DISSENTING OPINION OF MRS. G.H. THUNE AND MR. H.G. SCHERMERS

     Unfortunately we have been unable to find any violation of

Article 6 para. 1 as regards the applicant's complaints about the lack

of an oral hearing and public pronouncement of the decisions given.

     We agree with the majority that Article 6 applies to the

proceedings at issue (para. 42) and that the Commission is not

prevented by the Austrian reservation from examining the applicant's

complaints (para. 50).

     As regards the applicant's complaint concerning the lack of an

oral hearing, we would point to the approach taken by the Court in the

Schuler-Zgraggen case, where it accepted that Article 6 para. 1 must

be interpreted with some flexibility, having regard to the type of

proceedings one is faced with (see Eur. Court HR, Schuler-Zgraggen v.

Switzerland judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263, p. 20,

para. 58).  The Court considered that the dispute in the said case did

not raise issues of particular public importance, but on the contrary,

involved matters of a highly personal nature which better could be

dealt with by the domestic court without a public hearing during an

oral hearing.  We submit that similar considerations can be applied to

the present case.

     This approach is supported by the concurring opinion of Judge

Martens to the Court's judgment in the Masson and Van Zon case which

concerned proceedings identical to those in the present case (Eur.

Court HR, Masson and Van Zon v. the Netherlands judgment of

28 September 1995, Series A no. 327-A).  As the only member of the

Court who considered Article 6 para. 1 to be applicable, Judge Martens

took the view that Article 6 para. 1 did not require an oral hearing

having regard to the particular nature of the proceedings.  This seems

to be a logical and reasonable interpretation of the principles laid

down in the Schuler-Zgraggen case.

     As regards the applicant's complaint about the lack of public

pronouncement of the decisions given, we find that, having regard to

the particular nature of these proceedings, public access to judgment

by means of access to the file of the case upon request must be

considered sufficient in order to provide the necessary public scrutiny

which is the main purpose of the publicity requirement under Article

6 para. 1.  We here refer to our dissenting opinion in the Report of

the Commission in the case of Szücs v. Austria.

                                                (Or. français)