PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. N. BRATZA,

        JOINED BY MRS. J. LIDDY and MM. H.G. SCHERMERS,

        J.-C. GEUS, G. RESS, P. LORENZEN and K. HERNDL

     While we agree with the majority of the Commission that there has

been a violation of Article 5 para. 1 of the Convention in the present

case, we cannot share the majority's view that the handcuffing of the

applicant amounted to degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the

Convention.

     As is noted in the Report, ill-treatment must attain a minimum

level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The

assessment of this minimum is relative and depends on all the

circumstances of the case such as the duration of the treatment, its

physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state

of health of the subject of the treatment.

     In the present case the applicant was handcuffed for the duration

of the journey in a police car from the Turku County Prison to the

barracks of the Pori Brigade at Säkylä. We accept that, in the light

of the applicant's history and of the fact that he had at no time

threatened to escape or offered violence to the military police who

effected his arrest, such handcuffing was most probably unnecessary.

We accept, too, that the use of handcuffs was in all the circumstances

a harsh measure. On the other hand, there is no evidence to suggest

that the use of handcuffs either resulted in physical or mental

suffering on the part of the applicant or that it led to his gross

humiliation in his own eyes or in the eyes of others, including those

who witnessed his arrest. In our view, accordingly, the handcuffing of

the applicant did not reach the threshold required by Article 3 of the

Convention.

     The applicant further contends that his handcuffing amounted to

an unjustified interference with his right to respect for his private

life, in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.

     It is true that the notion of "private life" within the meaning

of Article 8 para. 1 is a broad one and has been held to cover both the

physical and moral integrity of a person. On the other hand, it is also

established that not every act or measure which may be said to affect

adversely an individual's physical or moral integrity necessarily gives

rise to an interference with the right to respect for private life. In

its Costello-Roberts judgment of 25 March 1993 (Series A no. 247-C,

pp. 60-61, para. 36) the Court, in concluding that there had been no

violation of Article 8 of the Convention, noted that the disciplinary

measures taken against the applicant had not attained a level of

severity sufficient to bring it within the ambit of Article 3, "the

Convention Article which expressly deals with punishment and therefore

provides a first point of reference for examining a case concerning

disciplinary measures in a school". While the Court did not exclude the

possibility that there might be circumstances in which Article 8 could

be regarded as affording in relation to disciplinary measures a

protection which went beyond that given by Article 3, it concluded that

the treatment complained of had not entailed adverse effects for the

applicant's physical or moral integrity sufficient to bring it within

the scope of the prohibition contained in Article 8.

     While the present case concerns the physical treatment, rather

than punishment, of the applicant, we consider that the Court's

reasoning is germane and that Article 3 provides a first - and in our

view, the primary - point of reference for examining a complaint

concerning the treatment of a person on arrest by the police. Having

found that the treatment did not in the present case attain the level

of severity to amount to a breach of Article 3, we are also of the view

that it did not entail such adverse effects for the applicant's

physical or moral integrity as to amount to an interference with his

right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention.