DISSENTING OPINION OF MM. S. TRECHSEL, C.A. NØRGAARD,

              G. JÖRUNDSSON, F. MARTINEZ AND B. CONFORTI

      We regret that we cannot share the Commission's opinion that

there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention in

conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

      We observe in the first place that the aim pursued by the

exemption was to prevent that a particular category of women, who were

not expected ever to become entitled to receive payments under the

terms of the Act, would be held liable for contributions. Even though

the application of the exemption resulted in men being treated

differently from women, it appears that this difference of treatment

was not based on sex as such. Its origins lay rather in the biological

fact that the ability of a woman of 45 and older to procreate is not

the same as that of a man of that age.

      In those circumstances the position of men and women is not

comparable and the distinction made by the law between them cannot be

regarded as discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention.

      It is true that, as of 1989, the law was changed and the

distinction existing earlier was removed. We note that in the

applicant's view the Government, by abolishing the exemption as of 1989

as a result of the notions underlying its enactment having become

outdated, acknowledged that the exemption had no compelling

justification.

      Although it is clear that the Convention, being a living

instrument, must be interpreted in the light of current circumstances

(cf. Eur. Court, Cossey judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A

no. 184, p. 17, para. 42), this cannot mean that where social

developments cause a Contracting Party to amend its legislation, the

previous legislation must be regarded as having infringed the

provisions of the Convention. In this respect we take into account that

social and economic goals to be pursued by a State in its social

security policy may legitimately develop with the passing of time and

changing of circumstances. A margin of appreciation must also apply to

the moment when a government thinks fit to amend a system of levying

social security contributions (cf. mutatis mutandis No. 11077/84,

Dec. 13.10.86, D.R. 49 p. 191).

      In light of the above we cannot find that the abolition of the

exemption as of 1989 and without it being granted retroactive effect

was unreasonable.

      In the circumstances of the present case we find therefore that

the impugned legislation which until 1989 held the applicant liable for

contributions cannot be said to have had no objective and reasonable

justification or to have been disproportionate as to the aim pursued.