CONCURRING OPINION OF MRS. J. LIDDY

      One of the points at issue in the present case is whether the

publication of the report denied the applicants' subsquent access to

a court for proceedings against the Inspectors and the Secretary of

State, because any defamation proceedings would have been effectively

met with a defence of privilege.

      In this connection, the Commission considered that the defence

of privilege acted as a restriction on effective access to Court, and

proceeded to examine the issue in the light of the Ashingdane judgment

(Eur. Court H.R., judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 93).

      However the Ashingdane case was concerned with a procedural

limitation on access to Court.  It was concerned with a statutory

provision stating that no civil proceedings shall be brought in respect

of certain acts without the leave of the High Court, and that the High

Court shall not give leave unless satisfied that there is substantial

ground for the contention that there had been bad faith or lack of

reasonable care.

      Here there is no procedural limitation on access to Court for

defamation proceedings.  Instead, the very content of the right to

protect one's reputation is limited by the defence of privilege.  As

stated by the Court on several occasions (e.g. Eur. Court H.R., James

and Others judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, para. 81)

Article 6 does not in itself guarantee any particular content for civil

rights and obligations in the substantive law of the Contracting

States.

      It is my opinion that to reach a finding of violation of

Article 6 in this case would be tantamount to stating that Article 6

does guarantee a particular content for the civil right to a good

reputation, and that that content extends to a degree greater than

afforded by the English law of defamation.

      This, however, seems to me to be less a question of access to

Court than of substantive protection of private life, guaranteed by

Article 8 of the Convention.  The admissible issues with which the

present report is concerned do not include an issue under Article 8.

      The fact is that there was no barrier in domestic law to taking

defamation proceedings.  Although those proceedings would have almost

inevitably have been unsuccessful because of the defence of privilege,

the absence of prospects of success is not the same as the absence of

access to Court.  Accordingly I have voted against a finding of

violation of Article 6.