DISSENTING OPINION OF MM. S. TRECHSEL, J.-C. SOYER,

                     C.L. ROZAKIS and L. LOUCAIDES

      In the present case, we disagree with the conclusion of the

majority of the Commission that the applicants had access to a court

as required by Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

      It has been stated that the Administrative Court was able to

review the facts of the case in that it could examine inter alia

whether they had been incorrectly or incompletely established by the

Provincial Government (see para. 71 of the Report).

      However, we note that the purpose of this review was to determine

any procedural defects leading to the unlawfulness of the Provincial

Government's decision.  It does not transpire from a literal reading

of Section 42 para. 2 subpara. 3 that the Court was competent fully to

assess the facts of the case, and that it could do so for the purpose

of deciding on the expropriation.

      We have therefore turned to the decision of the Administrative

Court of 22 September 1989.  Therein the Court stated that it could

"take evidence for examining the question whether a procedural defect

is essential or whether the incriminated authority might have arrived

at a different decision by avoiding the alleged procedural defect; the

Administrative Court may resort to these measures also in order to

control the assessment of evidence" (see para. 36 of the Report).

      In the same decision the Administrative Court also relied on

Section 41 of the Administrative Court Act (see para. 32 of the

Report).  Section 41 provides that, if no procedural defects are found

according to Section 42 para. 2 subpara. 3, the Court is bound by the

facts as accepted by the authority (see para. 46 of the Report).  By

emphasising Section 41 the Administrative Court could be seen as

stating that it was indeed limited in its power to review the facts.

      We have further considered the above provisions and statements

in the light of the Commission's previous case-law on the powers of

review of the Administrative Court (see para. 69 of the Report).  In

our opinion, it has not been established in the present case that the

Administrative Court was competent fully to review all the facts.

      At this point it must be recalled that the provisions guaranteed

by the Convention are intended to be practical and effective (see Eur.

Court H.R., Artico judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, p. 16,

para. 33).  In the light of the above, we cannot find that in the

present case the applicants practically and effectively enjoyed a right

of access to a court which "determined" their "civil rights".

      The applicants' case was not therefore "heard" by a tribunal as

required by Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, and we thus conclude

that there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

      Finally, having just found that the applicants' case was not

heard by a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention, we would have considered it unnecessary to examine their

further complaints under the same provision about the proceedings

before the Administrative Court.  However, Rule 18 para. 3 of the

Commission's Rules of Procedure prohibits abstention in votes

concerning the opinion as to whether the Convention has been violated.

Thus, we have voted for violation on the conclusions in paras. 83, 89

and 94.  This vote is to be understood as a consequence of our vote on

the question of access to court rather than the expression of our

opinion based on the hypothetical assumption that access was given.