DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. P. LORENZEN JOINED BY

           MM. S. TRECHSEL, G. JÖRUNDSSON AND M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

      I regret that I am not able to share the conclusion of the

majority that there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention in the present case.

      The proceedings before the Court of Appeal concerned an

assessment of the applicant's income tax including a 100% surcharge

which had been imposed on the basis that the applicant's failure to pay

sufficient taxes was due to his gross negligence or intent. I agree

with the majority that those proceedings - taken into account the

punitive character of the surcharge - concerned the determination of

a "criminal charge" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention (cf. Eur. Court HR, Bendenoun v. France judgment of

24 February 1994, Series A no. 284, p. 20, para. 47). Due to the

applicant's failure to pay a court registration fee of 75 Dutch

guilders his appeal was, however, declared inadmissible. The Court of

Appeal rejected an objection against this decision as ill-founded and

never considered the merits of the criminal proceedings. The appeal in

cassation to the Supreme Court concerned only the legality of the

levying of a court registration fee and the question whether the

applicant, in all circumstances, could be held responsible for the non-

payment of the fee.

      In my opinion, a decision of a national court regarding the

formal requirements for the lodging of an appeal in a criminal case do

not involve the determination of a criminal charge within the meaning

of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention. Whether they concern the

payment of registration fees, the observance of time-limits, the

production of certain documents or other similar requirements should

not be considered decisive. The Commission has constantly held that a

rejection of claims on procedural grounds is neither a determination

of a dispute on civil rights and obligations nor of a criminal charge

(cf. e.g. No. 12624/87, Dec. 10.7.89, D.R. 62 p. 207). I see no reason

to depart from this case-law which is based on careful considerations

with regard to the reasonableness of the safeguards under Article 6

para. 1 of the Convention. There are no valid reasons to widen the

scope of applicability of that provision so as to include preliminary

decisions relating to procedural conditions for court proceedings.

Furthermore, national courts may as a result encounter considerable

difficulties in securing an efficient administration of justice - not

least in respect of the right to a public hearing. In my view, the

Commission and Court of Human Rights also have to bear in mind the

enormous workload of most of the tribunals in the High Contracting

Parties and avoid imposing unnecessary burdens upon them by an

excessive interpretation of Article 6.

      The fact that the Dutch Supreme Court was apparently empowered

under Section 25 of the WARB to rule on the merits of the case, if the

non-payment of the registration fee had not been considered a

procedural obstacle, cannot lead to a different result. Even assuming

that the Supreme Court in the circumstances of the present case - where

the Court of Appeal had not ruled on the merits - might in principle

have exercised that power, it did in fact not do so.

      For these reasons I do not find a violation of Article 6 para. 1

of the Convention in the present case.