicting the perpetrators of a crime. Therefore, the Court ’ s assessment should be limited to the effectiveness of the investigation. In that connection the Government stressed that there had been an investigation into the applicant ’ s allegations of an attack against him and that the State Attorney ’ s Office and the police had established all the relevant facts. They had heard evidence from the applicant, the alleged assailant s and two independent witnesses. These authorities had not found any indication that the attack on the applicant had been racially motivated. Since the alleged perpetrators had been either minors or young adults, special provisions were to be applied. The Government admitted that the criminal proceedings had been terminated owing to expiry of the statutory limitation period , but argued that that in itself could not amount to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

63 . As regards the complaint under Article 13, the Government argued firstly that since Article 3 was not applicable, there could be no violation of Article 13. Furthermore, the applicant could have lodged a civil claim for damages and had been informed of the results of the investigation.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

(a) Severity of the treatment

64 . The Court reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom , 25 March 1993, § 30, Series A no. 247-C, and A. v. the United Kingdom , 23 September 1998, § 20, Reports 1998 ‑ VI).

65 . Treatment has been held by the Court to be “inhuman” because, inter alia , it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 120, ECHR 2000-IV). Treatment has been considered “degrading” when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance (see Hurtado v. Switzerland , 28 January 1994, opinion of the Commission, § 67, Series A no. 280, and Wieser v. Austria , no. 2293/03, § 36, 22 February 2007 ).

66 . The Court notes that the applicant alleged that seven individuals had confronted him. They had attacked him by kicking him and hitting him all over his body. One of them had hit him in the head with a wooden plank, after which he had lost consciousness. The medical documentation shows that the applicant sustained numerous blows which caused contusions and lacerations on his head and body. The Court considers that acts of violence such as those alleged by the applicant in principle fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. In this connection it stresses that the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions and that the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies (see, mutatis mutandis , Selmouni v. France , [GC], no. 25803/94, § 101, ECHR 1999-V, and Mayeka and Mitunga v. Belgium , no. 13178/03, § 48, ECHR 2006 ‑ XI ). Furthermore, Article 3 of the Convention also requires the authorities to investigate allegations of ill-treatment when they are “arguable” and “raise a reasonable suspicion”, even if such treatment is administered by private individuals (see, Ay v. Turkey , no. 30951/96, §§ 59-60, 22 March 2005, and Mehmet Ãœmit Erdem v. Turkey , no. 42234/02, § 26, 17 July 2008).

67 . The Court has had special regard to the distinctive circumstances surrounding the attack on the applicant. It attaches particular importance to the fact that the applicant was physically attacked by seven individuals, in the evening and in an isolated place where any calls for help would appear to have been futile. Furthermore, the attack was premeditated, since the findings of the national authorities, including the statements made by the assailant s, reveal that they had planned to find and attack the applicant in retaliation for his previous attack against three of them. The act of violence in question was an assault on the applicant ’ s physical integrity. Such behaviour must have caused the applicant anxiety and fear to a significant degree, and was obviously aimed at intimidating and injuring him.

68 . In addition, the injuries sustained by the applicant cannot be said to have been of a merely trivial nature. In conclusion, having regard to the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers that the applicant ’ s allegations of ill-treatment were “arguable” and capable of “raising a reasonable suspicion” so as to attract the applicability of Article 3 of the Convention. It remains to be determined whether the authorities ’ response to the situation in respect of which the applicant sought their assistance was in line with their positive obligations flowing from Article 3 in conjunction with Article 1 of the Convention.

(b) Compliance with the State ’ s positive obligations

69 . Once the Court has found that the level of severity of violence inflicted by private individuals attracts protection under Article 3 of the Convention, its case-law is consistent and clear to the effect that this Article requires the implementation of adequate criminal-law mechanisms (see A. v. the United Kingdom ; M.C. ; and Šečić , all cited above). However, the scope of the State ’ s positive obligations might differ between cases where treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention has been inflicted through the involvement of State agents and cases where violence is inflicted by private individuals. The Court observes in the first place that no direct responsibility can attach to Croatia under the Convention for the acts of the private individuals in question.

70 . The Court observes, however, that even in the absence of any direct responsibility for the acts of a private individual under Article 3 of the Convention, State responsibility may nevertheless be engaged through the obligation imposed by Article 1 of the Convention. In this connection the Court reiterates that the obligation on the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see A. v. the United Kingdom , cited above, § 22).

71 . Furthermore, Article 3 requires States to put in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against personal integrity, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions (see, mutatis mutandis , A. v. the United Kingdom , cited above, § 22, and Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 96, ECHR 2005-VII), and this requirement also extends to ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see Šečić , cited above, § 53). On the other hand, it goes without saying that the obligation on the State under Article 1 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as requiring the State to guarantee through its legal system that inhuman or degrading treatment is never inflicted by one individual on another or that, if it is, criminal proceedings should necessarily lead to a particular sanction . In order that a State may be held responsible it must in the view of the Court be shown that the domestic legal system, and in particular the criminal law applicable in the circumstances of the case, fails to provide practical and effective protection of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 (see X and Y , cited above, § 30, and A. v. the United Kingdom , cited above, opinion of the Commission, § 48).

72 . As to the criminal-law mechanisms provided in the Croatian legal system in connection with the State ’ s obligations under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court notes at the outset that the only criminal offence that expressly prohibits torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment relates solely to the acts of a State official or another person acting with the acquiescence of such an official, whereas violent acts committed by private individuals are prohibited in a number of separate provisions of the Criminal Code. The Court observes further that Croatian criminal law distinguishes between criminal offences to be prosecuted by the State Attorney ’ s Office, either of its own motion or on a private application, and criminal offences to be prosecuted by means of a private prosecution. The latter category concerns criminal offences of a lesser nature.

73 . The Court further observes that the Croatian legal system also allows the injured party to act as a subsidiary prosecutor. In respect of criminal offences for which the prosecution is to be undertaken by the State Attorney ’ s Office, either of its own motion or on a private application, where the Office declines to prosecute on whatever ground, the injured party may take over the prosecution as a subsidiary prosecutor. In contrast, a private prosecution is undertaken from the beginning by a private prosecutor. However, the prosecution of minors must always be undertaken by the State.

74 . The Court will now examine whether or not the impugned regulations and practices, and in particular the domestic authorities ’ compliance with the relevant procedural rules, as well as the manner in which the criminal-law mechanisms were implemented in the instant case, were defective to the point of constituting a violation of the respondent State ’ s positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.

75 . In respect of the duty to investigate, the minimum standards applicable, as defined by the Court ’ s case-law, include the requirements that the investigation be independent, impartial and subject to public scrutiny, and that the competent authorities act with diligence and promptness (see, for example, Çelik and İmret v. Turkey , no. 44093/98, § 55, 26 October 2004). In addition, for an investigation to be considered effective, the authorities must take whatever reasonable steps they can to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia , a detailed statement concerning the allegations from the alleged victim, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, additional medical reports (see, in particular, Batı and Others v. Turkey (nos. 33097/96 and 57834/00, § 134, ECHR 2004-IV (extracts)).

76 . As regards the steps taken by the national auth orities , the Court notes that the police promptly conducted interviews with all of the assailant s, the applicant and two neutral witnesses. They also obtained a medical report on the applicant ’ s injuries and filed a criminal complaint against the assailant s with the competent State Attorney ’ s Office. However, the further steps taken by the prosecuting authorities and the courts cannot be seen as satisfying the requirement of effectiveness of the criminal - law mechanisms for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention .

77 . T he Court ’ s case-law shows that the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention may go beyond the stage of the investigation. So far the Court has addressed this issue in situations where the alleged ill-treatment was perpetrated by State officials. The relevant principles were stated as follows in its judgment in Ali and Ayşe Duran v. Turkey (no. 42942/02, 8 April 2008):

“61. The requirements of Articles 2 and 3 go beyond the stage of the official investigation, where this has led to the institution of proceedings in the national courts: the proceedings as a whole, including the trial stage, must satisfy the requirements of the positive obligation to protect lives through the law and the prohibition of ill-treatment. While there is no absolute obligation for all prosecutions to result in conviction or in a particular sentence, the national courts should not under any circumstances be prepared to allow life-endangering offences and grave attacks on physical and moral integrity to go unpunished (see Öneryıldız , cited above , §§ 95 and 96; Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 104-109, ECHR 2000-VII; and Okkalı , cited above, § 65).

62. The important point for the Court to review, therefore, is whether and to what extent the courts, in reaching their conclusion, may be deemed to have submitted the case to the careful scrutiny required by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, so that the deterrent effect of the judicial system in place and the significance of the role it is required to play in preventing violations of the right to life and the prohibition of ill-treatment are not undermined (see Okkalı , cited above, § 66).”

78 . It must be stated at this juncture that it is not the Court ’ s task to verify whether the domestic courts correctly applied domestic criminal law; what is in issue in the present proceedings is not individual criminal-law liability, but the State ’ s responsibility under the Convention. T he Court must grant substantial deference to the national courts in the choice of appropriate measures, while also maintaining a certain power of review and the power to intervene in cases of manifest disproportion between the gravity of the act and the results obtained at domestic level (see, mutatis mutandis , Nikolova and Velichkova v. Bulgaria , no. 7888/03, § 62, 20 December 2007, and Atalay v. Turkey , no. 1249/03, § 40, 18 September 2008).

79 . In this connection the Court notes that the obligation on the State to bring to justice perpetrators of acts contrary to Article 3 of the Convention serves mainly to ensure that acts of ill-treatment do not remain ignored by the relevant authorities and to provide effective protection against acts of ill-treatment.

80 . The Court notes that in the present case, the State authorities filed an indictment only against B.B. , although the interviews conducted during the investigation clearly showed that the other six assailant s were also actively involved in the attack on the applicant. In this connection and as regards the applicant ’ s arguments that his Convention rights could be secured only if the assailant s were prosecuted by the State and that the Convention requires State-assisted prosecution, the Court firstly reiterates that its role is not to replace the national authorities and choose in their stead from among the wide range of possible measures that could suffice to secure adequate protection of the applicant from acts of violence. Within the limits of the Convention, the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 3 in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves is in principle a matter that falls within the domestic authorities ’ margin of appreciation, provided that criminal-law mechanisms are available to the victim. However, the Court also notes that under the relevant domestic laws the prosecution of minors must always be undertaken by the State. In the present case only the criminal proceedings against B.B., in his capacity as a minor, were undertaken by the competent State Attorney ’ s Office. In this connection the Court notes that four other assailant s, namely S.C., I.Š., F.P. and S.T. were also minors at the time of the attack on the applicant. However, the State Attorney ’ s Office failed to undertake a prosecution against them.

81 . As regards the proceedings instituted by the State authorities , the Court notes that on 4 July 2000 the Zagreb Police Department lodged a criminal complaint against B.B. with the Zagreb State Attor ne y ’ s Juvenile Office. However, initially no further steps were taken by that Office.

82 . On 12 June 2000 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Zagreb State Attorney ’ s Office against six identif ied assailant s, including B.B., and a seventh unknown individual. Th e Office remained inactive for eight months, until 12 March 2001, when it forwarded the complaint to the Velika Gorica State Attor ne y ’ s Office. The latter , however , decided not to instit u te criminal proceedings against B.B. on the g ro und that the injury he had allegedly inflicted on the applicant was only of a lesser nature and thus subject to private prosecution. This decision was in contravention of section 45 of the Juvenile Courts Act , which provides that c riminal proceedings against minors are to be instituted at the request of the State Attorney in respect of all criminal offences. This error was eventually rectified only when the applicant b ro ught a private prosecution again s t B.B. in the Juvenile Division of the Velika Gorica Municipal Court. Thus, the criminal proceedings against B.B. were properly instituted by the Zagreb County Court Juvenile Council only on 4 F ebruary 2002, almost two years after the incident, although the interviews conducted at the investigation stage had ended on 8 June 2000.

83 . Even when the criminal proceedings against B.B. wer e eventually instituted before the competent court, the first hearing was sc h eduled only for 2 November 2002, only to be adjourned because co u nsel for the defendant f ailed to appear. Another significant per i od of inactivity occurred between 26 May 2003 and 12 Feb r u a ry 2004 , and two months later, on 23 April 2004, the prosecution for the offence with which B.B. had been charged became time-barred, although a decision to that effect was adopted only on 21 December 2005.

84 . As to t he criminal proceedings concerning the remaining six assailant s, the Court notes that the app licant lodged a criminal complaint against them with the Velika Gorica State Attorney ’ s Office on 12 June 2000. However, this O ffice declared the complaint inadmissible only on 30 September 2002, again on the gr o und that a prosecution in respect of the c riminal offence of inflicting bodily harm had to be brought privately by the victim. As stated above, this conclusion was contrary to section 45 of the Juvenile Courts Act in respect of four assailant s, S.C., I.Š., F.P. and S.T. , who wer e also minors at the time of the incident at issue. This error was actually never rectified and in the end it was the applicant who lodged a private subsidiary indictment against the five suspects (all the assailants but B.B. and the one unidentified assailant) with the Velika Gorica Municipal Court , on 11 November 2002. Duri ng these proceedings reports were prepared by the competent Social Welfare Centre, but no hearing was held prior to 23 April 2004 , when the prosecution became ti me - barred. The first hearing was held after that date, on 28 October 2005 , and on 11 M ay 2006 the proceedings were discontinued .

85 . Thus, the facts of the case were never established by a comp e tent court of law. In this connection the Court notes that the main purpose of imposing criminal sanctions is to restrain and deter the offender from causing further harm. However, these aims can hardly be obtained without having the facts of the case established by a comp e tent criminal court. While the Court is satisfied that criminal sanctions against minors m a y in certain circumstances be replaced by such measures as community service, it cannot accept that the purpose of effective protection against acts of ill-treatment i s a chieved in any manner where the criminal pr ocee di ngs are discontinued ow ing to the fact that the prosecution has become time-barred and where this occur r ed , as is shown above, as a result of the inactivity of the relevant State authorities.

86 . In the Court ’ s view, the outcome of the criminal proceedings in the present case cannot be said to have had a sufficient deterrent effect on the individuals concerned, or to have been capable of ensuring the effective prevention of unlawful acts such as those complained of by the applicant. In conclusion, the Court considers that the above elements demonstrate that, in the particular circumstance s of this case, the relevant State authorities did not fulfil their positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention .

87 . In the Court ’ s view, the impugned practices , in the circumstances of the present case , did not provide adequate protection to the applicant against an act of serious violence and , together with the manner in which the criminal-law mechanisms were implemented in the instant case , were defective to the point of constituting a violation of the respondent State ’ s procedural obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.

88 . Having regard to the above the Court finds that there is no separate issue to be examined under Article 13 of the Convention.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 TAKEN IN CONJU N CTION WITH ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

89 . The applicant also complained that both his ill-treatment and the subsequent proceedings conducted by the authorities showed that he had been discriminated against on account of his ethnic origin. He relied on Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention. Article 14 reads as follows:

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

A. The parties ’ submissions

90 . The applicant maintained that the attack on him and the lack of action by the authorities had resulted from the fact that he was of Roma origin. He relied on the Nachova case and on the principle that a complaint of racist violence should be accorded utmost priority, as racist violence was particularly destructive of fundamental rights. In this respect the applicant pointed to the broader situation of the Roma population in Croatia as well as the recently published report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (Third Report on Croatia, CRI (2005) 24, 14 June 2005).

91 . The Government considered the applicant ’ s Article 14 complaint wholly unsubstantiated. They maintained that nothing in the conduct of the domestic authorities had indicated a difference in the treatment of the applicant on the basis of his Roma origin or a tendency to cover up events or encourage an attack to his detriment. The course of events had no connection with the ethnic origin of the applicant, but was the result of objective problems experienced by the prosecuting authorities during the proceedings.

92 . In this connection the Government enumerated several cases in which the police had been successful in identifying and prosecuting persons who had committed crimes against individuals of Roma origin. They claimed that no systemic problem s were encountered by the Roma population in Croatia other than their difficulties of integration into society, which were common also to other States signatory to the Convention.

