PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MRS. J. LIDDY,

JOINED BY MM. E. BUSUTTIL, L. LOUCAIDES, N. BRATZA AND M. VILA AMIGÓ

      I regret that I cannot agree that there has been no violation of

the right to a fair hearing in this case.

      The applicant considered that he was employed on a full-time

basis by the parish authorities. On 10 October 1989 the parish

authorities disputed this, while nonetheless awarding him some extra

pension and compensatory sums, apparently on an ex gratia basis. The

dispute went before the Cathedral Chapter and the applicant produced

in his support a written statement signed by six members of the Parish

Council as to the full-time nature of the post that was created in

1966. There is no indication that in proceedings of this kind such a

statement would have been inadmissible evidence. The Cathedral Chapter

in Finnish law appears to have the standing of an administrative

tribunal, without necessarily being a tribunal for the purpose of the

Convention. It rejected the applicant's claim and also his request for

an oral hearing of his witnesses without stating why the evidence

submitted by the applicant was insufficient and without stating what

other, countervailing, evidence there was and without stating why the

witnesses could not be called.

      The applicant then appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court,

but in these proceedings his de facto opponent was, apparently, the

Cathedral Chapter itself, as the decision-making body, and not the

other party to the original dispute, the parish authorities. The

Supreme Administrative Court did not take any evidence, whether by way

of public hearing or otherwise, and did not refer the matter back to

the Cathedral Chapter for further investigation, as requested by the

applicant. Having obtained the comments of the Cathedral Chapter and

the applicant, it saw no reason to change the latter's decision. It is

undisputed that the Supreme Administrative Court is a tribunal within

the meaning of Article 6.

      Article 6 para. 1 places a tribunal under a duty to conduct a

proper examination of the submissions and evidence adduced by the

parties and to give reasons for its judgment. The question of whether

a court has failed to fulfil the obligation to state reasons can only

be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case (Eur.

Court. HR, Ruiz Torija v. Spain, Series A Vol. 303-A).

      In the present case the applicant has received no reason

whatsoever as to why the evidence he produced, and which was not

apparently countered by other evidence in proceedings before the

Supreme Administrative Court was not accepted as showing the full-time

nature of the post. Moreover, he appears to have been at a disadvantage

vis-à-vis his real opponent, the parish authorities, in that those

authorities were, apparently, replaced by the more prestigious

Cathedral Chapter as his opponent before the Supreme Administrative

Court, which merely adopted the Chapter's decision without reasoning.

He has never received a determination of the question of the nature of

the original agreement between the parties concerning his employment

and whether that agreement had been observed. This cannot have been a

difficult question to respond to by reference to the facts established

by the tribunal and the national law principles applicable. It may be

that the outcome in financial terms would have been no more favourable

than the payments made in 1989, but there was a real and serious

dispute which called for a reasoned answer.

      Even assuming that the Cathedral Chapter was an independent and

impartial tribunal within the meaning of the Convention, and that it

would suffice for the Supreme Administrative Court to adopt the

Cathedral Chapter's reasons, I see no support in the facts for the

statement by the majority at paragraph 68 of the Report that "the

Supreme Administrative Court in essence ... found insufficient evidence

in support of [the applicant's] contention that his post had been full-

time". There is no statement by either the Cathedral Chapter or the

Supreme Administrative Court to the effect that the applicant had put

forward insufficient evidence or that his evidence was outweighed by

contrary evidence. Accordingly, it is not necessary in the present case

to express an opinion as to whether the Cathedral Chapter was in fact

an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6

or as to whether, if it was, the principle of equality of arms was

infringed by the role it played before the Supreme Administrative

Court. It suffices to note that the duty to give reasons for an

eventual judgment against a litigant cannot be met by the inference

that the court has "in essence" not been satisfied by his or her

evidence.

      In the circumstances I consider that the applicant's right to a

fair hearing has been violated.

                                                       (Or. English)