PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, G. JÖRUNDSSON,

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK, A. WEITZEL AND B. MARXER

      We agree with the majority of the Commission that there has been

a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together with

Article 8.  However, we disagree as to the conclusion to be drawn in

respect of Article 8 of the Convention.  In particular, we consider

that the case raises issues which should be examined independently

under Article 8 of the Convention.

      Without doubt, Article 8 of the Convention was applicable (see

above, paras. 41 et seq.).  We also note that the applicants' request

for permission to put the second applicant's name before the family

name did not relate to one particular incident but concerned their

situation in general.

      As a result, the restrictions imposed on the applicants were

sufficiently substantial to warrant the conclusion that there has been

an interference with the applicants' right to respect for private life

under Article 8 para. 1 of the Convention.

      Next, it must be examined whether the interference satisfied the

conditions of Article 8 para. 2 of the Convention.

      We note that the authorities, when refusing the applicants'

request to put the second applicant's name before the family name,

relied on Sections 30 and 160 of the Swiss Civil Code.  The

interference was therefore "in accordance with the law" within the

meaning of Article 8 para. 2 of the Convention.

      Moreover, inasmuch as the legislation concerned aimed at securing

the unity of the family, the interference may be regarded as aiming at

"the prevention of disorder" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2

of the Convention.

      There remains the question whether the interference was

"necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of Article 8

para. 2 of the Convention.

      The applicants submit that the Swiss authorities's refusal to let

the second applicant put his name before the family name was an

unjustified and disproportionate interference.  The second applicant's

original name no longer appears in many official documents and

registers.  His university also refuses to issue the certificate of his

doctoral thesis with his previous name put before his family name.

Thus, the connection of identity to his previous publications is no

longer maintained.

      The Government describe the preparatory materials leading to the

legislation concerned, as explained by the Federal Court in its

decision (see above para. 26).  It transpires therefrom that parliament

did not want a free choice of names, as this would have abandoned the

principle of the unity of the family  name.  The Government submit that

the unity of the family name in turn manifests the unity of the family.

      According to the Convention organs' case-law, the notion of

necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing

social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the

legitimate aim pursued.  In determining whether an interference was

"necessary in a democratic society" the Convention organs will also

take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the

Contracting States (see Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of

24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, p. 31 et seq., para. 67).

      In the present case we consider, on the one hand, that the State

has a legitimate interest in preserving the unity of the family, and

in employing legislation in order to manifest such unity.

      It is true that the Swiss Civil Code permits some flexibility in

determining the family name, thus to some extent calling in question

the principle of the unity of the family.  However, we note the Swiss

legislator's intention to remain within tradition and not to provide

an entire freedom, in particular by not letting the husband put his

name before the family name.

      On the other hand, we have considered the applicants' interest

in the second applicant putting his name before the family name.  They

claim in particular that the second applicant's name no longer appears

in various documents and registers.  However, we find that these

difficulties, which result in the first place from the applicants'

decision to adopt the first applicant's maiden name as the family name,

may cause inconveniences, but they do not appear insurmountable.  The

same holds true in respect of the alleged difficulties concerning the

second applicant's academic career.  He is not prevented in future from

further developing his academic reputation, and showing the connection

with his previous publications, for instance by referring in his new

publications to his previous name before marriage.

      In our opinion, the legislation concerned, in attempting to

strike a balance between the general interest in preserving the unity

of the family and the interests of the individual, did not, in its

application in the present case, transgress the margin of appreciation

left to the Contracting States under the Convention.

      We are therefore satisfied that the interference at issue may be

regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of

Article 8 of the Convention.

      In our view, there has, therefore, been no violation of Article 8

of the Convention.