PAEZ v. SwedenDISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. J-C. GEUS, JOINED BY MRS. J. LIDDY AND
Doc ref: • ECHR ID:
Document date: December 6, 1996
- Inbound citations: 0
- •
- Cited paragraphs: 0
- •
- Outbound citations: 0
DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. J-C. GEUS, JOINED BY MRS. J. LIDDY AND
MM. A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK, A. WEITZEL, I. BÉKÉS, J. MUCHA AND A. PERENIC
I have voted against the finding of the majority that the
applicant's expulsion to Peru would not violate Article 3 of the
Convention. My conclusion differs from that of the majority for the
reasons below.
It is true that the present applicant has not presented any warrant
of arrest or similar evidence showing that he would be wanted by the
Peruvian authorities. However, as there now appears to have been a
resurgence in the violent activities of Sendero Luminoso (para. 48), one
must take into account the effects which this may have on the treatment
of returning Peruvians suspected of participation in activities for the
benefit of that movement. In this connection I note a further report
released by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki in September 1996 - "Swedish
Asylum Policy in Global Human Rights Perspective (Vol. 8, No. 14 (D)) -
which states, inter alia, as follows:
"... Sweden has denied a number of credible asylum applications submitted in
the past few years by Peruvians. In many of these cases, the Swedish
authorities have recognised that the applicant was once a victim of
persecution in Peru. Nonetheless, citing recent reforms in Peru, the
applicants' acquittal by a Peruvian court, or their ability to obtain travel
documents, the Swedish authorities have concluded that they would not face
continued persecution if returned. But, as Human Rights Watch/Helsinki and
other human rights organisations have documented, recent reforms in Peru have
been minor: an acquittal does not protect Peruvians from harassment, arrest,
and retrial; and Peruvian travel documents may be easily obtained by bribing
the relevant officials. Peru's congress has voted to extend the regime of
'faceless courts' until October 1996, meaning that these courts are
continuing to prosecute civilians (p.27; footnotes omitted)."
Human Right Watch goes on to referring to three cases involving
Peruvians, including that of Mr. Aponte Inga (paras. 38 and 46 of the
Commission's Report) and Ms. Monica Castillo Paez (paras. 18 and 26 of
the Commission's Report):
"Aponte, ... left Peru to begin his studies in the Soviet Union in 1984,
where he remained until 1994. During this time, several of his family members
took part in public political activities in Peru. A brother ... took part in
protests against police abuses. His activities resulted in his arrest and
severe torture, followed by the arrest and torture of two younger brothers
... . Aponte's sister ... was accused of belonging to the Communist Party of
Peru - Shining Path and was killed while incarcerated in 1992. His other
siblings ... as well as his parents, fled Peru for Sweden, where they sought
asylum and received permission to stay, some as de facto refugees and others
on family reunification grounds. While in Europe, Aponte was accused by the
Peruvian Government of being a member of a Shining Path support network, a
charge Aponte denies. For this crime, Aponte was tried in absentia by one of
Peru's 'faceless courts', along with sixty-seven other people. Meanwhile, in
1994 Aponte travelled to Sweden to join his family and was subsequently
arrested there for being an illegal resident. At that time he applied for
asylum, arguing that he would face persecution if returned to Peru. His
asylum application was denied, and he was forcibly returned to Peru in
September 1994. Upon arrival at the airport in Lima, he was arrested and
charged with having been sympathetic to terrorist activities. He was
imprisoned for four months, during which he withstood beatings, torture,
shortages of food and medical care, and substandard living conditions. He was
eventually tried by a 'faceless court' and finally acquitted and released on
18 January 1995. Nonetheless, he continued to suffer harassment in Lima. The
police paid frequent visits to his home, and he had the impression of
constantly being followed. Fearing renewed persecution, he left Peru in March
1995, returned to Sweden, and reapplied for asylum. In November 1995, the
Immigration Board once again denied Aponte asylum, reasoning that because he
had ultimately been acquitted, he had nothing more to fear in Peru. In
support of this conclusion, the Immigration Board also noted that Aponte had
been able to obtain travel documents in order to return to Sweden. In July
1996, the Appeals Board reversed the decision of the Immigration Board and
granted Aponte permission to remain in Sweden, albeit with the status of a
'de facto refugee', not a convention refugee.