B. The Court ’ s assessment

93 . The Court reiterates that when investigating violent incidents, State authorities have the additional duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask any racist motive and to establish whether or not ethnic hatred or prejudice may have played a role in the events. Admittedly, proving racial motivation will often be extremely difficult in practice. The respondent State ’ s obligation to investigate possible racist overtones to a violent act is an obligation to use best endeavours and is not absolute; the authorities must do what is reasonable in the circumstances of the case (see Nachova and Others, cited above, § 160 ) .

94 . The Court considers the foregoing to be necessarily true also in cases where the treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention is inflicted by private individuals. Treating racially induced violence and brutality on an equal footing with cases that have no racist overtones would be to turn a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. A failure to make a distinction in the way in which situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention (see Nachova and Others, cited above, with further references).

95 . In the present case, the Court observes that the police interview ed all the alleged assailants and well as the applicant in order to establish the relevant facts surrounding the attack on the applicant. The ir statements revealed that the applicant and the assailant s had belonged to the same group of friends until 8 December 1999, when the applicant and two other individuals had physically attacked three minors, D.E., S.C. and I.Š., and had also damaged a car owned by the mother of D.E. A few months later, the victims of that attack and their four friends decided to confront and attack the applicant. In the Court ’ s view these circumstances show that the attack on the applicant was rather an act of revenge for his previous attack , and provide no indication that the attack on the applicant was racially motivated.

96 . As to the applicant ’ s contention that one of his assailant , I.Š., had referred to the applicant ’ s Roma origin in his interview with the police, the Court notes that while it is true that I.Š. did so, there is nothing in his statement to indicate that the applicant ’ s Roma origin had played any role in the attack on him. In this connection the Court notes that I.Š. gave no indication that the assailants had attacked the applicant on account of his ethnic origin. The Court also notes that no ne of the other assailant s mentioned the applicant ’ s origin in any way.

97 . Lastly, the Court notes that neither in his interview with the police conducted soon after the attack, on 8 June 2000, nor in his evidence given before the Velika Gorica Municipal Court on 13 January 2003 did the applicant himself indicate that any of his assailants had made reference to his Roma origin. The facts of the case reveal that the applicant and his assailants had actually belonged to the same circle of friends , and there is no indication that the applicant ’ s race or ethnic origin played a role in any of the incidents.

98 . In conclusion, the Court considers that there is no evidence that the attack on the applicant was racially motivated. Therefore, in the circumstances of the present case there has been no violation of Article14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention .

IV . APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

99 . Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

100 . The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

101 . The Government argued that the applicant had submitted the same claim in the civil proceedings pending against his assailants and that his claim for non-pecuniary damage should therefore be rejected. In any event, they deemed the claim excessive.

102 . Having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated solely by the finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1 ,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him.

B. Costs and expenses

103 . The applicant also claimed EUR 12,975 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court and attached detailed documentation in support of his claim. This included the costs of the lawyer representing the applicant in the domestic proceedings (EUR 1,250), counsel ’ s fees and secretarial expenses . The hourly rates charged by the lawyers were as follows: EUR 70 in respect of the European Roma Rights C entre s taff lawyer and EUR 80 in respect of Mrs Kušan.

104 . The Government op posed the reimbursement of the app licant ’ s costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings. Furthermore, they argued that he had n ot submitted any proof of payment of any costs.

105 . According to the Court ’ s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. As to the criminal proceedings instituted by the applicant against his assailant s before the national authorities, the Court agrees that , as they were essentially aimed at remedying the violation of the Convention alleged before the Court, these domestic legal costs may be taken into account in assessing the claim for costs (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 284, ECHR 2006-...). In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court awards the applicant a sum of EUR 1,250 for costs and expenses in the proceedings before the national authorities . As to the Convention proceedings, making its assessment on an equitable basis and in the light of its practice in comparable cases, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant, who was legally represented, the sum of EUR 5,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on these amounts.

C. Default interest

106 . The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the application admissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;

3. Holds that there is no need to examine separately the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention;

4. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention ;

5. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, which are to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) EUR 1 ,000 ( one thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant;

(ii) EUR 6,250 (six thousand two hundred and fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6 . Dismisses the remainder of the applicant ’ s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 June 2009 , pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis Registrar President