PARTIALLY CONCURRING, PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION

                          OF MR. C.L. ROZAKIS

      In my partially concurring and partially dissenting opinion to

the opinion of the Commission in the cases of Metropolitan Chrysostomos

and Archimandrite Papachrysostomou against Turkey (Nos. 15299/89 and

15300/89), I referred to a number of issues on which I disagree with

the majority of the Commission. The approaches that I have expressed

there remain the same, insofar as they are pertinent to the present

case.

      In the case of Titina Loizidou there is, however, one more

element on which I disagree with the majority of the Commission: that

of the access of the applicant to her property; mainly from the angle

of the first article of the First Protocol to the Convention. The

applicant complains that "Turkey through the use of its armed forces

and by the continued occupation and control of part of Cyprus and by

prohibiting the applicant on a number of occasions from gaining access

to the said part of Cyprus and consequently to the property in

question, has affected the rights of the applicant as property owner"

[peaceful enjoyment of her possessions] (para. 91 of the Commission's

Report).

      The answer to the complaint of the applicant on the part of the

Commission does not satisfy, in my view, her expectation for an overall

determination of her case. The Commission contents itself with dealing

with only one aspect of her complaints: in paras. 97, 98 and 99 it

considers that what she asks is not actually a request for the

enjoyment of her possessions - which comes under the protection of the

First Protocol - but a request for moving freely in the occupied

territory of Cyprus, where her possessions lie. And  since the "right

to peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions does not include, as a

corollary the right to freedom of movement ... the applicant's claim

of free access to the north of Cyprus cannot be based on her alleged

ownership of property in the northern part of the island."

      I think that the Commission interprets in a very narrow way the

meaning of the word "access" to the applicant's property. Under the

influence of the previous cases (Nos. 15299 -15300) and because of the

participation of the present applicant in the March manifestations, it

considers that the notion of "access", as used by the applicant, is

solely referring to a physical contact between the applicant and her

possessions.

      Yet, to my mind, the notion of "access", when referring to the

enjoyment of possessions (and when referring to the very wording of the

expressed complaint of our applicant) is a wider one than the mere

freedom of movement which may allow the establishment of a physical

contact. It actually covers all the elements constitutive of the right

to enjoyment of possessions; i. e. the possibility to repair an

immovable good; or the possibility to usefully exploit the possession;

or the possibility to exchange a possession through the free

acquisition of another one, etc. Under these circumstances, it becomes

clear that the occupation by Turkey of the northern part of Cyprus

actually prevents, in a continuing manner, the free enjoyment of

possessions, the access to their many uses, and attributes, for the

applicant.

      I must also concede that even a narrow interpretation of the term

"access" could not have led me so easily to the conclusion that no

issue arises under the First Protocol to the Convention. There are

circumstances where the absence of physical contact of a person with

his or her possessions may amount to a deprivation of possessions; this

is particularly true in cases where the use of a possession is the main

constitutive element for the enjoyment of the possession; but also in

other cases where the optimal exploitation of a possession requires

physical presence of the person who owns it.

      I then wonder whether, under the circumstances of the present

case, when the applicant has for a long time been unable both to have

any physical contact with her possessions and to freely make use of

them, she cannot effectively claim to be a victim of continuous

violation of her rights, under the Protocol. I conclude, in answering

my own dilemma, that in either way I see a violation of Article 1 of

the First Protocol.

                                                        (Or. English)