PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DAVID THÓR BJÖRGVINSSON

1. I agree with the majority that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention as regards the costs payable by the applicant. However, I disagree that there has been no violation of that provision on account of the domestic court ' s f inding of a breach of privacy (“confidence”) against the applicant.

2. It is not disputed that the basic facts of Ms C ' s drug addiction and treatment were publishable in the public interest. This is so not only because she had earlier pronounced publicly that she did not take illegal drugs but also because she herself is a public figure who, as a n international fashion model and celebrity, has a direct interest in projecting a certain image of herself in the mind of the general public in order to exploit that image to promote her professional ventures and interests. In this light, Ms C ' s earlier statements that she did not take drugs can be seen as a n intentional projection of an inaccurate image. The applicant was therefore justified in alerting the public to the truth about her drug problem.

3. The main issue in dispute before the domestic c ourts was whether the publication of the additional information was justified. This additional information consisted of a report that Ms C was attending NA meetings, information about those meetings as well as two phot og raphs of her outside the NA centre . The majority of the Chamber agreed with the domestic courts that the publication of this additional information was not justified. It would seem that t he main reason for its stance is that the relevance and sufficiency of the reasoning of the House of Lords concerning the limits of the latitude given to an editor ' s decision to publish the additional material “is such that the Court does not find any reason, let alone a strong reason, to substitute its view for that of the final decision of the House of Lords or to prefer the decision of the minority over that of the majority of the House of Lords... ” ( paragraph 155 ). I find the approach of the Chamber to be unacceptable for a number of reasons.

4. Firstly, at least some of the principles applied by the House of Lords are not relevant in the balancing exercise. I refer in this regard to Baroness Hale ' s opinion that i t was “ not necessary to publish any further information ...” ( paragraph 152 of the judgment of the House of Lords and paragraph 38 above). T he test implied in that opinion is the wrong one . From the point of view of journalistic discretion in the presentation of a legitimate story , it is the restriction on freedom of expression that must be justified by reference to ' necessity ' and not the publication as such. Secondly, insofar as the relevant principles are concerned, they have not been correctly applied on all counts. I agree that the “public interest” test was corre ctly applied when the majority found that the publication of the original story was in the public interest. However, its finding that the publication of the additional material was not is difficult to justify . I find this distinction in principle between the original story and the supplementary material to be unconvincing.

5. However, in the final analysis, the majority simply defers to the assessment made by the domestic courts . This approach is inconsistent with the ' strict scrutiny ' that is usually found in this Court ' s case law in balancing Article 8 and Article 10 rights where the Court regularly makes it s own independent assessment of the facts involved and of the application of the relevant principles to those facts and it frequently substitutes its own views for those of the domestic c ourts. I t has been the consistent approach of this Court that it is not enough, in itself, that the domestic courts consider the relevant principles; they must also be applied correctly ( in this regard, see, for example , Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, ECHR 1999 ‑ I ; Von Hannover v. Germany , no. 59320/00, ECHR 2004 ‑ VI ; Biriuk v. Lithuania , no. 23373/03, 25 November 2008 ; Petrenco v. Moldova , no. 20928/05 , 30 March 2010 ; Flinkkilä and Others v. Finland , no. 25576/04 , 6 April 2010 ; and Mariapori v. Finland , no. 37751/07 , 6 July 2010 ) . In these and many other cases, the Court has made its own assessment and reversed the findings of the domestic courts without suggesting that the domestic courts had considered irrelevant principles or applied improper criteria in the overall assessment made . I do not see why a different approach should be adopted in this case.

6. A nnoying as Ms C may have found the publication of the story in question , the applicant newspaper was justified in alerting the public about her drug addiction. The additional information and the phot og raphs were no more than a continuation of the original legitimate story . I agree with the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal and the views of Lord Nicholls and Lord Hoffman JJ of the House of Lords that this addition did not reveal anything fundamentally significant t o the story b ut served mostly “ to add colour and conviction” to it. In my view, the publication of the supplementary materials fell well within the journalistic margin of the press in deciding the way in which a legitimate story is presented (see , for example , Fressoz and Roire v. France , cited above, at § 54 ) . Thus, even accepting that the publication of the additional information and pictures was a further incursion into Ms C ' s private life , it was only to a relatively minor degree in the overall context of the story as a whole. It cannot be considered as sufficient and serious enough to justify the restriction on freedom of expression under Article 10.