DISSENTING OPINION OF MRS. J. LIDDY, MM. E. BUSUTTIL,

                J.-C. SOYER, K. HERNDL AND E.A. ALKEMA

      We voted against the majority's finding in para. 102 of the

Report that in the present case the expulsion of the applicant to

Bangladesh would be in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

      According to the applicant he has been involved with the illegal

organisation Shanti Bahini for a long time. He submits that the

Bangladeshi authorities are aware of this involvement following the

discovery in his house of papers drawn up by him. His activities for

Shanti Bahini have also been brought to the attention of the

Bangladeshi authorities by a complaint that a certain Omar K. has filed

against him in which he is accused of having committed the offence of

extortion on behalf of Shanti Bahini (paras. 20, 21, 26, 27 and 29).

      We note in the first place that the declaration which the

applicant initially submitted as evidence of his membership of Shanti

Bahini was found by the Dutch authorities not to be authentic (para.

32). Furthermore, in his interview with an official of the Ministry of

Justice, the applicant stated that the search of his house had taken

place after he had been seen to participate in a demonstration

organised by a legal party on 16 April 1990 (para. 21). However, the

aim of this demonstration was connected to sub-district elections which

at that time had apparently already taken place (para. 33). Although

the President of the Regional Court of The Hague in his decision of 14

November 1991 did not rule out the possibility that he applicant had

made a mistake in respect of the date of the demonstration (para. 25),

it does not appear that at any stage of the asylum proceedings the

applicant attempted to correct this mistake. If, on the other hand, it

is to be assumed that the demonstration in fact took place on 16 March

1990, one is surprised to see that the applicant stayed in Bangladesh

for another three and a half months after the demonstration without

experiencing problems from the side of the authorities despite the fact

that, as is submitted by him, they had issued a warrant for his arrest.

      As regards the complaint by Omar K. that the applicant extorted

money from him, we draw attention to the fact that Omar K. is alleged

to have filed his complaint against the applicant six years after he

had begun paying the taxes allegedly demanded by the applicant (para.

27). In this respect we also observe that at the hearing before the

Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs the applicant stated that he went

to Omar K. to collect money with three other people (para. 27). It has

not been submitted that these three other people have also left

Bangladesh or that the Bangladeshi authorities had become aware of

their involvement with Shanti Bahini. In these circumstances it appears

rather unlikely that Omar K., who allegedly feared for his life, would

have filed a complaint against the applicant at a moment when the three

other people involved were still in the area.

      We further note the fact that from 1994 onwards efforts were made

to resolve the conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In this context

the Government of Bangladesh promulgated an amnesty for Shanti Bahini

insurgents who were convicted during the previous regime. It is

reported that the amnesty will stay in force as long as the dialogue

between the Government of Bangladesh and Shanti Bahini's political

wing, the JSS, continues. Furthermore, both parties to the conflict

agree at regular intervals to extend a cease-fire (paras. 57, 58 and

61).

      Although in 1995 there were still reports from the Chittagong

Hill Tracts indicating that the situation in the area continued to be

unsettled (paras. 59, 60, 62 and 63), the amnesty combined with the

ongoing dialogue between the political opponents provide a strong

indication that the situation in the area has improved. It is true that

in such an unsettled situation the possibility still could exist that

the applicant could be detained and ill-treated. However, we wish to

recall in this context that a mere possibility of ill-treatment is not

in itself sufficient to give rise to a breach of Article 3 (cf.

Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment, loc. cit., p. 37,

para. 111).

      In these circumstances, we find that no substantial grounds have

been established for believing that the applicant would be exposed to

a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of

the Convention if returned to Bangladesh.

      Accordingly, in our view, the expulsion of the applicant to

Bangladesh would not be in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.