PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. H.G. SCHERMERS

      In my opinion there is no violation of Article 8 of the

Convention. I agree that the mutual enjoyment by parents and children

of each other's company constitutes a fundamental element of family

life, but there are cases in which the prevailing interest of the child

requires the severance of family ties. Decisions in this field are

difficult and require good knowledge of the factual situation.

Authorities on the spot are inevitably better equipped to evaluate the

situation than the European Commission of Human Rights. The Commission,

therefore, should interfere only where an infringement of family life

and the absence of sufficient justification are clear. In the present

case I find insufficient ground to criticise the national authorities

in this respect.

      On the other hand I do find a violation of Article 6. The parties

do not dispute that Article 6 applies to the present case. The

proceedings related not only to the question of care but also to the

question of depriving the applicant of her parental rights and access

with a view to adoption. Their outcome was thus decisive for the future

ties between mother and child. Since these ties constitute the very

substance of family life there can be no reasonable doubt that the

proceedings involved the determination of a "civil right" of the

applicant.

      It is not in dispute between the parties that the period to be

taken into consideration in the present case started on

13 December 1989 when S was taken into care and ended on

19 September 1991 when the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to

appeal. It was thus a period of approximately one year and nine months.

      The reasonableness of this period is to be assessed according to

the particular circumstances and having regard, notably, to the

complexity of the case, to the conduct of the parties and the

authorities concerned and to what was at stake for the applicant in the

litigation (cf. for example Eur. Court H.R., H. v. the United Kingdom

judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 120, p. 59, para. 71).

      In my opinion there are particular circumstances in this case

which required a speedy decision. The case was not particularly

complex. The applicant was in Oslo and her history was well documented.

S was in care and the questions to be determined were clear, although

a considerable amount of evidence had to be collected and assessed.

      As regards the conduct of the parties the Government point out

that the CPC determined the case on 3 May 1990, i.e. only four months

and three weeks after S had been taken into care. Having regard inter

alia to the need to obtain an expert opinion such a period cannot be

considered to be excessive. Furthermore, they maintain that the period

until 9 November 1990, when the County Governor determined the matter,

was not excessive. The Government also maintain that the judicial

proceedings are beyond criticism, in particular since they lasted only

ten months and six days and involved two court levels.

      I agree that the space of time from 13 December 1989 until

3 May 1990 when the CPC determined the case does not disclose periods

of inactivity which could give rise to criticism. The expert opinion

was available on 13 February 1990, the report from the social

authorities was submitted on 30 March 1990 and the report from the

expert engaged by the applicant was available on 17 April 1990.

Furthermore, during this period of time, the applicant had access to

S, albeit only twice a week, which enabled her to maintain some contact

with S.

      As is mentioned in para. 107 of the Commission's Report the

situation changed decisively when the CPC deprived the applicant of her

parental rights and terminated access. A process of gradual alienation

started.

      Good court proceedings necessarily take time, but in the

relationship between parents and children such time may not be

available. A factual separation of many months may cause irreparable

damage for which reason speedy action is required. Either should

interim measures continue the relationship between parents and children

or measures should be taken in order to obtain a decision within an

extremely short period of time.

      Under the circumstances of the present case I find it

unacceptable that the County Governor needed approximately five months,

and the courts, in addition, more than ten months to decide the case.

The proceedings taken as a whole, were accordingly not concluded within

a reasonable time.

                                                        (Or. English)