DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. H. DANELIUS, Mrs. G.H. THUNE

                     and Mr. L. LOUCAIDES

     In our opinion, Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention has been

violated in the present case for the following reasons.

     The impartiality required by Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention

implies that judges who decide in a criminal case must not have a

preconceived view on the guilt of the accused.  A further requirement

must be that the judges have not had such previous impressions or

information about the matters in regard to which they are to adjudicate

as to create a risk that they will be influenced, in the determination

of the charges against the accused, by elements which should be

irrelevant to that determination.  Moreover, since the condition of

impartiality also has an objective side, Article 6 para. 1 must be

considered to require that the circumstances should not be such as to

give the accused a legitimate fear of such elements affecting the

judgment in his case.

     In the present case, it appears that the three judges who

convicted the applicant on 3 October 1990 of professional, completed

and attempted fraud, simple bankruptcy and breach of book-keeping

obligations had already found him guilty of the same offences in a

previous judgment of 17 May 1989.  This latter conviction had been

preceded by a trial which had been held in the applicant's absence,

whereas the second trial was held in his presence and with his

participation.

     We accept that the applicant's presence at the second trial

changed the procedural situation considerably and that, after rehearing

the case, the judges could well have been prepared to change their

original opinions.  Nevertheless, it cannot be disregarded that the

three judges had already evaluated the charges against the applicant

in previous proceedings and had then found him guilty of certain

offences and had sentenced him to a term of imprisonment.  We consider

that, when the same judges again had to consider the same case against

the applicant, there must have been at least a risk that they would be

to some extent influenced by their impressions from the previous

proceedings or by the deliberations which had taken place on that

occasion.  The fear that the applicant had in this regard would thus

seem to have been objectively justified.

     Our opinion that in this respect there was a lack of impartiality

within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention is supported

by the position taken by the Court in the Hauschildt case where a judge

who had taken pretrial decisions on detention on remand, based on the

finding that there was a "particularly confirmed suspicion" against the

accused person, was found not to be impartial when, subsequently, he

conducted the trial against the accused (Eur. Court H.R., Hauschildt

judgment of 24 May 1989, Series A no. 154).  Here too, the decision

which the judge had taken was based on a much less complete material

than that which was made available at the trial, but the Court

nevertheless considered that the position taken by the judge in regard

to the existence of the particular ground of detention was sufficient

to create a legitimate doubt about his impartiality.

     The further question arises whether the lack of impartiality at

first instance was remedied by the fact that there was a full review

of the applicant's conviction and sentence in the subsequent appeal

proceedings.

     We consider, however, that where criminal justice, as is often

the case, is administered at two levels - at first instance and on

appeal - it is not sufficient that the requirement of impartiality is

satisfied at the appeal stage.  While various minor procedural

deficiencies may well be remedied in appeal proceedings, the

requirement of an impartial tribunal is of such a fundamental character

that it should be satisfied already during the trial at first instance,

this being in general an essential - and perhaps even the most

important - part of the criminal proceedings against an accused person,

in particular where - as would seem to have been the situation in the

present case - the evidence in the case was not heard again by the

court of appeal.  We also refer in this regard to the Court's finding

in the De Cubber case (Eur. Court H.R., De Cubber judgment of

26 October 1984, Series A no. 86, p. 19, para. 33).

     It follows that, in our view, the applicant did not have a

hearing by an impartial tribunal.

                                                 (Or. English)