SARKÖZY v. HUNGARYPARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MRS. THUNE, MRS. LIDDY, MR. BUSUTTIL, MR. BRATZA
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Document date: March 6, 1997
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PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MRS. THUNE, MRS. LIDDY, MR. BUSUTTIL, MR. BRATZA
AND MRS. HION
We have voted with the majority of the Commission on the main complaints
under Articles 3 and 8, but have been unable to agree that there has been no
violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 and Article 8
respectively. Accordingly we have voted against the conclusions in paragraph 125
and 130.
The applicant alleges that he did not have at his disposal an effective
remedy for his Article 3 complaint. The majority of the Commission, found that
the possibility to complain to the Public Prosecutors Office was sufficient in
the particular circumstances of this case.
We regret that we have not been convinced that this remedy is sufficiently
effective to comply with the requirements under Article 13 of the Convention.
Under S. 11(a) of Law V. of 1972 on the Public Prosecutor's Office, the
public prosecutor is empowered to supervise, inter alia, the lawfulness of the
conditions of detention, forced medical treatment and the execution of the
detention. Further, by S. 12 para. 1 of the Law it is provided, inter alia, that
the organs competent for the execution of sentences are required to comply with
the prosecutor's instructions "ensuring respect for the law".
The majority of the Commission acknowledge - rightly, in our view - that
the possibility of recourse to the competent public prosecutor is in the
relevant legal texts couched in vague terms. In particular, it is unclear
whether there is a duty to investigate such individual complaints and whether a
complainant is entitled as of right to a decision in his or her individual case.
Recalling the vulnerable position of detainees, we consider that clarity
as regards their legal position is essential. It must be the responsibility of
the Contracting States to ensure that the applicable rules are precise and clear
as to the possibility to complain and the procedure to follow.
In addition, we have doubts as to the scope of the powers of the public
prosecutor to issue binding instructions to the relevant prison authorities. It
is true that in the present case the applicant had recourse to the public
prosecutor and received a reasoned decision rejecting his complaint. However, we
note that his complaint to the prosecutor did not relate to general prison
conditions but to specific allegations of ill-treatment in prison.
The complaints set out in the decision of admissibility concerning
conditions of detention and control of correspondence relate to alleged
structural deficiencies within the prison for which in our view an application
to the public prosecutor would appear to afford no obvious remedy within the
meaning of Article 13.
The applicant has exemplified his problems by stating that the activities
out of the wards were only possible "as special rewards". He liked reading and
sport but these possibilities were restricted for him on the stated ground that
"it is better if such a man does not read". The Government has not disputed the
assertions.
It appears therefore that an award system, with all its risks of
arbitrariness and favouritism, operated within the prison rather than a system
of disciplinary measures to deprive a prisoner of a privilege or right because
of the prisoner's verifiable misconduct and following appropriate procedures.
There is no evidence as to how the remedies relied on by the majority could
resolve such structural problems. In particular, in the absence of any prison
records regarding receipt and transmission of the applicant's mail, it is
difficult to see how complaints to the National Headquarters of Penal
Institutions or the competent Public Prosecutor's Office could have been
effective. It would appear that any changes in the structural organisation of
prisons, probably with financial and personnel implications, were primarily a
matter for the Minister for Justice and his or her Government colleagues to
decide on. In these circumstances, the only effective remedy would appear to be
a Court Order establishing the prisoner's rights and engendering appropriate
administrative or legal consequences. Article 70/K of the Constitution has not
been shown to be effective in this respect, for the reasons given in para. 119
of the Report.
Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 13.
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