S.P.
S.P. went to Sweden in October 1991 and immediately applied for asylum. He
based his asylum claim on his fear that, if he returns to Peru, he risks
wrongful arrest on terrorism-related charges and the torture that accompanies
most such arrests in Peru. ... The Swedish authorities have denied three
consecutive applications for asylum filed by S.P. In initially denying him
asylum, the authorities discredited his claims of harassment by the Peruvian
security police, noting that the police had not given him any trouble going
through passport control on his way to Sweden. ... His third application was
denied, in part, because the Appeals Board believes that Peru's 'faceless
courts' no longer prosecute civilians. As previously noted, this decision
reflects a serious error regarding the current state of justice in Peru.
Monica Castillo Paez
Castillo went to Sweden in December 1990. Her brother, Ernesto Castillo Paez
had 'disappeared' in October of that year and is presumed dead. One of her
cousins [A; see para. 18] was killed in 1989. Security forces are suspected
in both cases. Her parents, still living in Peru, have received numerous
threats from people thought to be connected to the security forces. In the
months following her brother's disappearance, the police went to Castillo's
home on several occasions. Fearing the same fate as her brother, Castillo
fled to Sweden and sought asylum. The Swedish authorities denied her
application, finding insufficient grounds for asylum. In August 1993, she was
deported from Sweden. While changing planes in Amsterdam, she applied for
asylum there. The Dutch Government subsequently recognised her as a refugee
under the Refugee Convention (pp. 28-29; footnotes omitted)."
I also note the interest shown notably by Peruvian press in Sweden's
handling of asylum claims lodged by Peruvians. As noted also by the
majority of the Commission (para. 82), at least part of these asylum
seekers have been accused of being Sendero Luminoso "terrorists". I note,
in particular, the newspaper reports of 13 October 1995 and 14 May 1996
(paras. 29 and 33). In these reports the applicant is referred to as a
"terrorist", although there is no indication that he - or indeed any
member of his extended family - has been convicted or even charged with
such a crime. I consider that his treatment on his return to Peru is
likely to be affected negatively by these statements in the public
domain.
The respondent Government have referred to the possibility that the
applicant might be placed in a special detention centre under the
supervision of a public prosecutor where his risk of being tortured could
be limited significantly. I cannot find this argument sufficiently
convincing, as judging from the various evidence available to the
Commission there is still reason to believe that not all officers
particularly within the Peruvian anti-terrorist police respect the
prohibition of torture (cf. the above-mentioned Chahal judgment, paras.
106-107).
Nor can I find any indication that the respondent Government has
received - or even sought - assurances from the Peruvian Government as
to the applicant's fate on his return to Peru.
I also find it probable that the various proceedings which the
applicant himself and members of his extended family have instituted
outside Peru are being perceived negatively by representatives of
Peruvian authorities (see, e.g., paras. 49-50). This is a further element
to be taken into account when assessing whether the applicant would run
a "real risk" of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 on
his return to Peru.
I finally note the facts set out by the majority of the Commission
in paras. 76-78 of the Report. These relate, on the one hand, to the
applicant himself, to the killing and the disappearance of two of his
cousins as well as to the granting of refugee status to members of his
immediate and extended family (see also paras. 18, 20 and 26 in fine).
On the other hand, the facts noted by the majority also relate to the
general situation in Peru. All this information would seem to be of
decisive importance in evaluating the consequences of the applicant's
expulsion to that country.
In these exceptional circumstances I consider that the interest
shown by Peruvian press and presumably by the Peruvian authorities in the
applicant's fate rather than diminishing his risk of facing treatment
contrary to Article 3 has increased it to such an extent as to attain the
threshold set up by the notion of a "real risk" (cf. Eur. Court HR,
Chahal v. the United Kingdom judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-
I, p. ..., para. 106).
I am therefore of the opinion that sufficient evidence has been
adduced to establish substantial grounds for believing that the applicant
would be exposed to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the
Convention, if returned to Peru. Accordingly, his expulsion to Peru would
violate Article 3 of the Convention.
(Or. English)
LEXI - AI Legal Assistant
