CONCURRING OPINION OF MR. H.G. SCHERMERS, MRS. J. LIDDY,

                     MM. J-C. GEUS and B. MARXER

      We agree that there has been no violation of Article 6 in the

present case, but for different reasons from the majority.

      In all the cases involving determinations of property rights

determined by the European Court of Human Rights, the applicant's

property has always been directly affected by the administrative act

at issue.  Thus in Mats Jacobsson (judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A

no. 180) the applicant's own land was affected by the changes to the

building plan; in Ettl (judgment of 23 April 1987, Series A no. 117)

the applicants' land was compulsorily exchanged, and in Fredin

(judgment of 18 February 1991, Series no. 192) the applicants wanted

to extract gravel on their own land.  In the cases concerning pecuniary

matters, the position was similar: there was no doubt as to whether the

applicant was affected by the administrative act at issue in Benthem

(judgment of 23 October 1985, Series A no. 97), Editions Périscope

(judgment of 26 March 1992, Series A no. 234-B) or Tre Traktörer

(judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 159).

      The present case is different.  The right the applicant had

before the Administrative Court was the right to ensure that the

proceedings between her neighbours and the administrative authorities -

relating to the grant of planning consent - were properly conducted.

Of course, nobody is suggesting that the right was exercised purely for

the public good, and indeed the legislation (Section 46 of the Upper

Austrian Building Regulations Act) lays down conditions for making

these "subjective, public law objections", namely that the objections

serve not just the general public interest, but the "interests of the

neighbourhood".  Thus the applicant clearly hoped to derive some

benefit from the proceedings - to prevent development next to her

house.  We cannot see, however, that that is sufficient to make the

"right" which was determined a civil one.  It is rather as if someone

has a right to see that criminal proceedings are brought by the police

against his neighbours if unruly and unseemly events take place next

door.  He may derive a considerable benefit from the criminal

proceedings taking place, and indeed the value of his property may be

enhanced, but that cannot, in our view lead to the conclusion that the

proceedings between him and the police determine civil rights.  We are

supported in these considerations by the Commission's decision in the

case of Rayner v. the United Kingdom (Dec. 16.7.86, D.R. 47 p.5).  In

that case, the Commission accepted that "nuisance of considerable

importance" may give rise to the operation of Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 but that Mr. Rayner had not established such nuisance.

In the present case, the Administrative Court found that the applicant

had not made out her case that she would be subjected to "considerable

nuisance" if the proposed development were permitted.  The complaint

under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was rejected in the present case for

formal reasons, but if it had not been, we venture to suggest that the

Rayner line would have been followed.

      Accordingly we conclude that, although the applicant had a right

to put her objections to the administrative authorities and then to the

Administrative Court via (in some of the cases) the Constitutional

Court, that right was not "civil" within the meaning of Article 6 of

the Convention.

      We do not therefore need to consider whether the scope of review

by the Administrative Court satisfies the requirements of Article 6 in

this case.

                                                        (Or. English)