MURRAY v. the UNITED KINGDOMDISSENTING OPINION BY MR. L. LOUCAIDES
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Document date: June 27, 1994
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PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. F. MARTINEZ
I agree with the dissenting part of Mr. Bratza's opinion.
(Or. Eng.)
DISSENTING OPINION BY MR. L. LOUCAIDES
I am unable to agree with the conclusion of the majority that in
this case there has been no violation of Article 6 para. 1 or 2 of the
Convention as regards the applicant's right to silence.
My disagreement refers to the application of the 1988 order to
the silence of the applicant during his pre-trial detention by the
police.
I had the opportunity in my dissenting opinion in the Saunders
case (Application No. 19187/91) to explain that the presumption of
innocence safeguarded under Article 6 para. 2 of the Convention entails
the right to remain silent and not to be compelled to incriminate
oneself. The right in question aims at the protection of the innocent
against abuses by law-enforcing agencies. Therefore it is particularly
important to secure this right during pre-trial police detention.
Subject to the following, I share the view of Amnesty
International (para. 55 of the Report) according to which a system
which permits adverse inferences to be drawn against an accused person
because of his silence is inconsistent with the right to remain silent.
I believe that this view should only be applicable as regards the
exercise of such right at pre-trial stages when the danger of abuses
by state organs (i.e. the raison d'être of the right) exist and not at
the stage when the accused chooses to offer no explanation to the court
after a prima facie case is made in court against him.
Apart from the danger of abuse, which I believe does not exist
at the stage of the judicial proceedings, there are other factors which
distinguish the above-mentioned two stages for the purposes of the
right in issue. In contrast with the trial stage an accused person,
when faced with the law-enforcing agencies before trial, alone and
without the legal guidance of a counsel, lacks the necessary safeguards
for an effective presentation of his version in an inherently coercive
setting in which the prosecutorial forces have the upper hand.
Although he may not be guilty he may not be in a position to establish
effectively his innocence. In this respect it is useful to recall that
the Commission found that in this case there has been a violation of
Article 6 para. 1 in conjunction with Article 6 para. 3 (c) of the
Convention as regards the applicant's lack of access to a solicitor
during the preliminary investigations by the police.
In the light of the above and in view of the fact that the
failure of the applicant to give an account to the police of his
presence in the house where L. was imprisoned, was relied on by the
trial judge in drawing "very strong inferences" against the applicant
(pursuant to Article 6 of the Order) I find there has been a breach of
the presumption of innocence which is protected in absolute terms in
Article 6 para. 2 of the Convention.
Appendix I
HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Date Item
________________________________________________________________
16.08.91 Introduction of the application
27.08.91 Registration of the application
Examination of admissibility
10.09.92 Commission's decision to invite the parties to
submit observations on the admissibility and
merits
25.02.93 Government's observations
08.04.93 Commission's grant of legal aid
07.06.93 Applicant's reply
30.08.93 Commission's decision to invite the parties to
an oral hearing
18.01.94 Hearing on admissibility and merits
18.01.94 Commission's decision to declare the application
admissible
Examination of the merits
18.01.94 Commission's deliberations
24.02.94 Applicant's observations on the merits
13.05.94 Consideration of the state of proceedings
27.07.94 Commission's deliberations on the merits, final
votes and adoption of the Report
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