CONCURRING OPINION OF MR. LOUCAIDES

      As regards the complaints of the first applicant under

Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, while I agree with the conclusion

- that there has been no violation - I do so for different reasons.

      As established in the case-law of the Commission and Court,

Article 6 para. 1 applies only to disputes ("contestations") over

"rights and obligations" which can be said, at least on arguable

grounds, to be recognised under domestic law.  It does not in itself

guarantee any particular content for "rights and obligations" in the

substantive law of the Contracting States (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Lithgow

and Others judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p. 70,

para. 192).  On the other hand, it is not decisive whether a certain

benefit, or possible claim, is characterised as a "right" under the

domestic legal system.  This is so since the term "right" must be given

an autonomous interpretation in the context of Article 6 para. 1 (see

eg. Lithgow and Others judgment loc. cit. para. 192).

      It is also established case-law that Article 6 para. 1 guarantees

to everyone who claims that an interference with his "civil rights" is

unlawful the right to submit that claim to a tribunal satisfying the

requirements of that provision (see Eur. Court H.R., Le Compte, Van

Leuven and De Meyere judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A no. 43, p. 20,

para. 44).  The claim or dispute must be "genuine and of a serious

nature" (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Benthem judgment of 23 October 1985,

Series A no. 97, p. 15, para. 32).  The dispute may relate not only to

the actual existence of a right but also to its scope or the manner in

which it may be exercised.  The dispute may concern both questions of

fact and questions of law (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Van Marle and

Others judgment of 26 June 1984, Series A no. 101, p. 11, para. 32).

      In the present case, the first applicant prior to his marriage

to the second applicant enjoyed under domestic law no parental rights

in respect of his son A. (see paras. 59-60 above). The second applicant

initially denied that the first applicant was the father (see

paras. 28 and 31 above).  While he did have the possibility of applying

to domestic courts for a parental rights order under section 3 of the

1986 Act, I consider that this limited procedural provision confers no

substantive rights of custody or access capable of falling within the

concept of civil rights.  I  recall that in the Keegan case (Keegan v.

Ireland, Comm. Report 17.2.93, pp. 13-14, paras. 60-67) the Commission

found that the relationship of the applicant, the natural father with

his child born out of wedlock had sufficient recognition in Irish

domestic law to base a claim to enjoyment of "civil rights". In my view

however the present case can in this respect be distinguished from  the

Keegan case in that in the Irish case the applicant had applied for

guardianship and it had been established in the Irish courts that in

such proceedings regard must be had to the wishes and desires of the

natural father to enjoy the society of his child, subject to other

overriding considerations. There was in the event in that case a

"serious" and "genuine" dispute over the applicant's rights.

      Consequently, my conclusion is that Article 6 para. 1  of the

Convention is not applicable to the first applicant's complaint

concerning the Children's Hearings.  I note that this complaint does

not relate to the adoption proceedings before the Sheriff Court and the

Court of Session subsequent to the applicants' marriage, by which the

first applicant obtained parental rights in request of A. In the

adoption proceedings the first applicant was a party and the documents

before the courts were disclosed.