DISSENTING OPINION OF MRS. G.H. THUNE,

                   MM. J. MUCHA AND D. SVÁBY

     We have voted in favour of finding a violation also of Article 6

para. 1.

     Having found, like the majority of the Commission, that the

applicant on arguable grounds can claim a right to confidentiality of

the information in question in Sweden, we consider Article 6 to be

applicable in the present case.

     A procedure satisfying the requirements of Article 6 is thus

called for. We have reached the conclusion that the applicant did not

have at her disposal such a procedure.

     We note in particular that the availability of the existing

remedies - criminal prosecution by the aggrieved person against the

physician and action for damages - depends on the aggrieved individual

being informed that certain information has been forwarded to the

Social Insurance Office. There is, however, no obligation under Swedish

law to notify such a person of the disclosure of information. Thus,

notwithstanding the fact that the applicant in the present case,

through her own action, learned about the disclosure, we consider that

these remedies, as such, cannot be considered as effective in disputes

such as the present one. In the circumstances of the present case, they

further fail to meet the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 for the

following reasons.

     Some medical records forwarded by the women's clinic contained

information concerning the applicant's abortion and was thus of a very

private and sensitive nature. Moreover, the clinic's decision to

forward the records to the Social Insurance Office had immediate and

irreversible effects on the applicant's alleged right to

confidentiality of that sensitive information. The obvious reason for

having this decision reviewed by a court was to obtain the court's

finding that it was not necessary in the circumstances to forward the

information to the Office and that the information should thus be kept

confidential by the clinic. Thus, a remedy available only after the

information had been disclosed to the Office could not effectively

determine the applicant's alleged right to confidentiality.

     We find that the nature of the right at stake required that the

applicant could have the dispute between her and the clinic determined

by a court prior to the disclosure to the Office. The existing remedies

were, however, available to the applicant only after the information

had actually been disclosed.

     It is true that the requirement to obtain a court permission

prior to the disclosure of information could, to some extent, delay the

Social Insurance Office's determination of the applicant's compensation

claim. However, there were no interests of third persons or other

circumstances in the present case which required the information in

question to be forwarded immediately. In this connection, it should be

noted that the Office requested information from the women's clinic

more than a year after the applicant had lodged her claim for

compensation and that a further two months lapsed before the Office

took its decision on the claim.

                                                 (Or. English)